Spencer v. Ault
| Decision Date | 27 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C 95-4015-MWB.,C 95-4015-MWB. |
| Citation | 941 F.Supp. 832 |
| Parties | Joseph Nelson SPENCER, Jr., Petitioner, v. John AULT, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
B. John Burns, Des Moines, Iowa for Petitioner Joseph Nelson Spencer, Jr.
Assistant Iowa Attorney General Thomas D. McGrane, Iowa Attorney General's Office, Des Moines, Iowa, for Respondent John Ault.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............................................ 834
II. FINDINGS OF FACT ....................................................... 836
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ..................................................... 839
A. The Sixth Amendment Right To Self-Representation .................... 839
1. Nature of the right .............................................. 839
2. Assertion and waiver ............................................. 840
3. "Standby counsel" ................................................ 841
4. Impact of denial of the right .................................... 841
B. Spencer's Right To Self-Representation .............................. 842
1. Invocation of the right to self-representation ................... 842
a. The record .................................................... 842
b. Conclusions from the record ................................... 843
i. The trial court's inquiry .................................. 843
ii. Spencer's statements ...................................... 845
c. The state trial court's rationale ............................. 846
2. Appointment of counsel ........................................... 847
a. The record on appointment of counsel .......................... 848
b. Conclusions from the record ................................... 849
3. Waiver of the right to self-representation ....................... 850
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 853
Invoking the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus,1 a prisoner in state custody asserts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself in his state court criminal proceedings. When confronted with a similar contention, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed, "A trial court evaluating a defendant's request to represent himself must `traverse ... a thin line' between improperly allowing the defendant to proceed pro se, thereby violating his right to counsel, and improperly having the defendant proceed with counsel, thereby violating his right to self-representation."2 In determining whether the trial court in petitioner's case successfully traversed this "thin line," or instead strayed from it, this court finds it must decide three issues. The threshold issue is whether the petitioner clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment in his state court criminal proceedings. If the court finds that the petitioner did indeed make such a demand to represent himself, then the court must consider two further questions. They are, first, whether the state trial properly appointed only "standby counsel" to assist the petitioner with his defense, and, second, whether the petitioner then waived his right to self-representation by acquiescing in the actions of his standby counsel.
Petitioner Joseph Nelson Spencer, Jr., an inmate at the North Central Correctional Facility (NCCF) in Rockwell City, Iowa, filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 27, 1995,3 challenging his conviction in state court nearly three years before on drug and weapons charges. The respondent is John Ault, the warden of NCCF. Spencer contends that he is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution, because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself in his state court criminal proceedings.
On August 20, 1990, the State of Iowa filed four separate trial informations against Spencer in the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Iowa. Spencer was charged with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture in violation of Iowa Code § 204.401(1)(b), one count of possession of a schedule I controlled substance (marijuana) in violation of Iowa Code § 204.401(3), one count of possession of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of Iowa Code § 204.401(3), and one count of unauthorized possession of dangerous weapons in violation of Iowa Code § 724.3. The trial court granted the State's motion to join the four charges for a single trial, and the case proceeded to jury trial on May 12, 1992. On May 15, 1992, Spencer was convicted on all counts. On November 2, 1992, Spencer was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of up to five years for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, up to five years for possession of offensive weapons, one year for possession of cocaine, and six months for possession of marijuana. All sentences were to run concurrently.
Spencer timely appealed his conviction, inter alia, on the ground that the trial court erred in denying his request to proceed pro se. On January 25, 1994, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed Spencer's conviction in an unpublished 2-to-1 decision. See State v. Spencer, No. 92-1887 (Iowa Ct.App. Jan. 25, 1994). Upon further review, in a split 5-to-4 decision, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals. See State v. Spencer, 519 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 548 (1994). Over the thoughtful and vigorous dissent of Justice Lavorato, the Iowa Supreme Court held that Spencer did not make a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation, that "[t]he intent behind the appointment [of counsel] ... was to provide Spencer with `standby counsel' as envisioned in Faretta and McKaskle [v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)]," and that Spencer subsequently acquiesced in full representation by appointed counsel. Id. at 358-60.
Because of his unsuccessful appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, Spencer had exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 before filing the present action for habeas corpus relief. Spencer therefore filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court on February 27, 1996. Spencer seeks relief on just one ground: He contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court's appointment of counsel over his request to represent himself. In his resistance to Spencer's petition, the respondent points out that the Iowa courts have made factual findings that Spencer did not make a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation, that the appointment of counsel was for the purpose of providing "standby counsel," and that Spencer subsequently acquiesced in full representation by appointed counsel. The respondent asserts that these factual findings are correct and that, based on these findings, Spencer's right to self-representation was not denied.4
On September 19, 1996, this court held oral argument on Spencer's petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner Joseph Nelson Spencer, Jr., was represented by B. John Burns, Des Moines, Iowa. Respondent John Ault was represented by Assistant Iowa Attorney General Thomas D. McGrane. This matter is now fully submitted.
State court findings of fact are presumed to be correct in federal habeas corpus proceedings unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).5 Thus, to the extent this court finds that Spencer has not challenged the factual findings of the state courts, or has failed to rebut the presumption of the correctness of the state courts' findings, the following findings of fact are based on findings of the Iowa courts.
On July 18, 1990, Monona County Sheriff Dennis Smith went to Spencer's rural home to investigate complaints from neighbors that Spencer was discharging firearms on his property. While at Spencer's house, Sheriff Smith observed marijuana growing in Spencer's garden. After obtaining a search warrant marijuana plants, cocaine, and several firearms were seized from Spencer's premises. On August 20, 1990, trial informations were filed charging Spencer with possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, unauthorized possession of firearms, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana. Spencer privately retained attorney Richard Mock of Onawa, Iowa, to represent him and pleaded not guilty to all four charges. Attorney Mock filed a motion to suppress drugs and weapons seized during the execution of the search warrant. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court overruled the motion. A trial date was then set. On May 17, 1991, a few days before trial, attorney Mock moved to withdraw from his representation of Spencer. During the hearing on attorney Mock's motion to withdraw, the following colloquy occurred between the court and Spencer:
The court: The question is now, do you have confidence in him to defend you in the trial? That's the statement he's made.
Spencer: Well, I guess not, Your Honor.
The court: Do you agree to his withdrawal? Do you want to get another attorney or do you want to go to trial tomorrow with him?
Spencer: I feel I would be better off defending myself, Your Honor. He doesn't want to listen to what I'm telling him.
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