Spencer v. United States
| Decision Date | 24 March 1909 |
| Docket Number | 2,812.,2,684 |
| Citation | 169 F. 562 |
| Parties | SPENCER v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Williamson S. Summers and Charles S. Bradshaw, for plaintiff in error.
Marcellus L. Temple, for the United States.
Before SANBORN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and RINER, District Judge.
Two indictments were found against Carl M. Spencer, the plaintiff in error, in the District Court of the Central Division of the Southern District of Iowa--one charging him in 10 counts with making that number of false entries in one of the books of the Des Moines National Bank of which he was a clerk, with the intent of injuring and defrauding the bank; the other charging him in 5 counts with that number of separate embezzlements of the funds of the bank; each in violation of section 5209, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3497). The cases were separately tried, and the defendant was found guilty on each and all the counts of both indictments, and judgment was pronounced against him accordingly. The present writs of error are prosecuted to secure a reversal of these judgments.
In the first case, involving the false entries, no other question is presented for our consideration except the legality of the constitution of the grand and petit juries which indicted and tried the defendant. That question, and also the question whether the money alleged to have been embezzled was the money and property of the bank as charged in the indictment are the only questions presented in the second case. These cases were argued and submitted to the court together.
1. Touching the first question common to both cases, the only pertinent facts are that the jurors were drawn from the body of the Southern district of Iowa, and not exclusively from the Central division of that district where the trial occurred; and also that by an order of court before then made and applicable to all the divisions of the Southern district no citizen of the county in which the court should be held could be drawn for service on either the grand or petit jury and as a result of that order no citizen of Polk county, the same being the county in which the District Court for the Central division was held, was permitted to serve in this case. Did either of these facts invalidate the panels? By Act July 20, 1882, c. 312, 22 Stat. 172 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 349), the state of Iowa, which before then had constituted only one judicial district, divided into four divisions, was divided into two judicial districts-- the Northern and Southern. The same act divided the Southern district 'for the purpose of holding terms of court' into three divisions, called the Eastern, Central, and Western divisions, and designated the counties of the state which should constitute each one of these divisions. A later act approved June 1, 1900 (Act June 1, 1900, c. 601, 31 Stat 249 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 353)), carved out of the counties composing the three divisions an additional division denominated the 'Southern Division of the Southern District. ' By section 5 of the latter named act it was provided:
'That all the grand jurors and all jurors for the trial of civil and criminal causes in the division hereby created (the Southern) shall be selected from citizens residing in the division created by this act.'
No such provision is found in the act of 1882 creating the Eastern, Central, and Western divisions.
Defendant's contention is that the jurors should have been drawn exclusively from the Central division of the district. This contention made under similar statutes was considered by us in the light of all the authorities in the recent case of Clement v. United States, 149 F. 305, 79 C.C.A. 243, and was disapproved. We there held that, although Congress subdivided the one judicial district of Minnesota which had been previously ascertained by law into six divisions 'for the purpose of holding terms of court,' those divisions were not thereby by established as separate judicial districts so as to require a grand or petit jury to be drawn from each division for the accusation and trial of offenses originating therein. We see no reason for departing from the conclusion then reached, and, for the reasons there stated, we hold that the defendant was lawfully indicted and tried by jurors drawn from the body of the Southern district of Iowa.
2. It is next argued that, as section 5 of the act of 1900 creating a Southern division of the Southern district contains a provision that all grand and petit jurors in that division should be drawn from citizens resident therein, it amounts to a legislative declaration that as the residents of the Central division are disqualified from service on the juries in the Southern division, therefore the reverse is true, and no resident of the Southern or any other division is qualified to sit as a grand or petit juror in the Central division. We fail to appreciate the force of this argument. If any implication on this subject is manifest by section 5, it would seem to be exactly the contrary. If the law had previously been as now contended by defendant's counsel, there was no occasion for the enactment of section 5, as, even without it, only residents of the Southern division would be qualified to serve as jurors in that division. Why, therefore, did Congress make the special provision in section 5? Obviously because it recognized the general rule to be as indicated by us, and wished to depart from that rule and make an exception with respect to this particular division, and deemed it necessary to do so in express terms in order to accomplish its purpose.
The opinion of legislative bodies concerning an existing ambiguous or uncertain law manifested by or implied from the passage of subsequent acts relating to the same subject is some, though not controlling, evidence of the true meaning of the original law. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 473, 18 L.Ed. 497; Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203, 223, 21 L.Ed. 447; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7, 13, 23 L.Ed. 188; Farmers', etc., Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 36, 23 L.Ed. 196; Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 U.S. 196, 201, 25 L.Ed. 803; Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U.S. 550, 561, 5 Sup.Ct. 631, 28 L.Ed. 993; Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 577, 14 Sup.Ct. 720, 38 L.Ed. 556; Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 262, 17 Sup.Ct. 302, 41 L.Ed. 708; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of Denver, 72 F. 336, 345, 19 C.C.A. 139.
3. Did the order of court excluding residents of Polk county from service on the grand or petit jury invalidate the panels? This order was made pursuant to the provision of section 802, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 625), that:
'Jurors shall be returned from such parts of the district from time to time as the court shall direct so as to be most...
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