Spencer v. State Of Mo.
| Decision Date | 28 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | WD72100 |
| Parties | FREDERICK SPENCER, Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County
The Honorable Patricia S. Joyce, Judge
Before: Mark D. Pfeiffer, P.J., and Victor C. Howard and Alok Ahuja, JJ.
Dr. Frederick Spencer is currently incarcerated based on his convictions for forcible rape and forcible sodomy. He appeals the Cole County Circuit Court's judgment dismissing his petition for declaratory relief with prejudice. Although he makes multiple arguments, Spencer's primary claim is that the Missouri Sex Offender Program ("MoSOP") violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, by requiring that he admit to commission of the offenses of which he was convicted as a condition of successful completion of the program. Spencer alleges that he was terminated from the program because of his refusal to admit his guilt, and that he was denied eligibility for parole, conditional release, and good-time credits against his sentence as a result of his failure to complete the program.
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the dismissal of Spencer's petition.
After a jury trial, Spencer, a psychologist, was convicted of three counts of forcible rape and three counts of forcible sodomy. The sexual assaults allegedly occurred in 1994 and 1995 and involved two of Spencer's patients. The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis sentenced Spencer to a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. The Eastern District affirmed Spencer's convictions on direct appeal. State v. Spencer, 50 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). The Eastern District later affirmed the denial of Spencer's post-conviction relief motion following an evidentiary hearing, Spencer v. State, 156 S.W.3d 365 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004), and the denial of his motion to reopen the post-conviction relief proceedings based on alleged abandonment by post-conviction counsel. Spencer v. State, 255 S.W.3d 527 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).
Spencer was afforded two opportunities to complete the MoSOP. On each occasion, he was terminated from the program because he refused to acknowledge or admit his guilt for the offenses for which he was convicted.
Spencer filed his petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on April 3, 2009. He alleges that he has unconstitutionally been denied parole, and eligibility for conditional release and good-time credits, based on his failure to complete the MoSOP, and that his failure to complete the program is due to his unwillingness to admit guilt for the offenses for which he stands convicted.1 Spencer alleges that, due to his failure to complete the program, he will be required to serve 100% of his sentence in prison. His petition argues that the requirement that he complete MoSOP to be eligible for early release violates his rights under various provisions of both the federal and state constitutions.2 Spencer seeks a declaration that the MoSOP as currently implemented is unconstitutional, an injunction against further extensions of his periodof incarceration, and immediate release based on the alleged accrual of his conditional release and time-credit release dates.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The circuit court granted the State's motion and dismissed Spencer's petition with prejudice, finding that he had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Following entry of the trial court's judgment, Spencer filed both a notice of appeal and a motion to vacate the judgment, which the circuit court denied. Following entry of the judgment Spencer also filed a motion for leave to file a first amended petition, which was likewise denied.
This appeal follows.3
"In reviewing the court's dismissal of appellant's declaratory judgment action, we deem all facts pleaded to be true, liberally construe the petition's averments, and draw all reasonable and fair inferences therefrom." Sandy v. Schriro, 39 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (citation omitted). "We review the allegations set forth in the petition in order to determine whether principles of substantive law are invoked, which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to declaratory relief." Id. "If so, then the petition is sufficient and cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim." Id. "In other words, if the petition contains facts, not mere conclusions, supporting its allegations, and those facts demonstrate a justiciable controversy, then we will reverse the court's dismissal and remand the cause to the court for a determination of the parties' rights." Id.
Spencer's principal argument is that the State has violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination because it conditions eligibility for conditional release and good-time credits on an inmate's successful completion of the MoSOP, which in turn requires an admission of guilt concerning the inmate's sexual offenses. We disagree.4
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Section 589.0405 requires that the DOC develop a treatment and rehabilitation program for sexual assault offenders, and that all sexual assault offenders successfully complete the program. It states:
DOC developed the MoSOP to comply with § 589.040. Its guidelines provide that "[s]uccessful completion of Phase I is dependent upon the offender's acknowledgement and admittance of their sexual offense and a willingness to work toward personal change." DOC Policy D5-4.1. Spencer alleges that the Board of Probation and Parole uniformly requires sexual offenders to complete the MoSOP before being considered for conditional release under § 558.011, or being awarded good-time credit under § 558.041.
Our analysis of Spencer's Fifth Amendment claim begins with the United States Supreme Court's decision in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). Because McKune is central to our resolution of Spencer's principal claim, we describe the Court's opinions in that case in some detail.
In McKune, a Kansas inmate convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated kidnapping sought an injunction to prevent prison officials from withdrawing certain prison privileges and transferring him to a different housing unit based on his failure to participate in Kansas' Sexual Abuse Treatment Program ("SATP"). As here, the inmate (respondent Lile) "refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 31.
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court held that Kansas' SATP did not unconstitutionally compel the inmate to incriminate himself. No opinion garnered the votes of five justices, however; instead, the Court's disposition was based on a plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, in which three other justices concurred, and a concurring opinion authored by Justice O'Connor. The plurality opinion began by recognizing that "[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation," id. at 32, and that, "[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they aremuch more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault." Id. at 33. The plurality opinion continued:
Therapists and correctional officers widely agree that clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders to manage their impulses and in this way reduce recidivism. An important component of those rehabilitation programs requires participants to confront their past and accept responsibility for their misconduct.... Research indicates that offenders who deny all allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely to fail in treatment than those who admit even partial complicity.
Id. (citations omitted). The plurality specifically recognized that Kansas "does not offer legal immunity from prosecution based on statements made in the course of the SATP." Id. at 34. Despite the lack of immunity, the plurality noted that "[t]here is no contention... that the program is a mere subterfuge for the conduct of a criminal investigation." Id. at 34. To resolve the question whether Lile was subject to unconstitutional compulsion to incriminate himself, the plurality opinion drew on the legal standard announced in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995):
[T]he Court in Sandin held that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless those conditions constitute "atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." See 515 U.S., at 484. The determination under Sandin whether a prisoner's liberty interest has been curtailed may not provide a precise parallel for determining whether there is compelled self-incrimination, but it does provide useful instruction for answering the latter inquiry. Sandin and its counterparts underscore the axiom that a convicted felon's life in prison differs from that of an ordinary citizen.... A prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to bear a rational relation to a legitimate penological...
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