Spencer v. Scutt

• Decision Date: 06 February 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 09-13362
• Citation: Spencer v. Scutt, CASE NO. 09-13362 (E.D. Mich. Feb 06, 2013)
• Parties: FREDERICK TED SPENCER, Petitioner, v. DEBRA SCUTT, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

FREDERICK TED SPENCER, Petitioner,

v.DEBRA SCUTT, Respondent.

CASE NO. 09-13362

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: February 6, 2013

HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

OPINION AND ORDER CONDITIONALLY GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.PetitionerFrederick Ted Spencer, a Michigan Department of Corrections prisoner, is currently housed at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan.He is serving a life sentence for felony murder and a two to ten year sentence for arson of a dwelling house and preparation to burn property over $20,000 in connection with a fire at his home in Shepherd, Michigan on January 30, 2000.On March 3, 2006, a jury convicted Spencer of starting this fire, which caused the death of Spencer's then-girlfriend, Kathy Sytek.Spencer was also charged with arson in connection with a second fire at his home on February 18, 2000, but was found not guilty.Spencer's petition raises a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, based on his trial counsel's failure to move to exclude statements he made to state arson investigator whilein the hospital recovering from severe injuries sustained in the January fire.For the reasons below, the Court grants a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

I.BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are set forth in the opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals denying Spencer's direct appeal:

DefendantFred Spencer owned an old farmhouse on Deerfield Road outside Shepherd, Michigan.In 1999, Kathy Sytek, who was unemployed and had been forced to move from her apartment, began living rent-free in defendant's home.Defendant and Kathy began a relationship soon thereafter, and defendant supported Kathy financially.Both defendant and Kathy were alcoholics.Although some witnesses claimed that Kathy and defendant had a good relationship, others testified that their relationship became volatile when they drank.

Around 8:45 p.m. on January 30, 2000, Tracy Carpenter[¹] was driving west on Deerfield Road when she noticed that defendant's house was on fire and called 911.Soon after she began talking to the dispatcher, defendant ran toward her, distraught, and told her that his "woman" was inside the burning house.A few minutes later, defendant ran back to the house and entered the front porch, collapsing just inside the door.Firefighters arriving at the scene soon thereafter rescued defendant.He was transported to Saginaw St. Mary's Hospital and admitted to the burn trauma intensive care unit.Defendant received severe burns to his face and arms, requiring skin grafts, and was hospitalized for two-and-a-half weeks.

Other firefighters at the scene eventually put out the fire.They discovered Kathy's body in the dining room, lying facedown in a fetal position in front of a couch.An autopsy revealed that she died from asphyxia caused by carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of the fire.Her blood alcohol concentration at the time of death was 0.30 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.Greg Proudfoot, a detective sergeant and state fire marshal for the Fire Marshal Division of the Michigan State Police, investigated the cause and origin of the January 30 fire.He determined thatdefendant started separate fires in the basement and garage of the house, and that the fire that he started in the garage destroyed the house.

People v. Spencer, No. 271884, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 2599, at *1-3(Mich. Ct. App.Nov. 20, 2007)(per curiam)(unpublished).

Spencer was admitted to the hospital on January 30, 2000 with serious injuries and stayed there for 19 days following the fire.A second fire occurred on February 18, 2000, within a few hours of Spencer's release from the hospital.

At Spencer's trial, the prosecution introduced two audio-taped interviews taken from Spencer by Proudfoot, the State's arson investigator, while Spencer was in the hospital recovering from the January fire.The interviews, each over an hour long, took place on February 10 and 12, 2000.(Pet., Apps.E, F (interview transcripts).)The prosecution used Spencer's statements to highlight inconsistencies between Spencer's account of the fire and the physical evidence found by Proudfoot.

The jury convicted Spencer of one count of arson (preparation to burn property) in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.77(1)(d)(i), arising from the fire in his home on January 30, 2000, and one count of felony murder, id.§ 750.316(b), arising from the death of Spencer's girlfriend in that fire.The jury found Spencer not guilty of arson to real property as to the February 18, 2000 fire.

Following his conviction, but before the Isabella Countytrial court imposed a sentence, Spencer's trial counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal and new trial on the grounds of sufficiency of the evidence and that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.In response to a request by the trial court to supplement hismotion by raising all issues that could be raised on appeal, trial counsel supplemented his initial motion and raised several additional claims, including his own ineffective assistance for failure to seek suppression of the statements Spencer made to Proudfoot while in the hospital on voluntariness grounds.The trial court held oral argument on the post-trial motions on April 18, 2006.(4/18/06 Tr. of Mot. Hrg.)The trial court denied this motion on June 16, 2006.Op. & Order, People v. Spencer, No. 05-59-FC(Isabella Cnty. Tr. Ct. June 16, 2006)(attached to Pet. as App. D).Spencer was sentenced to life in prison on July 12, 2006.

Spencer filed a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals on July 24, 2006, raising six claims: (1) insufficiency of the evidence/verdict against the great weight of the evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to suppress as involuntary two statements taken from Spencer while he was in the hospital; (3) erroneous admission of expert testimony of fire investigator; (4) erroneous admission of threatening remark; (5) prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) five-year delay between offence and arrest denied Petitioner due process of law.The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Spencer's convictions in an unpublished, per curiam opinion.People v. Spencer, No. 271884, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 2599(Mich. App.Nov. 20, 2007).The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on March 24, 2008.People v. Spencer, No. 135444, 2008 Mich. LEXIS 511 (Mich. Mar. 24, 2008).Spencer's pro per motion for reconsideration was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court on May 27, 2008.Spencer did not file a petition for the writ of certiorari and his conviction became finalupon the expiration of the filing period.Spencer then filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 25, 2009.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Spencer's petition is subject to review pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA").Pub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214.In order to grant relief, this Court must conclude that the Michigan court's decision"with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" was (1)"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[]" or (2)"based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court has fleshed out the meanings of the two clauses contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)."A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's]cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent."Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 493-94(6th Cir.2009)(quotingWilliams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519(2000)(alterations in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)).Alternatively, "[i]f the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . , habeas relief is available under the unreasonable application clause if the state court unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case or unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses toextend a legal principle from the Supreme Court precedent to a new context."Akins v. Easterling, 648 F.3d 380, 385(6th Cir.2011)(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).A federal court may not find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent unreasonable if it is merely "incorrect or erroneous.[Rather, t]he state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'"See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535(2003)(citations omitted).

As suggested by the above-quoted language, AEDPA's standard of review is "difficult to meet . . . [as it is a] highly deferential standard."Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398(2011).In fact, "[a]state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision."Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786(2011)(quotingYarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2150(2004)(per curiam)).

III.ANALYSIS

The sole claim in Spencer's pending habeas petition is that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the hospital-bed statements Spencer made while recovering from severe injuries.Spencer's position is that the statements should have been...