Spencer v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 08 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 6:11-00128-KSF |
| Parties | BART SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. ERIC D. WILSON, Warden, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Bart Spencer is an inmate confined in the Springfield Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Spencer, proceeding without an attorney, has filed a complaint asserting constitutional claims pursuant to the doctrine announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). [R. 2] Spencer alleges that while confined at the United States Penitentiary-McCreary ("USP-McCreary"), located in Pine Knot, Kentucky, officers assaulted him and then placed him in a cell for days without water, proper sanitation, or medical care.
Because Spencer has been granted permission to pay the filing fee in installments and asserts claims against government officials, the Court conducts a preliminary review of his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1997). Because the plaintiff is not represented by an attorney, the complaint is reviewed under a more lenient standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). At this stage the Court accepts Spencer's factual allegations as true and his legal claims are liberally construed in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). But the Court must dismiss a case at any time if it determines the action (a) is frivolous or malicious, (b) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (c) seeks monetary damagesfrom defendants who are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim unless its sets forth sufficient factual matters which, if accepted as true, would allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged; it is not enough to allege facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 552 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court will require two defendants to respond to Spencer's excessive force claims but dismiss the remainder of his constitutional claims, and deny his two pending motions.1
Spencer alleges that on August 21, 2009, eight of the defendants came to his cell, and that Lieutenant Baker ordered him to "cuff up" because he was being moved to another cell. Spencer alleges that Officer Cox opened the cell door, and, without warning, Lieutenant Terry Baker, Officer Reams, and an unknown officer hit him in the back and sides and slammed him into the wall. [R. 2, pp. 5-6] Spencer states that he was then told that he was being placed in a multi-purpose room, and that [Id., p. 6]
Spencer alleges that unidentified officers and Lieutenant Baker came to his room for days, saying "it" (presumably his confinement in the multi-purpose room) would end if he ate. [Id.] Spencer alleges that unidentified officers either denied him water or gave him water according totheir moods; denied him medical treatment for the injuries he sustained during the assault; denied him ice; failed to properly treat his eating disorder; punished and abused him because of his mental illness; and subjected him to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering." [Id.]
Spencer's allegations fall into seven different categories, discussed below.
(1) Excessive force. Spencer alleges that Baker and Reams applied excessive force by slamming him into a wall, which is a claim of cruel and unusual punishment inflicted in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Spencer filed a grievance alleging that Reams and Baker "abused" him by slamming him into a wall, and then placed him in a holding cell with no bathroom or shower. [R. 2-2, pp. 2, 4, 6] Because this claim appears to be fully exhausted and states a viable claim, the Court will order defendants Baker and Reams to file a response to it. Because Spencer does not allege that any of the other six defendants applied excessive force against him, his claim will be dismissed with respect to each of them.
(2) Placement in Segregation. Spencer challenges his placement in the "multi- purpose" room for several days, alleging that Lieutenant Baker told him that "it" (presumably, his confinement in that room) would end "if I ate." [R. 2, p. 6] Regardless of whether Spencer was placed in administrative or disciplinary segregation, mere confinement in segregation does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship which violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, or the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Minnifeld v. Chandler, 2007 WL 4302694, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Sublett v. Vinson, 2008 WL 237656, at *4-6 (W.D. Ky. 2008); see also Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1428-29 (11th Cir. 1987) (). This claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
(3) Conditions of Confinement in Segregation. Spencer alleges that he was placed in a room with no water, bunk or toilet facilities for several days, a claim he appears to have exhausted. [R. 2-2, p. 2] To prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim, a prisoner must show that he suffered an objective, sufficiently serious deprivation (i.e., one that results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities) and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 842 (1994); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 419 (6th Cir.1984).
Spencer's complaint about being denied access to a bathroom does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, as a short term or temporary placement in a cell without its own bathroom facilities does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Dellis v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1999); Abdur-Reheem-X v. McGinnis, 1999 WL 1045069, at *2 (6th Cir. 1999) (); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1013 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). For example, in Laster v. Pramstaller, 2011 WL 4506956, (E.D. Mich. 2011), the prisoner alleged that the defendants failed to provide him with handicap accessible showers and toilets for six months, and that some of the prison staff members forced him to stay in a cell for four days with no running water or flushable toilet, and poor air circulation. The court held that the prisoner failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because he did not allege that he faced risk of serious harm by the defendants' failure to provide him with handicap-accessible toilets and showers for a six month period. Id. at *12.
Nor does temporary placement in a cell without running water violate the Eighth Amendment. Diaz v. Cumberland County Jail, 2010 WL 3825704, at *4 (D.N.J. 2010); Gibert v. Anderson County Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 328840, at *8 (D.S.C. 2007) (collecting cases). Prisons are not required to provide, nor can prisoners expect to receive, "the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel." Harper v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 2007 WL 204002, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (citation omitted). Spencer's allegation that he was denied a bed for "many days" fails to state a claim for relief absent any allegation that he suffered any concrete physical injury as a result. Grissom v. Davis, 55 F. App'x. 756, 757 (6th Cir. 2003); Shaw v. Mangione, 27 F. App'x. 407, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Toombs, 1996 WL 67750, at *1 (6th Cir. 1996) (). This claim will likewise be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.
(4) Denied Medical Assessment/Treatment for Physical Injuries. Spencer alleges that after he was forcibly removed from his cell, he was refused medical treatment for the injuries he sustained as a result of the alleged excessive force. This claim will be dismissed for two reasons.
First, it is clear from the face of the Complaint and exhibits attached to it that Spencer did not administratively exhaust this claim. Spencer indicates that he filed five inmate grievances. [R. 2, pp. 8-9] In two of those, he alleged that he had been denied proper medical treatment for his anorexia/eating disorder. [R. 2-2, p. 1, 19] Spencer did not, however, file a grievance complaining that he had been denied medical treatment for injuries he allegedly suffered after the cell extraction episode of August 21, 2009. Prisoners must administratively exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit asserting claims relating to the conditions of their confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). A court may dismiss a claim at the initialscreening stage where it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the prisoner did not satisfy this requirement. See Clifford v. Louisiana, 2008 WL 2754737, at *3 (M.D. La. 2008); Whitaker v. Gannon, 2007 WL 2744329, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
Second, this claim fails on the merits because Spencer does not indicate that any of the named defendants were personally involved in the denial of medical care for his injuries; rather, he alleges only that he was in pain from the injuries he sustained. A plaintiff must allege that the named defendant performed the acts that resulted in the deprivation of his...
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