Spencer v. City of Casey
| Decision Date | 18 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO: 2:19-CV-100-RMP,: 2:19-CV-100-RMP |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
| Parties | QUANAH M. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SPOKANE, a municipal corporation in and for the State of Washington; GREGORY PAUL LEBSOCK, in his individual and official capacities; SPOKANE COUNTY, a municipal corporation and political subdivision of the State of Washington; and CASEY A. EVANS, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
BEFORE THE COURT are Defendant Lebsock and City of Spokane's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, and Defendant Evans and Spokane County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 21. In Plaintiff Spencer's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, he moved for a continuance of the Court's consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). The Court considers that motion as well. A hearing on these matters was held on September 13, 2019, and all parties were present and represented. The Court has considered the record, the pleadings, counsels' oral argument, and is fully informed.
In 2017, Quanah Spencer and his wife Gwen Spencer filed a consumer protection lawsuit regarding property they had purchased in Spokane against SAS Oregon, LLC and former employees of the Spokane Police Department. ECF No. 22-2 at 2; ECF No. 1 at 10. Attorney Aaron Kandratowicz represented them. See id. The Spencers did not prevail in their lawsuit, and the court ordered garnishment of Mr. Spencer's wages to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees in the amount of $37,102.50. ECF No. 22-2 at 2. Mr. Spencer's employer, Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), was notified of the garnishment through a writ.
However, after the writ of garnishment was entered, the Spencers' attorney, Mr. Kandratowicz, told the Spencers that he had obtained an order for a permanent injunction of the order of garnishment, shielding Mr. Spencer from further wage garnishment. See ECF No. 1 at 9. In truth, the court had issued no such order. Mr. Kandratowicz was charged with forging the order and eventually pleaded guilty to the charge. See ECF No. 1 at 23. Upon learning of the purported injunction, Mr. Spencer used his credit card at a UPS store to fax the order to his employer, BNSF. See id.; ECF No. 22-2 at 4. BNSF stopped garnishing his wages after receiving theforged order. Id. at 3. Fifteen months later, counsel for SAS Oregon discovered the purported injunction and contacted Mr. Kandratowicz and the court. Id. Mr. Kandratowicz did not respond to counsel's communications, nor did he appear at a show cause hearing set for November 20, 2017, regarding the purported injunction. See ECF No. 1 at 11.
The court notified the City of Spokane Police Department (SPD), which promptly initiated an investigation regarding who had forged the order. SPD assigned Defendant Lebsock to investigate the case. See ECF No. 22-2. On January 5, 2018, Officer Lebsock submitted an Affidavit of Facts, setting out facts to support probable cause as to Mr. Spencer, and requesting a warrant for Mr. Spencer's arrest. ECF No. 22-2. A warrant was issued that same day for Mr. Spencer's arrest. ECF No. 22-3. Mr. Spencer was living in Missoula, Montana at the time.
In his Affidavit of Facts, Defendant Lebsock laid out facts to support probable cause for a forgery charge against Mr. Spencer. ECF No. 22-2 at 1, 8. Officer Lebsock's investigation revealed that Mr. Spencer had used his credit card to fax the forged order to his employer. Id. Detective Lebsock's Affidavit of Facts did not mention that Mr. Kandratowicz was a person of interest or a target for further investigation even though Mr. Kandratowicz had failed to appear at a show cause hearing regarding the forged order several weeks earlier. ECF No. 1 at 13-14.However, Officer Lebsock did note that the forged order was marked with the stamp of Mr. Kandratowicz's law firm. See ECF No. 22-2 at 4.
In addition to Officer Lebsock's Affidavit of Facts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA) Evans submitted a "Certificate" in support of the arrest warrant. The Certificate states that "there exists good cause to issue a direct warrant for the immediate arrest of the defendant." ECF No. 22-4 at 1. It also provides supporting reasons, which include: (1) the nature of the allegations; (2) "the defendant's multi-state business dealings between Washington and Montana and the potential risk for the defendant to seek refuge outside the state of Washington"; (3) the defendant may not respond to a summons because he appears to live at his Montana residence; and (4) the potential to "interfere with the administration of justice considering the nature of these allegations and the risk of evidence tampering or destruction." Id.
