Spencer v. Cundiff
Decision Date | 18 May 1976 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76-0015 and 76-0016. |
Citation | 413 F. Supp. 1246 |
Parties | Robert Edward SPENCER, # 98768, Petitioner, v. O. Raymond CUNDIFF, Judge, Lynchburg Circuit Court, Respondent. Robert Edward SPENCER, # 98768, Petitioner, v. Jack DAVIS, Director, Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Robert Edward Spencer, pro se.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondents.
These are two cases brought by Robert Edward Spencer, an inmate at Wise Correctional Unit # 18. The petitioner was sentenced by the Honorable O. Raymond Cundiff in the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg on a guilty plea to a charge of uttering a false check. The petitioner entered this plea midway through his trial before a jury after the prosecution agreed in a plea bargain to move that a charge of forgery against the petitioner be nol prossed. The court entered a nol prosse on the forgery charge after sentencing petitioner to serve two years in the state penitentiary on the uttering conviction.
In Case Number 76-0015 the named respondent is Judge Cundiff. The petitioner seeks to be "released". He makes the following allegations:
The respondent in this action has filed a motion to dismiss and this court believes this motion is well taken.
After studying the petition in this action, the court is convinced that the remedy sought is a writ of habeas corpus. The allegations petitioner makes challenge the fact and/or duration of confinement as opposed to the conditions of confinement. This makes a writ of habeas corpus the proper remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).
A writ of habeas corpus is more properly addressed to the officer in charge of confining the prisoner. The sentencing state court judge is not a proper party defendant since he neither has the power or authority to order the petitioner released under a federal writ of habeas corpus. However, in Case Number 76-0016, the petitioner has properly brought a similar habeas corpus action against the Director of the Virginia State Penitentiary. This being so, this court herein orders Case Number 76-0015 dismissed and turns its attention to the merits of Case Number 76-0016.
In this action, the petitioner makes the following allegations:
Initially, this court must examine these claims to see whether petitioner has properly exhausted his remedies in the state courts. It appears that none of these allegations have been raised by way of direct or collateral review in the state courts. However in Virginia, an aggrieved party has only four months for noting a direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, 8-463, Va.Code Ann. (1950). Since, final judgment was rendered by the trial court on May 13, 1975, this is clearly not an available option for the petitioner here.
Furthermore, habeas corpus relief in Virginia will not extend to alleged trial defects that were not raised at trial and pursued on appeal unless they are jurisdictional defects on a claim of inadequacy of counsel. Superintendent v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974). Thus it would be fruitless for petitioner to attempt to raise his claims by way of state court collateral review. In ascertaining whether the petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies, this court should look only to determine whether petitioner has presently available any such remedies. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). This court cannot find any presently available state court remedies for petitioner and thus will consider each claim for its substantive value.
In response to petitioner's first claim, this court notes at the outset that a request for a continuance is generally left up to the sound discretion of the trial judge and absent an abuse of this discretion will not be overturned. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940). It appears from the pleadings available in this case that the petitioner was charged by warrant with uttering a false check on or about December 3, 1974. As a result of this warrant preliminary hearings were scheduled on December 12, 1974 and January 16, 1975, both of which were continued on motion of the Commonwealth over the objection of the defendant, because a Commonwealth's witness failed to appear. On February 6, 1975 a third preliminary hearing was held, at which time the Commonwealth moved to nol prosse the charge against the defendant, over defendant's objection. The judge did nol prosse the charge.
However, it appears that on April 8, 1975 another arrest warrant was issued pertaining to the same forgery incident, this time charging the defendant with uttering a false check and a preliminary hearing was scheduled in the General District Court on April 24, 1975 which was continued until the next day. At this preliminary hearing on April 25, 1975, defendant moved to have the charges dismissed against him on the grounds that he had been denied due process and his right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.
On May 5, 1975 the petitioner was indicted by a grand jury for the offenses of forgery and uttering a false check. Petitioner's appointed counsel did not renew his speedy trial and due process motions until the trial in the Circuit Court on May 13, 1975. Judge Cundiff refused to accept these motions because they were not filed seven days before the trial in writing in accordance with Rule 3A:12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. It is due to trial counsel's failure to properly raise this motion that petitioner claims he was inadequately represented by counsel. However, this court notes that it need only consider whether the delays described herein were constitutionally deficient for if they were not then the failure of counsel to have them considered by the trial court did not so prejudice the petitioner's case as to constitute inadequate representation of counsel.
The facts as related reveal that the petitioner was under accusation by law enforcement authorities after the date of the first arrest warrant on December 3, 1974. This being so his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attached from this date. U. S. v. Marion, 404 U.S....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Guerra v. Meese
...to reduce the sentence) has been squarely rejected. Christian v. Garrett, 432 F.Supp. 240, 241 (E.D.Tenn.1976); Spencer v. Cundiff, 413 F.Supp. 1246, 1247 (W.D.Va.1976), rev'd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 1306 (4th In 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2243 (1982), Congress required the federal courts to direct ......
-
Crowell v. Zahradnick
...it at trial and pursued it on appeal, except to the extent that he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 Spencer v. Cundiff, 413 F.Supp. 1246, 1247-48 (W.D.Va.1976). The majority adopts the Commonwealth's argument that Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (......
-
Cartera v. Mitchell, Civ. A. No. 82-0885-AM.
...v. Zahradnick, 571 F.2d 1257, 1259 n. 2 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 956, 99 S.Ct. 357, 58 L.Ed.2d 348 (1978); Spencer v. Cundiff, 413 F.Supp. 1246 (W.D.Va.1976). Thus, in determining whether petitioner has satisfied exhaustion requirements, the critical question is whether petitio......
-
Spencer v. Cundiff
...1306 573 F.2d 1306 Spencer v. Cundiff No. 78-6129 United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 4/18/78 W.D.Va., 413 F.Supp. 1246 AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND ...