Spencer v. Chesapeake Paperboard Co.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1946
• Docket Number: 138.
• Parties: SPENCER v. CHESAPEAKE PAPERBOARD CO. et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

47 A.2d 385

186 Md. 522

SPENCER v. CHESAPEAKE PAPERBOARD CO. et al.

No. 138.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 17, 1946

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; John T. Tucker, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by William Spencer claimant, opposed by the Chesapeake Paperboard Company employer, and the AEtna Casualty & Surety Company, insurer. From a judgment for the employer and insurer on appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission disallowing the claim, claimant appeals.

Reversed and judgment entered reversing the Commission's decision.

Albert A. Levin and Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., both of Baltimore, for appellant.

Rignal W. Baldwin and David R. Owen, both of Baltimore (Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, of Baltimore, on the brief) for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON and HENDERSON, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

William Spencer, of Baltimore, a laborer, 45 years old, is claiming workmen's compensation for burns received by him in the factory of Chesapeake Paperboard Company on the morning of December 2, 1944. His claim was disallowed by the State Industrial Accident Commission on the ground that his injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. When his case was heard on appeal in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the jury found that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of his employment; but the trial judge entered judgment n. o. v. in favor of the employer and its insurer, AEtna Casualty and Surety Company.

When claimant reported at the factory on December 1, 1944, at 7 p. m., he was put to work at a finishing machine, but several hours later was transferred to a beater machine, where several other men were working. He testified in the court below that after the beater was filled he would rest, and occasionally doze off in the drying room, where it was warm, before returning to refill it. After midnight he sat on a box, and later lay down on some paper, in the drying room about 100 feet away. The superintendent testified that claimant did not fill the beater more than once and disappeared after 1 a. m., while the assistant superintendent testified that he could not recall where claimant was after midnight; but claimant testified that he helped to fill the beater approximately 15 times after midnight, and that when he sat down in the dryer room to rest for the last time about 5, he fell asleep, and was waked up by his pants being on fire about 5:30. It is conceded that he did not take off his working clothes until 6, and that he punched the clock card at 6:45.

The Workmen's Compensation Act of Maryland provides for the payment of compensation for disability or death of an employee resulting from an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury, except where the injury is occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or another, or where the injury results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty. Code 1939, art. 101, sec. 14. The Act expressly provides that no employee or dependent of an employee shall be entitled to receive any compensation on account of any injury to, or death of, an employee caused by self-inflicted injury, the wilful misconduct, or where the injury or death resulted solely from the intoxication of the injured employee. Code 1939, art. 101,§ 58. We hold that an injury to an employee arises out of his employment if it results from the nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment. Whether an accident is so related or incident to the employment depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. No exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every case. Baltimore Dry Docks & Shipbuilding Co. v. Webster, 139 Md. 616, 626, 116 A. 842; State Roads Commission v. Reynolds, 164 Md. 539, 546, 165 A. 475; Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 262 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L.Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532. Upon the hearing of an appeal from a decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission, the Court, upon motion of either party, is required to submit to a jury the question of fact involved in the case. Code 1939, art. 101, § 70. When any case is tried before a jury on appeal from a decision of the Commission, it is for the jury to determine the question of fact presented, and the trial judge has no right to control the exercise of the jury's function to weigh the credibility of the evidence. Jewel Tea Co. v. Weber, 132 Md. 178, 182, 103 A. 476. The trial judge, in determining whether a verdict should be directed in favor of the employer on such an appeal, must assume the truth of the evidence presented by the claimant. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. De Mario, 164 Md. 272, 277, 164 A. 748. On the present appeal from the trial court, the Court of Appeals has no occasion to decide whether the injury sustained by the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment; our duty is merely to decide whether it was proper for the trial judge, upon the evidence presented, to submit the question to the jury for their decision. Todd v. Easton Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352, 359, 128 A. 42.

The law is entirely clear that an employee's injury may arise out of and in the course of his employment although he may not be actually working at the time, if he is exposed to risks which are incident to the doing of the employer's work. Boteler v. Gardiner-Buick Co., 164 Md. 478, 165 A 611. For instance, in Southern Can Co. v. Sachs, 149 Md. 562, 131 A. 760, 43 A.L.R. 417, where an employee in a factory in Baltimore was found unconscious at the bottom of the stairway to the second floor of the factory, the Court held that, although when last seen he was resting in a room on the second floor, where employees were not ordinarily permitted to go, the question whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment was for the jury, because he might have gone to the second floor for a proper purpose and he could not have returned to his work except by using the stairway. Likewise, in the case of the Globe Newspaper Company, of Boston, where it was the custom of the employees to leave the composing room in hot weather to go on the roof for fresh air, and one of the compositors fell off the roof, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the...