Spencer v. State, 69883

• Decision Date: 15 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 69883,69883
• Citation: Spencer v. State, 545 So.2d 1352, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 296 (Fla. 1989)
• Parties: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 296 Leonard SPENCER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1352

545 So.2d 1352

14 Fla. L. Weekly 296

Leonard SPENCER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69883.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 15, 1989.

Nelson E. Bailey, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Amy Lynn Diem and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Leonard Spencer appeals his conviction of two counts of first-degree murder and resulting imposition of two death sentences. He was also convicted and sentenced on four counts of robbery with a firearm, attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, and aggravated assault with a firearm. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Spencer raises one dispositive issue which leaves us no alternative but to reverse for a new trial without consideration of this matter on its merits. That issue concerns the use of the special districting process to select the jurors in this case. Special districts for jury selection are authorized by section 40.015, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides:

(1) In any county having a population exceeding 50,000 according to the last preceding decennial census and one or more locations in addition to the county seat at which the county or circuit court sits and holds jury trials, the chief judge, with approval of a majority of the circuit court judges of the circuit, is authorized to create a jury district for each courthouse location, from which jury lists shall be selected in the manner presently provided by law.

(2) In determining the boundaries of a jury district to serve the court located within the district, the board shall seek to avoid any exclusion of any cognizable group. Each jury district shall include at least 6,000 registered voters.

That statute was implemented in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit by Administrative Order No. 1.006-1/80 entitled "In re Glades Jury District--Eastern Jury District," which divided the county into two jury districts by establishing a western district at the branch courthouse in Belle Glade and an eastern district at the main courthouse in West Palm Beach. The trial jurors are drawn for each district only from within the geographically identified district lines as established in the administrative order. The stated purpose of the division was to reduce substantial travel time for jurors and alleviate unnecessary expense to the state. In addition to dividing the county into two jury districts, the administrative order further provided that every criminal case will automatically be set for trial in the West Palm Beach district, provided, however, that if the crime is alleged to have occurred in the Glades district, then, at the defendant's option and request, the trial may be had in the Glades district. The following racial statistics on the voter registration pool from which jurors are selected in Palm Beach County were presented to the trial court and are unrefuted:

GEOGRAPHIC AREA                           TOTAL   BLACKS    PERCENTAGE BLACK
                Palm Beach County as a whole             398,797  29,859          7.487
                Western (Belle Glade) Jury District        9,549   4,974         52.080
                Eastern (West Palm Beach) Jury District  389,248  24,885          6.393
                

Spencer challenges the Palm Beach County jury selection process on the following three grounds: (1) that the division distorts the population mix, resulting in a failure to be able to draw prospective jurors from a fair representative cross-section of the county; (2) the manner in which it is determined that a defendant will be tried in the eastern or western district is a denial of equal protection; and (3) the authorizing statute for jury districts, section 40.015, is unconstitutional under article I, sections 16 and 22; article III, section 11(a)(5) and 11(a)(6); and article V, section 1, of the Florida Constitution.

Spencer's crimes allegedly occurred in the eastern half of the county and his trial was set to take place in the West Palm Beach district. Spencer is black and, at the time of the incident, lived in the Glades district. Prior to trial, Spencer moved for an order requiring the clerk to draw the jury pool from the county at large. The trial court summarily denied the motion. Spencer then moved for his case to be transferred to the Glades district, alleging an equal protection violation. The trial court also denied that motion. Spencer renewed his motion for a countywide jury on two subsequent occasions, including the date of trial. At the time the jury was accepted, counsel for Spencer did so with the understanding that he was not waiving Spencer's claim to be entitled to a jury selected from the entire county.

With regard to his first claim concerning distortion of the population mix, Spencer emphasizes that the Glades district created by the administrative order is 52.08% black while the jury pool for the whole county is comprised of only 7.487% black registered voters. Spencer asserts that the effect of the division removes a significant concentration of black voters from jury duty in the urban eastern half of the county and that the population mix in each of the jury districts fails to draw prospective jurors from a fairly representative cross-section of the county and that these defects result in fundamental error.

In response, the state argues that, if the county as a whole has a percentage of 7.487 black registered voters within the jury pool, the West Palm Beach...