A warrant was issued, and on January 11, 2018, Mr. Spencer was arrested in his home in Montana. ECF No. 1 at 16. The following day, a judge in Missoula County ordered that Mr. Spencer be released immediately. Id. However, he was not released until January 16, 2018. According to Mr. Spencer, one of the jail guards told him that somebody from Spokane had called and "cancelled his release." Id. at 16-17. Detective Lebsock agrees that he called the Spokane County judge who issued the arrest warrant, after learning that Mr. Spencer was about to be released from Missoula County Jail. ECF No. 28 at 15. Detective Lebsock states that, after he contacted the Spokane County judge, the judge "contacted someone either at theMissoula County Jail or at Missoula County Superior Court to discuss the warrant." Id.
On January 16, 2018, when Mr. Spencer was released from jail, he realized that his debit card was missing from his wallet, and his coat was ripped and torn. Id. at 18. Mr. Spencer claims that Detective Lebsock caused his debit card to go missing and his jacket to be torn through alleged connections at Missoula County Jail. Id.
On February 27, 2018, the charge against Mr. Spencer was dismissed. Id. at 24. Prior to the dismissal order, SPD obtained a search warrant for Mr. Kandratowicz. ECF No. 1 at 19. He was never arrested or taken into custody. Id. He pleaded guilty on May 11, 2018, to having forged the order enjoining the garnishment. Id. As punishment for his actions, DPA Evans recommended six months of community custody, and no jail time. Id.
Mr. Spencer filed his complaint in this Court on March 29, 2019. See ECF No. 1. The Spencers are both Native American and argue that Defendants acted in a racially discriminatory manner toward Mr. Spencer in their investigation and prosecution of Mr. Kandratowicz's crime. They also allege that the Defendants were motivated to harm Mr. Spencer because Mr. Spencer had recently sued former SPD employees in a 2017 lawsuit. Against each defendant, Mr. Spencer alleges violations of his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also alleges the following state law claims against each defendant: falseimprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, negligence, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Furthermore, Mr. Spencer alleges that the City of Spokane and Spokane County are liable for the actions of their employees, Evans and Lebsock, through a respondeat superior theory.
Defendants Spokane County and DPA Evans filed a 12(b) and 12(c) motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 21. In their motion, Defendants argue that DPA Evans has absolute immunity and, in the alternative, qualified immunity. Id. at 6, 16. Detective Lebsock and the City of Spokane have moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Spencer's claims. See ECF No. 26. They argue that Mr. Spencer has failed to support his claims against them, and that Detective Lebsock is entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Spencer has asked the Court to either deny summary judgment or to continue summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(d) in order for additional discovery to be completed.
Although the parties agree that the Motion to Dismiss brought by the County and DPA Evans is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, they disagree about the applicable legal standard. Mr. Spencer argues that the Court should decide the motion using the summary judgment standard because Defendants have supported their motion with documents outside the pleadings. Rule 12(d) states that a courtmust apply the summary judgment standard to 12(c) motions if it considers "matters outside the pleadings" in its decision. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, a document is "not outside the complaint if the complaint specifically refers to the document and if its authenticity is not challenged." Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). A defendant may attach these documents to a 12(c) motion for the court's consideration without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Id. A court also may consider any documents of which it may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. Id.
Here, Defendants have attached the Information, Officer Lebsock's Affidavit of Facts filed January 5, 2018, the order issuing Mr. Spencer's arrest warrant, and Mr. Evan's Certificate. ECF Nos. 22-1-22-4. Mr. Spencer referenced these documents in his complaint, quoting two of them at length. Therefore, the applicable standard for Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is set out in Rule 12(b)(6).
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's claim will be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,...
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