Spencer v. State, 31108
| Decision Date | 25 October 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 31108,31108 |
| Citation | 133 So.2d 729 |
| Parties | Emmitt Monroe SPENCER, also known as Emitt Spencer, also known as Emmett Monroe Spencer, also known as Emmett Spencer, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert C. Youmans and Tom O. Watkins, Key West, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Spencer has been sentenced to death pursuant to a judgment of conviction based upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first degree with no mercy recommendation.
The sole points assigned for reversal were the refusal of the trial judge to exclude two witnesses from the court room during the trial, and certain alleged inflammatory remarks to the jury by the Assistant State Attorneys.
From the witness stand, the appellant denied most of the critical evidence presented by the State. Nevertheless, the record is permeated with evidence which, if believed by the jury, would thoroughly support the verdict.
During the early hours of the morning of April 15th, 1960, a deputy sheriff found one Johnnie T. Keen bludgeoned to death in his small cottage in Key West. In describing the cause of death, a physician later testified that the head of the victim had been struck so many times with a blunt instrument that it was impossible to determine the number of blows. On the early evening of April 14, 1960, appellant Spencer, his girl friend and a hitch-hiker were apprehended by a Highway Patrol Trooper, John H. Cox, near Clermont in South Lake County. Spencer, thirty years old, was driving an automobile with the other two as passengers. His girl friend, whom he described as his 'common law wife,' was eighteen. The Trooper signaled the driver to stop on a routine apprehension for speeding. When Spencer was requested to produce his driver's license, he handed to the Trooper the driver's license of the dead Keen. Upon careful examination of the date of birth and weight of the named licensee, the Trooper deduced that the person to whom the license had been issued was obviously older and considerably heavier than Spencer. This observation set in motion a chain of circumstances which included a chase through South Lake County at speeds approximating 125 miles an hour, a gun fight between the Trooper and Spencer, in which the former was wounded, and the ultimate arrest of Spencer by G. H. Neely, a second Highway Patrol Trooper, who had joined in the chase. Later investigation of the license tag number by Lake County officers revealed that the automobile belonged to the murdered Keen. The Sheriff of Monroe County apparently was contacted at once. This led to the early morning discovery of Keen's body on April 15th. Subsequently, Spencer admitted the murder to a representative of the Florida Sheriffs' Bureau and also to two Monroe County Deputies Sheriff. From the witness stand his girl friend testified that he had admitted it to her just before they fled Key West in Keen's automobile on the morning of April 14th. The hitch-hiker, incidentally, was in no way connected with the crime. It was apparent that Keen had been struck on the head innumerable times with a hammer which was found at the scene. Spencer's landlady identified the hammer as one which she had loaned to appellant at his request in order to 'repair a table.' There were numerous other circumstantial details in the evidence which pointed to the appellant as the perpetrator of this very hideous murder.
It is clear from this record that this appellant and his girl friend had left her home in Kentucky approximately a year before the murder. According to her testimony, they had traveled across the country and back again. They ultimately reached Jacksonville Beach and from there evidently headed for Key West. Their trip down the East Coast was an orgy of drunkenness, robbery and murder. The record reveals that, in addition to the murder of Keen, two other people, who started out as passengers in the Spencer automobile, came to violent deaths enroute to Key West. The evidence of these collateral crimes came into the record as a result of Spencer's own testimony given in explanation of the Keen murder. He laid it on a man he called 'Shorty' and testified that he himself later disposed of 'Shorty' in an act of self defense. This explanation the jury evidently did not believe. 'Shorty's' decomposed body was subsequently located in an area in Monroe County, to which Spencer led law enforcement officers. Appellant's girl friend testified that actually Spencer had murdered the unfortunate 'Shorty' and another woman passenger at different times on the way down the Florida East Coast.
All of the grim details of this heinous crime have not been delineated. We have extracted from the record sufficient...
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Brooks v. State
...413 (Fla.1996), is applicable: Wide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury. Thomas v. State, 326 So.2d 413 (Fla.1975); Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729 (Fla.1961),cert. denied, 369 U.S. 880, 82 S.Ct. 1155, 8 L.Ed.2d 283 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 904, 83 S.Ct. 742, 9 L.Ed.2d 730 (196......
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Ballard v. Mcneil
...( id. at 285). In Florida, wide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury. See Thomas v. State, 326 So.2d 413 (Fla.1975); Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729 (Fla.1961). Logical inferences may be drawn, and counsel is allowed to advance all legitimate arguments. See Spencer, supra. The prosecu......
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Stephens v. Mcneil
...that wide latitude in closing argument to a jury is permitted. See Thomas v. State, 326 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1975); see also Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1961).The final comment, where the prosecutor described his job, was also proper because this comment was made in response to defense......
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Booker v. State, SC93422.
...coloring of a witness's testimony by that which he has heard from other witnesses who have preceded him on the stand." Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729, 731 (Fla.1961),cert. denied, 369 U.S. 880, 82 S.Ct. 1155, 8 L.Ed.2d 283 (1962), and cert. denied, 372 U.S. 904, 83 S.Ct. 742, 9 L.Ed.2d 730......
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Invoking "the rule" during depositions? Absolutely "maybe".
...a witness "on no less than [14] occasions" in his interrogatory responses). (15) Id. (16) Id. (17) Id. (18) Id., citing Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. (19) Smith v. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Florida, Inc., 564 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1990). (20) Id. (21) Id. (22) Id. (23)......