Spencer v. Klementi

• Decision Date: 09 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 77086, No. 77711,77086
• Parties: Jeffrey D. SPENCER, an Individual, Appellant, v. Helmut KLEMENTI, an Individual; Egon Klementi, an Individual; Elfriede Klementi, an Individual; Mary Ellen Kinion, an Individual; Rowena Shaw, an Individual; and Peter Shaw, an Individual, Respondents. Jeffrey D. Spencer, Appellant, v. Helmut Klementi, an Individual; Egon Klementi, an Individual; Elfriede Klementi, an Individual; Mary Ellen Kinion, an Individual; Rowena Shaw, an Individual; and Peter Shaw, an Individual, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

466 P.3d 1241

Jeffrey D. SPENCER, an Individual, Appellant,

v.Helmut KLEMENTI, an Individual; Egon Klementi, an Individual; Elfriede Klementi, an Individual; Mary Ellen Kinion, an Individual; Rowena Shaw, an Individual; and Peter Shaw, an Individual, Respondents.

Jeffrey D. Spencer, Appellant,

v.Helmut Klementi, an Individual; Egon Klementi, an Individual; Elfriede Klementi, an Individual; Mary Ellen Kinion, an Individual; Rowena Shaw, an Individual; and Peter Shaw, an Individual, Respondents.

No. 77086

No. 77711

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED JULY 09, 2020

Doyle Law Office, PLLC, and Kerry St. Clair Doyle, Reno, for Appellant.

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Douglas R. Brown, Sarah M. Molleck, and Christian L. Moore, Reno, for Respondent Helmut Klementi.

McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, LLP, and Michael A. Pintar, Reno, for Respondents Mary Ellen Kinion, Egon Klementi, and Elfriede Klementi.

Tanika M. Capers, Las Vegas, for Respondents Rowena Shaw and Peter Shaw.

BEFORE PARRAGUIRRE, HARDESTY and CADISH, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, CADISH, J.:

Appellant sued respondents for, among other things, defamation based on statements they made during the public-comment period of planning-commission and improvement-district meetings, and malicious prosecution following his acquittal on battery and elder abuse charges. As to the defamation claim, the district court separately granted summary judgment to each respondent, relying in part on the judicial-proceedings privilege. Generally, the privilege absolutely protects statements made during judicial proceedings, and therefore those statements cannot form the basis of a defamation claim. This privilege extends to statements made during quasi-judicial proceedings, but the issue here is whether the public-comment periods of planning-commission and improvement-district meetings are quasi-judicial proceedings. We conclude that in this case, the public-comment portions of the meetings were not quasi-judicial because they lacked the basic due-process protections we would normally expect to find in a court of law. We therefore reverse the district court's orders that relied exclusively on this privilege and the corresponding awards of attorney fees, and remand for further proceedings on the defamation counterclaim. We affirm, however, the district court's adverse summary judgments on appellant's defamation claims that relied on statements that were undisputedly true. We likewise affirm the district court's summary judgments on appellant's malicious-prosecution claim because the district court did not erroneously apply the law in resolving that claim.

FACTS

This appeal arises from a dispute between neighbors living in the Kingsbury General Improvement District (KGID) of Douglas County. The dispute began when appellant Jeffrey D. Spencer built a fence around his property. Respondents Helmut, Egon, and Elfriede Klementi, Mary Kinion, and Rowena and Peter Shaw complained about the fence at Douglas County Planning Commission meetings and contacted the Douglas County District Attorney's office. At a later KGID board meeting, respondents alleged that Spencer, who operated a snowplow for KGID during the winter, retaliated by blocking their driveways with snow. They also alleged that he used a snowplow to cover Egon with snow and ice.

The dispute culminated in 2013 when Spencer allegedly battered Helmut. Respondents again complained about Spencer at KGID and Douglas County Planning Commission meetings. Shortly thereafter, the district attorney's office charged Spencer with a misdemeanor battery. Four months later, it enhanced the misdemeanor battery to felony elder abuse and added two more charges of elder abuse—one based on the alleged snowplow incident and the other based on alleged threats. After a jury trial, Spencer was acquitted.

