Sperry Products v. Association of American Railroads

Decision Date12 January 1942
Citation44 F. Supp. 660
PartiesSPERRY PRODUCTS, Inc., v. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Stephen H. Philbin, of New York City (Paul R. Ames and John B. Cuningham, both of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.

George E. Middleton, of New York City (L. B. Mann and Robert C. Brown, Jr., both of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for defendant association.

Louis J. Carruthers, of New York City, for Long Island R. Co.

Cravath, Degersdorff, Swaine & Wood, of New York City (W. F. West, of Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel), for New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.

Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed, of New York City (H. A. Taylor, of New York City, of counsel), for Erie R. Co.

Clive C. Handy, of New York City, for New York Cent. R. Co. and another.

Richard W. Hall, of Boston, Mass., and E. R. Brumley, of New York City, for Boston & M. R. R.

Thomas L. Ennis, of New York City, for Delaware & H. R. Co.

CONGER, District Judge.

Plaintiff has sued for patent infringement the Association of American Railroads, six railroad companies (members of the Association) and an individual director of the Association.

All of the defendants have moved for dismissal, on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and on the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over some of the defendants.

On the oral argument of these motions, it was agreed that the action be dismissed as to the Erie Railroad Company.

All of the defendants were originally served with process in the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleges that all of the defendants are inhabitants of the Southern District of New York. Three of the defendants (Boston & Maine, Delaware and Hudson, and the New York Central) are admittedly inhabitants of the Northern District of New York, and the New York Chicago and St. Louis is an inhabitant of the Western District of New York. After these motions were initiated, but before argument, additional summons were served on these four railroads in the districts in which they are inhabitants. For the purpose of these motions, I shall regard the inhabitancy of each of these railroads, as properly pleaded.

I shall first take up the motion to dismiss brought on by the defendant Association of American Railroads.

The Association is an unincorporated voluntary association of about two hundred railroad companies. It may be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing against it a substantive right existing under the laws of the United States. Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; see, also, United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762. The right sought to be enforced by the plaintiff herein is a substantive right under the Patent Laws of the United States; hence the Association can be sued in its common name for the alleged infringement of a patent.

The Association argues, however, that in a suit for patent infringement, the Court's jurisdiction is limited to Section 48 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 109, which provides, in part, as follows: "Patent Cases. In suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place of business. * * *"

The complaint does not allege infringement in the Southern District of New York. So, in order for this court to have jurisdiction in this action, the Association must be an inhabitant of the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff claims that the Association can be sued in this district, because, although it, itself, as an entity, has no single district in which it inhabits and where it can be sued, nevertheless its status to sue or be sued is that of each member, and that inasmuch as one of its members (Long Island Railroad Company) is an inhabitant of this district, the Association may be sued here. In other words, plaintiff says that the Association is an inhabitant of this district, or an inhabitant of any district in which one of its members is an inhabitant. In furtherance of this theory, plaintiff, in the complaint, alleges that "* * * said association having a regular and established office and place of business * * * within the Southern District of New York, of which district it and some of its members are inhabitants * * *."

I cannot hold with the plaintiff on this point. While the Association may be sued in its common name, it is not itself a legal entity, and while under the Coronado case, supra, and Rule 17(b) there is capacity to be sued, there is no extension of the jurisdictional elements involved, and no extension of the statutory limitations on jurisdiction. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 2 Cir., 61 F.2d 115. It is not a legal person, but more in the nature of a partnership. People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480, 53 S.Ct. 447, 77 L.Ed. 903.

The allegation in the complaint that the Association is an inhabitant of the Southern District of New York carries with it no weight and is meaningless. As the court stated in Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 195 U.S. 207, at page 214, 25 S.Ct. 24, 27, 49 L.Ed. 160, "Here the averment is only that the defendant board of trustees is a citizen of and domiciled in Ohio; not that the trustees themselves are citizens of that state. That averment alone is not sufficient." (citing with approval Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 405, 15 L.Ed. 451). In the Lafayette case, the Court stated: "* * * This court does not hold, that either a voluntary association of persons, or an association into a body politic, created by law, is a citizen of a State within the meaning of the constitution."

