Spencer v. United States Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-1236-NEB-KMM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
| Parties | Antwoyn Terrell Spencer, Plaintiff, v. United States Bureau of Prisons, Warden J. Fikes, Captain Warlick, Lieutenant Weber, Lieutenant Gravdahl, Officer G. White, Defendants. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Mr. Spencer's Complaint. Defs.' Mot., ECF No 33. The Defendants argue that Mr. Spencer's claims should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or, alternatively, because the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Defs.' Mem., ECF No. 35. Because Mr. Spencer has not exhausted administrative remedies, the Court recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice.
Mr. Spencer's Complaint addresses events that occurred while he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone (“FCI-Sandstone”).[1] Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. On the morning of April 13, 2020, Officer G. White directed Mr. Spencer to remove the linen from his cell mate's bed and deliver it to the FCI-Sandstone laundry department for exchange. Mr. Spencer refused, and Officer White threatened to take him to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) if he persisted. Officer White then Id.
Mr. Spencer asserts that Officer White's behavior violates provisions of the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Employee Personal Conduct policy. Under that policy, “[e]mployees may not use threats or intimidation toward any person nor use profane, obscene, or abusive language when dealing with inmates.” Id. at 1-2 (citing BOP Program Statement §§ 3420.08 & 3420.11). Although Officer White's conduct violated such rules, Mr. Spencer was given an incident report because of their disagreement. He was handcuffed and was sent to disciplinary segregation at the direction of Lieutenant Weber. Id. at 2. The incident report charged Mr. Spencer with violating two prison rules governing refusal to obey a staff member's order and insolence towards staff. According to the Complaint, reassignment to the SHU can only be a consequence of violating those rules if an inmate repeats the same act within a specified amount of time. Mr. Spencer asserts that he did not qualify for SHU placement for any violation of these rules. Id.
The incident report was informally resolved on April 15, 2020 as a result of “conflicting reports, ” but Mr. Spencer remained in disciplinary segregation based on an order given by Lieutenant Gravdahl. Id. Mr. Spencer did not return to the general population until April 20, 2020. Id. While he was in disciplinary segregation, Mr. Spencer was not allowed to make phone calls because Warden J. Fikes automatically suspended phone privileges for all inmates in the SHU. Id. Until he was returned to the general population, Mr. Spencer did not have access to his property, lost recreation privileges, and was restricted to his cell except for brief showers. Id. Mr. Spencer seeks damages of $500, 000, an injunction requiring Warden Fikes to be immediately transferred, and a 14-day suspension of all other named defendants. Id.
The Court has previously construed Mr. Spencer's pro se Complaint, in part, to bring claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Order (Sept. 16, 2020) at 2-4, ECF No. 18. Although Mr. Spencer cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for his claims in this case, that statute only applies to state actors, not the federal officials he named as Defendants.[2] Id. at 2-3. However, Mr. Spencer's mistake regarding the applicability of § 1983 alone does not mean that his claims necessarily fail. In some circumstances, Bivens will allow a person to recover damages as a result of federal officials' conduct that violates the Constitution. Id. at 3-4.
In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that Mr. Spencer's Complaint should not move forward because he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing this case. Alternatively, the Defendants allege that his Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Mr. Spencer did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court does not discuss the Defendants' alternative arguments for dismissal.
The Defendants filed their motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint and determines whether those facts “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). Although this standard generally governs motions to dismiss, the arguments raised by the Defendants implicate other analytical frameworks as well.
With respect to the Defendants' exhaustion argument, Rule 12(b)(6)'s standard does not necessarily apply.[3] The Supreme Court has made clear that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, and as a result, exhaustion does not have to be alleged in the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-17 (2007). Ordinarily, courts do not resolve affirmative defenses at the motion-to-dismiss phase unless the applicability of the defense is clear from the face of the complaint. See, e.g., United States v. Xcel Energy, Inc., 759 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1118 (D. Minn. 2010). In this case, however, the fact that exhaustion cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone is not fatal to the Defendants' motion.
The Defendants have submitted materials that are neither referenced in Mr. Spencer's Complaint, nor attached to it as exhibits. Generally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts do not consider materials “outside the pleadings.” Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) ... matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Converting a motion to dismiss is appropriate where a defendant provides written evidence in opposition to a complaint that does more than merely repeat the allegations in the pleadings. McAuley v. Federal Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2007). Because the Defendants submitted materials outside the Complaint on their motion to dismiss, the Court must consider whether it is appropriate to convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d).
When converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the materials]. pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). If a plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to respond to the evidence submitted and does not dispute the material facts, a court is not required to notify a plaintiff that it will be treating a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Van Zee v. Hanson, 640 F.3d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir. 2011); BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 348 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2003). Here, Mr. Spencer had an adequate opportunity to respond to the Defendants' motion, and he neither contested the authenticity of any evidentiary materials that the Defendants submitted, nor suggested that he needed additional time to provide evidence to the Court that is material to the exhaustion issue. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to convert the motion to one for summary judgment.[4] Schuett v. L. Lariva, Case No. 15-cv-4207 (WMW/SER), 2016 WL 11198353, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2016) (), report and recommendation adopted as modified, Case No. 15-cv-4207 (WMW/SER), 2017 WL 123427 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2017).
Having concluded that it is appropriate to convert the Defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is proper where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and the moving part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must then point to specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is required before an inmate files a lawsuit regarding conditions in a prison. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purpose of § 1997e(a) is “to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits” and give prison officials the chance “to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter v....
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