Spencer v. Pulido-Esparza
| Decision Date | 07 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-001176-GSA-PC |
| Parties | EDWARD B. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. PULIDO-ESPARZA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE PROCEED ONLY AGAINST DEFENDANT CDCR FOR VIOLATION OF THE ADA; THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF NO. 13.)
Edward B. Spencer (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On November 5, 2021, the Court screened the Complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 10.) On December 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, which is now before the Court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 13.)
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (SATF) in Corcoran, California, in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at SATF. Plaintiff names as defendants Correctional Officer L. Pulido-Esparza, Lieutenant C. Smith (Hearing Officer), Stuart Sherman (Warden), and CDCR (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff sues Defendants Pulido-Esparza, Smith, and Sherman in their individual capacities and Defendant CDCR in its official and individual capacities.
A summary of Plaintiff's allegations follows:
The gravamen of Plaintiff's Complaint is that Defendants forced him to stand up during inmate institutional counts until counted by the officer taking count, while Plaintiff was having severe cramps and in excruciating pain, rather than allowing him to sit on his assigned bed or in a wheelchair during count. Plaintiff alleges he is a qualified individual with a disability and is designated an intermittent wheelchair user who needs a wheelchair outside of his cell, but does not qualify to sit (and must stand) while inside his cell during inmate count (DPO). While on the other hand, a DPW is a full-time wheelchair user who requires a wheelchair accessible cell. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff for being a DPO and not a DPW who are allowed to sit inside their cells during count.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); Weinrich v. L.A. County Metro Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997). The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998); see also Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “there is no question that defendant CDCR, as a ‘department [or] agency . . . of a State' is a ‘public entity' for purposes of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).” Jones v. Scotland, No. 2:12-CV-00633 TLN, 2015 WL 461633, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:12-CV-0633 TLN DAD, 2015 WL 1347412 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015). “Generally, public entities must ‘make reasonable modification in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.'” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010); McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (policy burdened plaintiff in a manner different from and greater than it burdened non-disabled residents, solely as a result of his disabling condition); Weinrich, 114 F.3d at 978.
The proper defendant in an ADA action is the public entity responsible for the alleged discrimination. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006). State correctional facilities are “public entities” within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) & (B); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 524 U.S. at 210; Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). However, a state official sued in his/her official capacity is, in effect, a suit against the government entity and is an appropriate defendant in an ADA action. See Applegate v. CCI, No. 1:16-cv-1343 MJS (PC), 2016 WL 7491635, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (citing Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).
Ordinarily, a plaintiff is not entitled to monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar ADA or RA (Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.) suits against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief or damages. See Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 792-93 (9th Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The standard for intentional discrimination is deliberate indifference, “which requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139. The ADA plaintiff must both “identify ‘specific reasonable' and ‘necessary' accommodations that the state failed to provide” and show that the defendant's failure to act was “a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id. at 1140. When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the first element of the deliberate indifference test. Id. at 1139.
Although “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability,” it does not provide a remedy for “inadequate treatment for disability.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1022 ( )).
The ADA, as amended in 2008, defines a disability, with respect to an individual, as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more...
To continue reading
Request your trial