Spencer v. Roche

Decision Date18 October 2011
Docket NumberNo. 11–1146.,11–1146.
Citation659 F.3d 142
PartiesShane M. SPENCER, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.Stephen ROCHE et al., Defendants, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Valeriano Diviacchi, with whom Diviacchi Law Office was on brief, for appellant.Wendy L. Quinn, Assistant City Solicitor, for appellees Roche, Morris, and City of Worcester.Richard W. Jensen, with whom Morrison Mahoney LLP was on brief, for appellee Saint Vincent Hospital.Before BOUDIN, SELYA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This case raises interesting questions regarding the constitutional limits of searches conducted by the police with the aid of modern technology and medical professionals. Concluding, as we do, that the search at issue here comported with the strictures of both the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment for the defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties are in substantial agreement about the chronology of events that sparked this action. On July 28, 2005, Worcester police officers arrested plaintiff-appellant Shane M. Spencer for operating a motor vehicle without a license. Shortly thereafter, one of the officers, Gary Morris, learned that a confidential informant (CI) claimed to have seen the appellant insert a package of crack cocaine into his anal cavity just prior to the arrest. Because the CI had provided the police with reliable information in the past, Morris asked the appellant to submit to a visual inspection of his anus. When the appellant refused, Morris and a fellow officer, Stephen Roche, nonetheless attempted to conduct the visual inspection. Their efforts were thwarted by the appellant's refusal to cooperate.

The officers then sought a search warrant. In an affidavit supporting the warrant application, Morris recounted the information provided to him by the CI and noted the CI's favorable track record. A state court judge issued the requested warrant, which authorized a search of the appellant's anal cavity for cocaine.

Armed with the warrant, the officers transported the appellant to Saint Vincent Hospital (the Hospital) so that medical professionals could perform the search. At the Hospital, a nurse made the following note on the intake form: [Appellant] suspected heroin + cocaine inserted rectally here [with] police [with] warrant for cavity search.” After reviewing the warrant, a licensed physician, Dr. John Scola, performed a digital search of the appellant's anal cavity. The appellant recalls being handcuffed and held down by the officers while the doctor inserted two fingers into his rectum.

When the digital search revealed no contraband, Dr. Scola ordered an x-ray of the appellant's abdominal area. In an affidavit filed in the district court, Dr. Scola explained that a digital examination reaches only the lower portion of the anal cavity and a more complete exploration requires the use of radiological imaging. It is undisputed that the type of x-ray ordered by Dr. Scola—a KUB study—is the only type of x-ray that can capture the entire anal cavity. The hitch is that a KUB x-ray also captures images of the stomach, kidneys, and other organs surrounding the anal cavity.

The appellant made it plain to the police and to the Hospital staff that he did not consent to the KUB x-ray. The x-ray was nevertheless taken and read by a radiologist (also a licensed physician), who reported finding no foreign objects in the appellant's “stomach or rectum or elsewhere in the abdomen.”

In short order, the police released the appellant. No drug-related charges were filed against him. But that was not the end of the matter: on May 29, 2008, the appellant filed a federal suit against Roche and Morris. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleged that the digital and x-ray searches contravened the Fourth Amendment. He later amended his complaint to add additional claims against the officers, the City of Worcester (the City), and the Hospital.

After a period of pretrial discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The appellant opposed their motions. The district court granted brevis disposition to the City and the Hospital. As to the officers, the court initially granted summary judgment on a claim brought pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) but denied summary judgment on a litany of other claims. The MCRA claim was quickly reinstated following the appellant's motion to reconsider. At this stage of the proceedings, the court was acting under the mistaken impression that separate x-rays had been taken of the appellant's anal cavity and stomach. The officers later clarified this point, making it pellucid that only a single x-ray had been taken. This clarification was accompanied by the officers' request for further reconsideration of their summary judgment motion.

Confronted with this new information (which the appellant never challenged), the court reconsidered its earlier rulings. With the record clarified, the court deemed all of the searches reasonable and granted summary judgment in the officers' favor on all claims. It left undisturbed its earlier entry of summary judgment in favor of the other defendants. This timely appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the labyrinthine procedural travel of the district court's rulings is of no moment. Stripped of procedural flourishes, the appellant seeks review of the summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants on all counts of the amended complaint. We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. Cahoon v. Shelton, 647 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir.2011). In performing this appraisal, we are not restricted to the trial court's rationale but may affirm on any ground made manifest in the record. Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir.2011). We must construe the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (here, the appellant). Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.2004). We will affirm the entry of summary judgment only if the record, so viewed, shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that the movants are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The issues on appeal are narrowly cabined. The appellant challenges neither the validity of the warrant nor the constitutionality of the officers' attempted visual inspection of his anal cavity. Nor does he challenge the digital examination performed by Dr. Scola. Rather, he contends that the x-ray was an unreasonable intrusion on his privacy and that the police compounded this intrusion by searching beyond the scope of the warrant (i.e., by searching his stomach as well as his anal cavity). As a fallback, he contends that these actions, even if permissible under the Fourth Amendment, violated the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In assaying these arguments, we remain mindful that the appellant, as the party challenging the search, has the burden of showing that it was constitutionally deficient. See Rogan v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.2001).

We start with the appellant's first argument: that the x-ray search of his anal cavity offended the Fourth Amendment. As a general matter, that constitutional safeguard prohibits only those searches that are unreasonable. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The reasonableness of a search “depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that in determining the constitutionality of a search in the teeth of a Fourth Amendment claim, an inquiring court must consider whether the circumstances and the public's need for information justify the particular intrusion into the searched individual's privacy. See United States v. Cofield, 391 F.3d 334, 336 (1st Cir.2004). Holding this delicate balance steady and true requires careful perscrutation of the specific facts.

It is a piece of constitutional bedrock that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their bodies. Thus, a physical intrusion below the skin constitutes a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). Because individuals possess a strong interest in their bodily integrity, a nonconsensual intrusion into the body requires a particularly robust justification. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68, 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

Withal, not every intrusion into an individual's bodily integrity offends the Fourth Amendment. An inquiring court must weigh the nature of the particular intrusion against the totality of the circumstances surrounding it to determine the reasonableness of the search. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985).

The Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber is instructive. There, police compelled a man suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a physician-administered blood test. 384 U.S. at 758, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The suspect contended that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by taking the blood sample without his consent. Id. at 759, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Court held that the taking of the sample was reasonable under the circumstances. The Court emphasized that the police had strong probable cause to believe that the suspect had been driving drunk; that the blood test was a highly effective means of proving the crime; that the taking of the blood sample was a common, relatively safe, and relatively painless medical procedure; and that the blood had been drawn by doctors in a sterile environment. Id. at 768–72, 86 S.Ct. 1826.

By contrast, the Winston Court enjoined police from...

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