Spellens v. Spellens

• Decision Date: 30 October 1957
• Citation: Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal.2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1957)
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Annelen SPELLENS, Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. Sol Carl SPELLENS et al., Defendants. Sol Carl Spellens, Melvin Spellens, National Paint & Varnish Company, a co- partnership, E. W. Biscailuz, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, and Roy L Carter, Marshall of Los Angeles County, Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, and five other cases. Sol Carl SPELLENS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Annelen SPELLENS, Defendant and Respondent. L. A. 23683-23685, 22553, 23135, 23180, 23717.

Page 613

317 P.2d 613

49 Cal.2d 210

Annelen SPELLENS, Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. Sol Carl SPELLENS et al., Defendants.

Sol Carl Spellens, Melvin Spellens, National Paint & Varnish Company, a co- partnership, E. W. Biscailuz, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, and Roy L Carter, Marshall of Los Angeles County, Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, and five other cases.

Sol Carl SPELLENS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Annelen SPELLENS, Defendant and Respondent.

L. A. 23683-23685, 22553, 23135, 23180, 23717.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 30, 1957.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 26, 1957.

Leonard Horwin and Richard I. M. Kelton, Beverly Hills, for appellant Annelen Spellens.

Reynolds, Painter & Cherniss, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Isaac Pacht, Stuart L. Kadison, Harvey M. Grossman, Los Angeles, and Ellis J. Horvitz, Beverly Hills, for appellant Sol Carl Spellens.

CARTER, Justice.

Plaintiff, married to Robert, Seymon, had marital difficulties because of Robert's conduct; there were two children of the marriage. While this condition existed and she was considering divorce, defendant, Sol Spellens, told her he was in love with her and wanted to marry her. He was an old family friend of substantial wealth with extensive business experience and represented that he had had wide legal experience. He said he was aware of plaintiff's marital problems and that she was entitled to a divorce. He promised that when she divorced Robert he would marry her, take care of her and her children and make her a partner in all of his property. She still tried to save her marriage with Robert but was unsuccessful. In January, 1951, she decided to divorce Robert and defendant arranged for an attorney to represent her and provided funds therefor. She commenced an action for divorce the next month, based on extreme cruelty. After the commencement of the action, defendant conferred with Robert about a property settlement and advised plaintiff to waive her rights to any community property and all but a nominal $1.00 per month alimony. This she did, and defendant again made the same promises he had made before. Plaintiff obtained an interlocutory divorce decree on March 13, 1951, and defendant represented that upon the granting of the interlocutory decree he and plaintiff could be legally married in Mexico and the marriage would be valid anywhere. He took her to Mexico where he obtained an attorney who gave the same advice. Four days after the interlocutory decree, plaintiff and defendant returned to Mexico and saw the same attorney who was shown the decree and confirmed his former advice. As a result of this advice plaintiff and defendant were married in Mexico by the attorney, and they began living together as husband and wife with plaintiff's children as part of the family. Plaintiff became pregnant by defendant in 1951 and had a miscarriage. During the time they lived together defendant was extremely cruel to plaintiff, and in March, 1952, defendant suggested they separate, to which plaintiff objected, but defendant said he had been advised they were not legally married. Plaintiff consulted an attorney and was advised that the validity of her marriage lay in the field of unsettled law, but he thought defendant would be estopped to assert its invalidity. Plaintiff thereupon commenced her action (hereinafter called main action) on March 24, 1952. The parties separated for a brief period but then lived together until defendant left her in September, 1952.

In an amended complaint plaintiff asked that her marriage be declared valid, that defendant be estopped to question its validity, and for separate maintenance, or, in the alternative, if the marriage was found invalid, damages because of defendant's fraudulent representations and promises and an award of the 'community property' (that property accumulated while they were purportedly married). Plaintiff filed amendments and supplements to her complaint, adding other causes of action, and after an adverse determination by the court as to some of them, a second amended complaint for damages for fraud was filed. She sought a division of the community property and to be appointed guardian ad litem for her children and an allowance for their support on the theory of putative spouse. Defendant made general denials and asserted as an affirmative defense that the marriage was void as being after the entry of an interlocutory decree but before the entry of a final decree of divorce and asked that it be declared invalid.