Helmut thereafter filed a civil complaint against Spencer seeking recovery for his personal injuries. Spencer filed a malicious-prosecution counterclaim against Helmut, Egon, Elfriede, and Kinion, alleging that they falsely accused him of criminal activity with the intent to induce criminal prosecution. He soon added Rowena and Peter Shaw as third-party defendants and added a defamation counterclaim, alleging that respondents made defamatory statements at public meetings.¹

Kinion first moved for summary judgment on the malicious-prosecution counterclaim. At a hearing on the motion, the district court called the deputy district attorney as a witness. She testified that Kinion did not influence her decision to initially charge and prosecute Spencer or to later enhance the charges. Relying partly on this testimony, the district court found that Kinion was not involved in the initiation or enhancement of Spencer's criminal charges and granted her motion for summary judgment. As the prevailing party, Kinion moved for attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b), which the district court granted.

Next, respondents Kinion, Helmut, Elfriede, and the Shaws separately moved for summary judgment on the remaining counterclaims. The district court granted their motions, finding that Spencer did not present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the remaining malicious-prosecution counterclaims. It also found that respondents’ statements were protected under the judicial-proceedings privilege, which precluded liability for defamation. As the prevailing parties, Kinion, Helmut, and Elfriede separately moved for attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b), which Spencer did not oppose. The district court thus granted the motions, construing Spencer's failure to oppose as a concession that his counterclaims lacked a reasonable basis. The remaining claims were also resolved, and Spencer now appeals, challenging the district court's summary judgment orders and awards of attorney fees.

DISCUSSION

The district court's summary judgment in favor of Kinion on the malicious-prosecution counterclaim

Spencer first argues that the district court erroneously granted Kinion's motion for summary judgment on the malicious-prosecution counterclaim because there was a genuine issue of material fact about Kinion's participation in his criminal prosecution.²

We review the district court's summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The movant bears the burden of production and therefore must either "submit[ ] evidence that negates an essential element of the [non-moving party's] claim" or "point[ ] out ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 602-03, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant does so, then the nonmoving party must "transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact" in order to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 603, 172 P.3d at 134.

To prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim, a party must establish, among other elements, "that the defendant [1] initiated, [2] procured the institution of, or [3] actively participated in the continuation of a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff." LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 30, 38 P.3d 877, 879-80 (2002). In her motion for summary judgment, Kinion argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish any of those three requirements. She pointed out that the arresting officer did not contact or communicate with her during the investigation of the alleged battery. Kinion attached to her summary-judgment motion the official report of the incident, which did not list her name as a witness or otherwise mention her. She also attached the arresting officer's deposition, wherein he acknowledged that he did not speak with her before writing his incident report and forwarding it to the district attorney's office. Kinion pointed out that any continued involvement in Spencer's criminal prosecution was at the request of the deputy district attorney, who subpoenaed her to testify at Spencer's criminal trial and requested that she send a letter with information about the neighborhood dispute. Because Kinion successfully pointed out that there was insufficient evidence to support Spencer's counterclaim, she met her burden as the party moving for summary judgment.

In his opposition, Spencer focused solely on the third requirement, arguing that Kinion was actively involved in the continuation of his criminal prosecution.³ He introduced evidence that Kinion called the police after witnessing the snowplow incident, communicated ex parte with a judge, and sent a letter to the Douglas County District Attorney's Office.

We are not persuaded that these facts create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kinion was actively involved in the continuation of Spencer's criminal prosecution. The deputy district attorney testified that she based her decision to amend Spencer's criminal complaint on facts presented at a preliminary hearing, at which Kinion did not testify. The deputy district attorney also testified that Kinion's letter, which was one of many received during the investigation, did not influence her to enhance the charges. In fact, Kinion was not even listed as a witness on the amended complaint. Spencer's opposition to the motion for summary judgment and the documents attached thereto did not refute this evidence, nor were they sufficient to show a genuine issue as to any material fact. That Kinion called the police after witnessing potentially illegal behavior does not, without more, establish that she played an active role in the district attorney's decision to amend the criminal complaint. And Kinion's ex-parte communication with a judge, while improper, concerned the geographical reach of Spencer's restraining order and was therefore...