Sperling v. Sperling

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: MILLER
• Citation: Sperling v. Sperling, 567 N.Y.S.2d 538, 165 A.D.2d 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
• Decision Date: 25 March 1991
• Parties: Charlotte C. SPERLING, Respondent, v. Raymond G. SPERLING, Appellant.

Page 538

567 N.Y.S.2d 538

165 A.D.2d 338

Charlotte C. SPERLING, Respondent, v. Raymond G. SPERLING, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

March 25, 1991.

[165 A.D.2d 339] Ben Kinzler, New York City (Steve S. Efron, of counsel), for appellant.

Ralph Rubel, Merrick, for respondent.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and KUNZEMAN, EIBER and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, Justice.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether or not the court improvidently awarded the plaintiff wife lifetime maintenance in the sum of $100 per week. For the reasons that follow, we find the award improvident.

I

This marriage lasted for approximately 20 years, during which the parties had two daughters. Both the husband and the wife worked and struggled to make ends meet. At the time of the trial the plaintiff wife Charlotte was 37 years old, the defendant husband Raymond was 39, and their daughters were 19 and 16 years old, respectively. Raymond, a truck maintenance supervisor, earned a gross annual salary of $30,000. Charlotte, a teacher's aide at a Lutheran school, grossed $9,500 per year. The oldest daughter attended college and received some financial aid while working part time, and received a subsidy from her mother. The younger daughter attended high school while working part time to help pay for ballet lessons. The parties stipulated that the sole asset, the marital residence, would be sold no later than four years after the younger daughter graduated from high school, and the proceeds would be divided equally between them. They also agreed that Charlotte, as the children's custodial parent, would have exclusive possession of the marital residence until it is sold and would pay its maintenance (including mortgage and taxes) until that time.

Charlotte and the children enjoy good health. Raymond testified to being in "fairly decent health" and explained that although he works full time, he suffered two crushed discs in his back and a fractured heel and has been found to be partially permanently disabled. He receives disability benefits.

At the trial, the sole issues were child support and maintenance. The resulting judgment requires Raymond to pay $40 per week per child in child support until each child reached the age of 21 years or is sooner emancipated, and $100 per week maintenance for Charlotte until the death of either party or Charlotte's remarriage.

II

In challenging the maintenance provision of the judgment, Raymond contends that Charlotte is an inappropriate candidate for lifetime maintenance since she is relatively young, healthy, a high school graduate with one year of college and additional training, and various work experience. Charlotte, on the other hand, contends that she devoted her married life (20 years) to contributing to the good of the family as parent, homemaker, and part-time wage earner. She subordinated her personal ambitions and interests to family priorities and should not now, when approaching middle age, be penalized for the sacrifice that redounded to her husband's benefit.

III

Notwithstanding our concern and awareness of the dire plight of many women who, after long-term marriages, are unrealistically expected to enter the competitive job market from which they have been separated, we find that Charlotte does not fit into that unfortunate category. The trial court's conclusion that "[i]t is doubtful she will ever become fully self-supporting" is simply not substantiated by the record or even consistent with other of the court's findings. Notably the court also found that "[w]ith time, plaintiff's clerical skills should expand to include secretarial skills, thereby increasing her earning capacity, although [she] may need to incur some relatively modest, short term training expenses to achieve this goal". Entirely lacking is any basis for the court's ultimate pessimistic prediction that even with training she will never be able to sustain her needs.

That unsupported conclusion is further belied by her past history.

At age 37, Charlotte has demonstrated significant capability and industry. She not only raised two children (who appear to be ambitious and responsible) and maintained a home, but has also worked as a part-time school bus driver (starting when the youngest child was five), a sales person, a bank clerk, and teacher's aide. Since the family was chronically in debt notwithstanding its simple lifestyle, she was unable to complete her training in her chosen field of interpreting for the deaf. Nor was she able to hone her skills as a secretary or computer operator. Consequently, we view the limited nature of her earnings more as an indication of her limited opportunities than of any inherent limitations of her capabilities.

Based upon her age, mental and physical health, and past history, we find that Charlotte, given time and opportunity, will be capable of self support consistent with the parties' marital standard of living, and that, therefore, requiring Raymond to pay nondurational maintenance was improvident. On the other hand, we find the amount awarded insufficient to provide realistically for her rehabilitation.

IV THE LAW PERTAINING TO LIFETIME versus DURATIONAL MAINTENANCE

The amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, Petrie v. Petrie, 124 A.D.2d 449, 507 N.Y.S.2d 550). However, legislative intent and judicial precedent must be considered.

Prior to July 19, 1980, the advent of the Equitable Distribution Law, spousal support after divorce, termed "alimony", continued until terminated by the death of either party, remarriage of the supported spouse, or court modification. The Equitable Distribution Law provided, for the first time in this State, for a distribution of property regardless of title, predicated upon the concept that marriage is an economic partnership, requiring equitable distribution of property obtained during the course of the marriage. Seeking consistency with the economic partnership theory underlying equitable distribution, spousal support after termination of a marriage, now termed "maintenance", was conceived and interpreted as being rehabilitative in nature, based upon the assumption that the supported party would, over a period of time, become capable of self-support, after obtaining the necessary education or training.

In 1986 the Legislature amended Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6) to expressly provide for lifetime as well as durational maintenance (see, L.1986, ch. 884), recognizing that not every spouse would be capable of self-support, even after a period of education and training. The Legislature concluded that the equitable distribution law had been "incorrectly interpreted" by the courts, so as to "deny indefinite maintenance to divorced women who come away from long-term marriages or from short-term marriages where there are young children to be cared for." Such interpretations were found to contribute to the "feminization of poverty" and to be contrary to legislative intent (Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:10, at 224).

Clearly every case must be determined on its unique facts, and the resultant judicial authorities can provide no "bright-line test" clearly differentiating those cases where a spouse is found to be capable of future self-support, and therefore entitled only to durational maintenance, from those where the dependent spouse is found incapable of future self support and entitled to lifetime maintenance. However, the profile of the plaintiff in this case is clearly more identifiable with the former than the latter.

Where lifetime maintenance has been awarded, the recipient spouse has almost invariably been older than Charlotte, often in impaired health. Furthermore, the supporting spouse was in far better financial condition than Raymond. Thus, lifetime maintenance was directed in Reingold v. Reingold, 143 A.D.2d 126, 531 N.Y.S.2d 585 [wife, 52, never worked, husband earned over $100,000 per year], Iacobucci v. Iacobucci, 140 A.D.2d 412, 528 N.Y.S.2d 114 [husband owned a successful insurance business, wife had never worked], Formato v. Formato, 134 A.D.2d 564, 521 N.Y.S.2d 464 [wife, 46, had no business skills, husband earned $72,000 per year], Jones v. Jones, 133 A.D.2d 217, 519 N.Y.S.2d 22 [wife 50, had psychiatric problems; husband earned $58,000 a year], Shahidi v. Shahidi, 129 A.D.2d 627, 514 N.Y.S.2d 259 [husband's expectations were promising, wife had limited potential earning capacity], Kerlinger v. Kerlinger, 121 A.D.2d 691, 504 N.Y.S.2d 454 [wife, 50, no special skills, no high school diploma], Delaney v. Delaney, 114 A.D.2d 312, 494 N.Y.S.2d 4; see also, Delaney v. Delaney, 111 A.D.2d 111, 489 N.Y.S.2d 487 [wife, 47, husband, president of Consolidated Edison, earned...