The case was finally tried after various motions for support and attorney's fees hereinafter mentioned. The court in its findings recited that defendant raised the issue of the validity of the marriage and by stipulation plaintiff was to make an offer of proof thereon and on the pleadings and the offer the court should decide that issue and determine whether defendant was estopped to deny its validity, as though such issues had arisen through an objection by defendant to the introduction of any evidence by plaintiff; all facts pleaded and set forth in the offer of proof were to be taken as true on those issues, hence the question presented was one of law. Also involved was the question of whether plaintiff could recover on the agreement of defendant that he would validly marry plaintiff, share his property with her and care for plaintiff and her children if she married him. The court sustained the objection to the introduction of any evidence on those issues; the court then found the facts true on those issues; in its conclusion of law it determined that the marriage was invalid and no estoppel could exist. It also determined that the 'agreement' was invalid as promotive of divorce. It granted plaintiff permission to file her second amended complaint. The trial proceeded, and the court granted a nonsuit as to the first and third causes of action in the second amended complaint which was for damages for defendant's fraudulent representations and plaintiff's reliance thereon to her injury and also for the reliance by herself and children on the misrepresentations of defendant as to their support and maintenance, holding as a matter of law that there could be no recovery for such fraud. The court then found that plaintiff and defendant were well acquainted since 1947 and went through a marriage ceremony in Mexico and from March 17, 1951, to September 22, 1952, they resided together as husband and wife and plaintiff in good faith believed the marriage valid; that plaintiff would testify that her marriage with Robert had failed; that plaintiff was of limited business and no legal experience but defendant claimed much legal experience; that plaintiff trusted and had great confidence in defendant which was fostered by him; that defendant made the representations to plaintiff heretofore referred to in the statement of facts and intended that plaintiff rely thereon and plaintiff relied thereon, marrying defendant, living with him as a wife and having her children reside with them; that defendant represented to friends, relatives and others that they were married; that after the commencement of the action herein the same conditions continued to exist except that defendant represented to the court that the marriage was invalid; that during all of said time defendant knew the marriage was invalid and intended it that way which facts were known exclusively by him; that plaintiff and defendant was not legally married because of the lack of a final decree of divorce; that defendant treated plaintiff with extreme cruelty to her physical and mental prejudice; that during the time plaintiff rendered valuable services to defendant in the belief that she was his wife, and during said time defendant earned $58,574 out of a total income of $79,244; that 'by analogy to the community property laws of the State * * * the residue of the sums earned by * * * defendant * * * as the result of his own efforts during the period commencing March 17, 1951, and ending September 22, 1952, after deducting money spent by way of quasi-community expense, is * * * $10,052.00 * * * that included in said quasi-community expense and, therefore, deducted by the Court in arriving at the balance of quasi-community income on hand, is * * * $7,200.00 * * * which was expended by the defendant * * * during said period in the support of plaintiff's aforesaid minor children. * * *'

Accordingly judgment was entered determining the marriage to be invalid; that no estoppel existed and no damages were recoverable ¹ for defendant's fraud; that plaintiff was the putative wife of defendant from March 17, 1951, to September 22, 1952; that by reason of the latter fact and defendant's cruelty, plaintiff was entitled to all the 'community' property (that earned during the mentioned period), plus $10,052, the balance of the 'quasi-community property after deduction of quasi-community expense'; that plaintiff may not recover her attorney's fees incurred in the action; that plaintiff should not recover on the other issues disposed of on stipulation and objection to her evidence. Both plaintiff and defendant appeal from the portions of the judgment unfavorable to each of them.

After commencing her action plaintiff had an order to show cause issued why she should not be allowed counsel fees, costs and support money pendente lite. The court denied any allowance on the ground that there was no valid marriage. She appeals from that order of denial. She also asked for the same allowances pending her appeal from that order and was allowed attorney's fees on appeal but no support. She appeals from the portion of that order denying her an allowance for support. Defendant's motion to set aside the order fixing counsel fees was denied and he appeals from that order.

Plaintiff contends that the defendant was estopped to deny the validity of the Mexican marriage or, stated another way, that he was...