Spencer v. Merchant
Citation | 31 L.Ed. 763,8 S.Ct. 921,125 U.S. 345 |
Parties | SPENCER v. MERCHANT. 1 |
Decision Date | 02 April 1888 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
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[Statement of Case from pages 345-351 intentionally omitted] Albert Day and Matthew Hale, for plaintiff in error.
Walter E. Ward, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The leading facts of this case are as follows: The original assessment of the expenses of regulating, grading, and preparing the street for travel was laid by commissioners, as directed by section 4 of the statute of 1869, upon all the lands lying within 300 feet on either side of the street, and which, in the judgment of the commissioners, would be benefited by the improvement. After the sums so assessed upon some lots had been paid, the court of appeals of the state declared that assessment void, because the statute (although it made ample provision for notice of and hearing upon the previous assessment for laying out the street under section 3) provided no means by which the landowners might have any notice or opportunity to be heard in regard to the assessment for regulating, grading, and preparing the street for travel under section 4. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183. The lots, the sums assessed upon which had not been paid, were isolated parcels, not contiguous, and some of them not fronting upon the street. By the statute of 1881, a sum equal to so much of the original assessment as remained unpaid, adding a proportional part of the expenses of making that assessment, and interest since, was ordered by the legislature to be levied and equitably apportioned by the supervisors of the county upon and among these lots, after public notice to all parties interested to appear and be heard upon the question of such apportionment; and that sum was levied and assessed accordingly upon these lots, one of which was owned by the plaintiff. The question submitted to the supreme court of the state was whether this assessment on the plaintiff's lot was valid. He contended that the statute of 1881 was unconstitutional and void, because it was an attempt by the legislature to validate a void assessment, without giving the owners of the lands assessed an opportunity to be heard upon the whole amount of the assessment. He thus directly, and in apt words, presented the question whether he had been unconstitutionally deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, as well as of article 1, § 7, Const. N. Y.; and no specific mention of either constitutional provision was nee ssary in order to entitle him to a decision of the question by any court having jurisdiction to determine it. The adverse judgment of the supreme court, affirmed by the court of appeals of the state, necessarily involved a decision against a right claimed under the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which this court has jurisdiction to review. Bridge Prop'rs v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116, 142; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 442; Furman v. Nichol. 8 Wall. 44, 56; Insurance Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 579, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681.
The jurisdiction of this court, as is well understood, does not extend to a review of the judgment of the state court, so far as it depended upon the constitution of the state. Institution for Savings v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 514, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612. Yet, as the words of the two constitutions are alike in this respect, the decisions of the highest court of the state upon the effect of these words are entitled to great weight. The substance of the former decisions, and the grounds of the judgment sought to be reviewed, can hardly be more compactly or forcibly stated than they have been by Judge FINCH in delivering the opinion of the court of appeals, as follows: 100 N. Y. 587-589, 3 N. E. Rep. 684. The general principles upon which that judgment rests have been affirmed by the decisions of this court.
The power to tax belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government. U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 392; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. In the words of Chief Justice CHASE, condensing what had been said long before by Chief Justice MARSHALL: Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 548; McCulloch v....
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Sebastian Bridge Dist. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
... ... [292 F. 352] ... 187, 43 ... L.Ed. 443). While the taxing power is distinctively a ... legislative function (Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S ... 345, 355, 8 Sup.Ct. 921, 31 L.Ed. 763; French v. Barber ... Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 21 Sup.Ct. 625, 45 ... ...
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Nickey v. State ex rel. Attorney-General
... ... 300, 46 L.Ed. 207; ... Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 23 L.Ed. 678; ... Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 616; ... Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 31 L.Ed. 763; 8 ... S.Ct. 921; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 41 L.Ed ... 949, 17 S.Ct. 525; Orr v. Gilman, 183 ... ...
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Nickey v. State
... ... 300, 46 L.Ed. 207; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 ... U.S. 90, 23 L.Ed. 678; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, ... 24 L.Ed. 616; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 31 L.Ed ... 763; 8 S.Ct. Rep. 921; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 41 ... L.Ed. 949, 17 S.Ct. Rep. 525; Orr v. Gilman, ... ...
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