Spence v. Straw

• Decision Date: 27 March 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 94-1866 and 94-1916,s. 94-1866 and 94-1916
• Citation: 54 F.3d 196
• Parties: 4 A.D. Cases 528, 11 A.D.D. 404, 6 NDLR P 303 Kevin SPENCE, Appellant, v. Edward STRAW, Admiral, Director of the Defense Logistics Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense, Appellee. . Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 196

54 F.3d 196

4 A.D. Cases 528, 11 A.D.D. 404, 6

NDLR P 303

Kevin SPENCE, Appellant, v. Edward STRAW, Admiral, Director of the Defense Logistics Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense, Appellee.

Nos. 94-1866 and 94-1916.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 27, 1995.

May 10, 1995.

Alan B. Epstein, Jablon, Epstein, Wolf & Drucker, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant.

Richard Mentzinger, Jr., Karen E. Rompala, Office of the U.S. Atty., Philadelphia, PA, for appellee.

BEFORE: MANSMANN, COWEN and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

In this case we are required to evaluate whether a party suing under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, is required to exhaust administrative remedies provided in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16, and whether suit under the Rehabilitation Act--with prior exhaustion of remedies--is the exclusive means by which a plaintiff may raise claims against federal agencies relating to handicap discrimination. Concluding that the answer to both of these questions is yes, we will affirm the district court in most respects, while modifying the court's judgment to conform to our analysis.

I.

Because this case comes to us upon grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.1977). According to the recitations in the amended complaint, the following facts comprise this dispute.

In early 1992, Kevin Spence applied to the Defense Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense ("DLA") for the position of "Sewing Machine Operator (Single Needle)." He passed the DLA's competency examination with a score of 85. The DLA promptly provided Spence with a Notice of Rating, which confirmed his score and declared him eligible for the sewing machine operator position. On April 23, 1992 Spence passed the physical examination required for hire. After passing another performance examination on June 2, 1992, Spence was notified by the DLA that he had "been tentatively selected for a permanent position of Sewing Machine Operator, W-3."

However, on June 24, 1992 Spence was required to take an eye examination, and he failed. The test showed that his approximate vision in both eyes was 20/50, and the DLA required sewing machine operators to have at least 20/20 vision in one eye and 20/40 in the other. Because he had failed the eye examination, Spence was informed that the DLA had rescinded his selection as a sewing machine operator.

Spence filed a pro se complaint against the DLA in June 1992. The DLA moved to dismiss that complaint, but that motion was denied because the DLA had not served counsel which had been appointed to assist Spence. When a second motion to dismiss was properly filed and served, the pro se complaint was dismissed without prejudice in March 1994 on the ground that it did not with specificity set forth a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court noted, however, that new counsel had recently been appointed for Spence, and that it was likely that this counsel would be able to set forth Spence's concerns in a manner providing adequate notice to the DLA of the nature of plaintiff's claims. Thus, Spence's new counsel was allowed 30 days to file an amended complaint.

This was done. In the amended complaint, from which our factual recitation is gleaned, Spence sued Admiral Edward Straw ("Straw"), Director of the DLA, in his official and individual capacities, premising jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. Having provided the factual allegations described above, Spence contended in his amended complaint that those facts stated two causes of action. Count One alleged that Spence was a handicapped individual as defined under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and that he was denied employment as a sewing machine operator solely because of his slight vision handicap. Spence contended that the DLA's vision requirements were not reasonably related to the sewing machine operator position, and that even if they were, Spence could perform the job with a slight and reasonable accommodation on the part of the DLA, which would not unduly burden that agency. By failing to hire Spence because of his handicap, Spence contended, the DLA had violated section 504.

Count Two of the amended complaint alleged that the DLA denied Spence equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by singling him out and unnecessarily differentiating him because of his vision handicap. Furthermore, Spence contended, the DLA's actions were arbitrary and irrational, because Spence had passed the requisite performance test showing that he could perform the job of sewing machine operator.

Straw filed a motion for summary judgment upon and dismissal of the amended complaint on two grounds: (1) Spence failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his claim in Count One under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prior to filing suit, and the amended complaint is now time-barred; and (2) Spence's constitutional claim in Count Two should be dismissed because the Rehabilitation Act provides exclusive, preemptive remedies for a plaintiff pursuing handicap discrimination claims. The district court agreed, and in a memorandum and order filed in August 1994, the district court granted Straw's motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice (and dismissed the motion for summary judgment as moot). Spence timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction of the district court's final order under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

II.

We exercise plenary review over a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1993). Accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint (D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir.1992)), the relevant inquiry is whether under any reasonable interpretation of those allegations the plaintiff may be entitled to relief (Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir.1993)). We apply this standard to both of the district court's central holdings below, first discussing exhaustion of remedies prior to suing for violation of section 504, and then turning to the question of whether the Rehabilitation Act provides the exclusive means of raising allegations of discrimination on the basis of handicap by federal agencies.

A.

1.

Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in part "to promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in employment." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 701(8) (1976). The Rehabilitation Act approached this goal in a number of ways, but one strategy focused on prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped by the federal government, federal contractors and other recipients of federal funds.

As originally drafted the Rehabilitation Act required federal agencies to submit affirmative action plans for handicapped individuals (section 501(b), codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 791(b)), required federal contractors to include in their contracts provisions mandating that the contractor would take affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals (section 503, codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 793), and stated with respect to recipients of federal funds that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (section 504, codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794). However, as originally drafted the Rehabilitation Act did not explicitly permit handicapped individuals to bring claims for violations of its provisions.

Congress filled this gap in 1978, with the Senate and House adding different language to what became the Rehabilitation Act amendments of that year. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 301-04 (5th Cir.1981) (discussing 1978 amendment process in detail). The Senate's contribution focused on provision of a new section in the Rehabilitation Act--section 505, codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a. That provision stated in section 505(a)(1) that

[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) [Title VII], including the application of sections 706(f) through 706(k) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) through (k)), shall be available with respect to any complaint under [29 U.S.C.] section 791 [Rehabilitation Act section 501] of this title....

Section 505(a)(1), codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(a)(1).

Section 505(a)(2), in turn, provided a private cause of action for handicapped individuals against providers and recipients of federal assistance, stating:

The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under [29 U.S.C.] section 794 of this title [Rehabilitation Act section 504].

Section 505(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(a)(2).

At the same time the Senate was focusing on new section 505, the House "extended section 504's proscription against handicap discrimination to 'any program or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service....' " Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 302. In short,

by its 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, Congress clearly recognized both in section 501 and in section 504 that individuals now have a private cause of action to obtain relief for handicap discrimination on the part of the federal government and its agencies. The...