Spencer v. Huron Cnty.
Decision Date | 24 January 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-12209 |
Parties | ANTHONY SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. HURON COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
In this civil-rights case, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Anthony Spencer challenges the lawfulness of his arrest and subsequent prosecution for drug trafficking by officers of the Huron County Sheriff's Office. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 41), arguing, in part, that they did not violate Spencer's constitutional rights because the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents Spencer from relitigating the issue of probable cause.1 As discussed below, the Court agrees with Defendants and grants, in part, their motion for summary judgment.2
In July 2012, Defendant Ryan Swartz, a Huron County deputy sheriff, was assigned to county-wide drug investigations. See Defs. Statement of Material Facts ("SMF") ¶ 4 (Dkt. 41). Shortly thereafter, Swartz received tips that Spencer was involved in trafficking heroin. Id.
Later, in March 2013, Tracey Champagne, an inmate at the Huron County jail, sent an internal jail communication to Defendant Daryl Ford, a Huron County detective, offering her services as a confidential informant for drug investigations. Id. ¶ 6. Champagne had worked as a confidential informant for Ford in the past. Id. Ford then informed Swartz of Champagne's offer, and the two of them interviewed Champagne. Id. ¶ 7. Following that interview, Swartz sought and received permission from the Huron County Prosecutor for Champagne to serve as a confidential informant in Swartz's drug investigations. Id. ¶ 8. As a confidential informant for Swartz, Champagne participated in numerous controlled drug buys. Id. ¶ 11. Before each controlled buy, Champagne was searched and provided "buy money" to use during the drug transaction. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.
Champagne claims that Spencer either arranged for her to buy heroin or directly sold heroin to her on at least three occasions near the end of May 2013. Id. ¶ 13. For these particular incidents, Champagne entered the car of Spencer's cousin, Rollie Smith, to consummate the drug buys. Id. ¶ 14; Pl. Resp. at 15 (Dkt. 48). For at least two of these controlled buys, Champagne told Swartz that Spencer was in the car, handed her a bag of suspected heroin, and took the buy money in return. Defs. SMF ¶ 16.
On June 26, 2013, Spencer's best friend, Jeff Hatch, was arrested following the discovery of approximately 22 grams of heroin located in Hatch's bedroom. See id. ¶¶ 12, 17; Spencer Dep. at 43 (Dkt. 41-9). The following day, Champagne informed Swartz that Spencer was aware of Hatch's arrest and that Spencer intended to flee because he thought there was a warrant issuedfor his arrest. Defs. SMF ¶ 17. Upon learning of this information, Swartz contacted Defendant Ryan Neumann, a Huron County sergeant, and asked him to detain Spencer at a location provided by Champagne. Id. ¶ 18. Neumann arrived at that location and detained Spencer until Swartz arrived. Id. ¶ 19. Spencer was then transported to the Huron County jail and lodged overnight. Id. Arrest warrants were issued the following morning. Id. ¶ 20.
In September 2013, two preliminary examination hearings were held in state court. Id. After those hearings, the state-court judge determined that there was probable cause to bind Spencer over to trial on all of the felony charges. Id. However, six months following Spencer's arrest, Smith informed Swartz and Tom Evans, a chief assistant prosecutor, that Spencer was not involved in any of the drug sales that took place at the end of May 2013. Id. ¶ 21. After Spencer took and passed a polygraph examination, all of the charges against him were dismissed, on the prosecutor's motion. Id. ¶ 23.
Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009).
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "To withstand summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party "may not 'rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact' but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion." Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989)). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient; rather, "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const. amend. IV, but a "warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). To prevail on his Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983, Spencer must prove a lack of probable cause. Buttino v. City of Hamtramck, 87 F. App'x 499, 502 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Buchanan v. Metz, 647 F. App'x 659, 664 (6th Cir. 2016) (); Hardesty v. City of Ecorse, 623 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 (E.D. Mich. 2009) ("A plaintiff cannot recover for a violation of his constitutional rights arising out ofhis arrest where probable cause existed for the arrest." (citing Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988)).
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that the state court already ruled that there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute in this case when it bound Spencer over for trial following two preliminary examination hearings and, therefore, Spencer is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of probable cause. See Defs. Br. at 13 (Dkt. 41); see also Prelim. Exam. Trs., Exs. 14-A & 14-B to Defs. Mot. (Dkts. 41-15, 41-16).3 Spencer did not respond to this estoppel argument in his brief.
Id. (quoting Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Further, Sixth Circuit jurisprudence provides that "where a state affords an opportunity for an accused to contest probable cause at a preliminary hearing and the accused does so, afinding of probable cause by the examining magistrate or state judge should foreclose relitigation of that finding in a subsequent § 1983 action." Buttino, 87 F. App'x at 503 (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174-175 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2001)); Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); see also Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 778 F. Supp. 2d 787, 803 (E.D. Mich. 2011), aff'd, 493 F. App'x 731 (6th Cir. 2012).
However, a finding of probable cause in a prior criminal hearing does not prevent a plaintiff from maintaining a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution if the claims are based on the police officer supplying false information to establish probable cause. See Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2007); Hinchman, 312 F.3d at 202-203; see also Holz v. City of Sterling Heights, 465 F. Supp. 2d 758, 771-773 (E.D. Mich. 2006) ( ).
Spencer, who...
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