Spelman v. Gold Coin Min. & Mill. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 November 1901 |
| Citation | 66 P. 597,26 Mont. 76 |
| Parties | SPELMAN v. GOLD COIN MIN. & MILL. CO. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from district court, Deer Lodge county; Theodore Brantly Judge.
Action by J. F. Spelman against the Gold Coin Mining & Milling Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
O'Leary & Maiden, for appellant.
J. R Boarman, for respondent.
This was an action to recover judgment for the reasonable value of services alleged to have been rendered by the plaintiff and one McKenzie, as physicians and surgeons, at the special instance and request of the defendant, a corporation organized for the purpose of mining, and engaged in that business, in the county of Deer Lodge, Mont. The defendant denied that it ever employed the plaintiff or McKenzie, and traversed the allegation of the complaint touching the reasonable value of the services. The evidence disclosed or tended to show the existence of the following facts: One Shafner was the president of the defendant, one Loomis its secretary and general manager, and one Beaton its assistant manager and foreman. On January 13, 1898, Beaton and two other employé of the defendant were injured by the explosion of a blast in the Gold Coin mine, owned by the defendant, and in which they were then working. On the same day the men were taken to a hospital in Anaconda, where they received at the hands of the plaintiff and McKenzie medical and surgical attendance and treatment for several months. The hospital had no contract with the defendant, nor were there any relations between it and the defendant. The plaintiff was surgeon to the hospital. After the first examination of the men, the plaintiff suggested to Beaton the employment of a specialist in diseases of the eye, and that it would be well to call in one Grigg. To this Beaton assented, saying that the defendant would pay all the expenses incident to the treatment of himself and of the other men. Thereupon the plaintiff called in Grigg, who gave to the eyes of the men such attention as was necessary. On the 14th, which was the day after the accident, Loomis telegraphed to the plaintiff to spare no expense in giving Beaton the best possible nursing and attention, and, if the other men who had been injured needed surgical and hospital treatment, to provide it, and he would pay all the expenses. Thereafter, and while the plaintiff was professionally attending Beaton and his companions, Loomis orally assured the plaintiff and McKenzie that the defendant would pay them. McKenzie assigned his account to the plaintiff. Grigg's bill for the services rendered by him was paid in part by Beaton, and in part by a check on some part of which appeared the name of the defendant, Grigg testifying that he did not know where the name of the defendant appeared thereon, but it was his "impression that it was signed by the Gold Coin Mining Company, per some one else's order." On motion of the defendant, the court granted a nonsuit, for the reason that no authority had been shown in either Loomis or Beaton to employ the plaintiff or McKenzie on behalf of the defendant, to attend the men injured; that the evidence did not show that the employment of the plaintiff or his assignor came within the scope of the authority of either Loomis of Beaton; and that, therefore the plaintiff failed to show the liability of the defendant. The order granting the motion was followed by a judgment in favor of the defendant, from which, and from an order refusing a new trial, the plaintiff appeals.
Several errors are specified, but the question presented by the order granting the nonsuit is the only one that requires consideration. The plaintiff contends that Loomis, the general manager of the defendant, was, by virtue of his office, empowered to employ the plaintiff and McKenzie in the name of his principal, and to bind it by his promise to pay them. He insists that authority to employ physicians and surgeons to attend upon miners injured while engaged in working for the defendant was impliedly delegated to Loomis by his appointment to the office of general manager, and that neither express authority nor subsequent ratification by the company need be shown, and that the defendant paid a part of Grigg's bill, there by ratifying the employment of the plaintiff. It is argued that Loomis, in his capacity of secretary and general manager of the defendant, was its representative, and in the transaction of its ordinary affairs might do whatever the corporation could do within the scope of its powers, and that the general manager of a mining company must necessarily receive full power to act for the company in all emergencies. In short, the contention is that the law presumes the general manager of a mining corporation to be clothed with the power which Loomis attempted to exercise, and that courts must take judicial notice of such power.
A principal is bound only by the authorized acts of his agent, and prior authority or subsequent ratification must be shown in order to render the principal answerable ex contractu for the conduct of his agent, The agent's authority may be either express or implied, but the act done or the promise made by the agent must be within the powers expressly or impliedly delegated to him. Though the act was not authorized at the time it was done, it may be ratified subsequently by a competent principal. Powers of the agent cannot be enlarged by his unauthorized representations or promises. The principal is bound, however, by the acts of the agent, who is held out by him as possessing authority to do the act which he does. In such case his acts are the principal's when done under such apparent authority, and the principal is estopped to deny the agent's authority when the person dealing with the agent relied upon the holding out. The implication of a promise, on the part of one who requests the performance of medical or surgical services for another, to pay for them, does not arise "unless the relation of the person making the request to the patient is such as raises a legal obligation on his part to call in a physician and pay for the services." Meisenbach v. Cooperage Co., 45 Mo.App. 232; Boyd v. Sappington, 4 Watts, 247; Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N.Y. 256. To make him liable, there must be an express promise or engagement to pay by the one who called in the surgeon or by his authorized agent. These general rules are applicable to corporations as well as to natural persons. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 21 Mont. 539, 52 P. 375; Trent v. Sherlock, 24 Mont. 255, 61 P. 650. Both alike are bound by the acts of their agents done within the scope of the authority ostensibly delegated.
In the case at bar certain employés of the defendant, while working in its mine, were injured by the explosion of a blast. It does not appear that the company was in any wise at fault the employment of the plaintiff by Beaton and Loomis, who assumed to act in the name of the company, being of itself no evidence that the defendant was negligent, or that in their opinion it was responsible for the accident. The men were removed to a hospital, with which the defendant had no connection or contract whatever, and were there treated by physicians and surgeons, to whom the general manager of the defendant made promises to the effect that the defendant would pay them. There was nothing tending to...
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