The briefs contain many cases on the above proposition of inhabitancy or citizenship. The general consensus of these cases is that an unincorporated association, for the purpose of citizenship and inhabitancy, may not be treated as being a corporation, but is considered more in the nature of a partnership; and that the inhabitancy of a partnership or association is of the state or district in which the members thereof are citizens. See Sutherland et al. v. United States, 8 Cir., 74 F.2d 89. In Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 1, p. 508, this hiatus between capacity to sue and jurisdiction is recognized with this interesting comment: "A partnership or other unincorporated association is not a citizen for jurisdictional purposes. The fictional treatment that has been accorded to corporations has not as yet been extended to them." See also Moore on Federal Practice, Vol. 2, p. 2101.

The question then presents itself, whether or not this means the inhabitancy of all its members. I think it does, although this is rather a harsh rule.

Plaintiff's assertion that the association is an inhabitant of the Southern District of New York because one of its members is an inhabitant of this district is a very interesting one, and might be the practical solution of this question. But I cannot accept that proposition as sound. Plaintiff has furnished me no authority to that effect. Neither have I been able to find any. But I do find authority, at least by inference, for the contention of the Association that it is not a citizen, and its status in the federal courts must be determined by the citizenship of its members —meaning all of its members. For instance, in the case of Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, supra, the court held that the board was entitled to sue and be sued by their collective name, and would be bound by a judgment against it in that name, provided the bill had contained the added allegation that each individual trustee was a citizen of Ohio. In Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, supra, at page 118 of 61 F.2d, the court, after commenting upon Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, supra, stated: "In the case at bar neither allegation nor proof asserts that all the members of the defendant unions are citizens of states other than New Jersey and Pennsylvania." See, also, Ex parte Edelstein, 2 Cir., 30 F.2d 636, certiorari denied Edelstein v. Goddard, 279 U.S. 851, 49 S. Ct. 347, 73 L.Ed. 994.

The next question is whether or not the members of the Association may be sued in a class action under Rule 23, F.R.C.P. for patent infringement.

There is no question but that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of patent infringement suits. Wade v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624, 17 S.Ct. 425, 41 L.Ed. 851; New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 32 S.Ct. 238, 56 L.Ed. 513; Mohawk Mfg. Co. v. Cavicchi, 281 N.Y. 629, 22 N.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in 308 U.S. 522, 60 S.Ct. 294, 84 L.Ed. 442. Federal jurisdiction in the within action is therefore not based on diversity of citizenship.

As I have pointed out above, and will hereafter point out in relation to the New York Central Railroad, Section 48 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 109, governs the jurisdiction of federal courts in patent infringement suits, and limits the place of suit to those district courts meeting the requirements of the section. There is no provision therein for a class action.

The cases cited by plaintiff deal with class actions in which the enforcement of a common law right, or a state statutory right, is sought, necessitating diversity of citizenship between the parties for the basis of federal jurisdiction. I cannot find precedent, nor has any been cited by counsel, in which a class action was brought to enforce a federal substantive right. The case of United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., supra, had the problem of the...

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  • American Newspaper Guild v. MacKinnon, Civ. No. 1992.
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    • U.S. District Court — District of Utah
    • 13 November 1952
    ...201 et seq., Schmidt v. Peoples' Telephone Union of Maryville, Mo., 8 Cir., 138 F.2d 13; the Patent Laws, Sperry Products v. Association of American Railroads, D.C., 44 F. Supp. 660; the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, United Brick & Clay Workers v. Robinson Clay Produc......
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    • 10 August 1949
    ...the district, or has committed an act of infringement within the district in which the action is brought. Cf. Sperry Products v. Ass'n of American Railroads, D. C., 44 F.Supp. 660. The facts here establish that the May Company has committed no act of infringement within this district and th......

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