Spicer v. City of Claremont

• Decision Date: 29 March 1963
• Citation: 189 A.2d 496,104 N.H. 461
• Parties: Earl SPICER et al. v. CITY OF CLAREMONT et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 496

189 A.2d 496

104 N.H. 461

Earl SPICER et al. v. CITY OF CLAREMONT et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued March 5, 1963.

Decided March 29, 1963.

Shulins & Duncan, Newport (Richard C. Duncan, Newport, orally), for plaintiffs.

Sulloway, Hollis, Godfrey & Soden and Joseph S. Ransmeier, Concord (Joseph S. Ransmeier, Concord, orally), for defendants Charles Hardy and Barbara Hardy.

KENISON, Chief Justice.

Although three questions have been transferred without ruling to this court, counsel have treated the second question as the 'primary and main issue in this case.' In other words the question is whether, under the zoning ordinance of the city of Claremont, the term 'motel' is synonymous with the term 'hotel' and is subject to the same limitations as imposed on hotels as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of Ordinance 27 as amended. This ordinance defines a hotel as 'A building in which twenty rooms or more are available for hire and incidental hotel services are provided.' We conclude that the answer to this question is 'no' for the reasons hereinafter stated.

The plaintiffs argue that motels are a modern development of hotels, have many similarities thereto and have been classed as synonymous in certain zoning cases. Maturi v. Balint, 204 Misc. 1011, 130 N.Y.S.2d 122; Schermer v. Fremar Corp., 36 N.J.Super. 46, 114 A.2d 757; Purdy v. Moise, 223 S.C. 298, 75 S.E.2d 605. Additionally it is pointed out that hotels and motels have been classified together for purposes other than zoning. Weiser v. Albuquerque Oil & Gasoline Co., 64 N.M. 137, 325 P.2d 720; Davis v. State, Fla., 87 So.2d 416; Parrish v. Newbury (Ky.Ct. of App.), 279 S.W.2d 299. On the other hand the defendants rely on cases which have reached a contrary conclusion or have emphasized the differences between motels and hotels. Von Der Heide v. Zoning Board, 282 App.Div. 1076, 126 N.Y.S.2d 852; Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. Motel Syracuse, Inc., 283 App.Div. 182, 127 N.Y.S.2d 485, aff'd 309 N.Y. 831, 130 N.E.2d 620; see Costa v. Board of Appeals of Watertown, 340 Mass. 380, 381, 164 N.E.2d 149. In each case, however, the court seeks to ascertain the meaning and intent of the specific municipal zoning ordinance or the governing legislative act (Manchester v. Webster, 100 N.H. 409, 411, 128 A.2d 924) which frequently carries more weight than generalized statements from conflicting cases. Annot. 22 A.L.R.2d 774; Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401; Haar, Land-Use Planning 192 (1959).

In the present case the zoning ordinance of the city of Claremont has placed a restrictive definition and a limitation on what constitutes a hotel by requiring a minimum of twenty rooms. It has not defined motels, restrictively or otherwise, but has indicated an intention to treat motels as distinct from hotels. Cf. Johnson v. Shaw, 101 N.H. 182, 188, 137 A.2d 399. The following stipulation in the reserved case is significant: '10. The Claremont ordinance has not previously been construed to impose a twenty-room minimum size requirement upon motels, but on the other hand, the only motels for which permits have been issued under the ordinance have been upon the basis of permits for less than twenty rooms and such permits have been issued without variance proceedings.' While the administrative construction of the ordinance by the zoning authorities is neither conclusive nor binding on this court in its construction of the ordinance, it is entitled to consideration. Manchester v. Webster, 100 N.H....