Spicer v. Earl

• Decision Date: 17 June 1879
• Citation: 1 N.W. 923,41 Mich. 191
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: FREDERICK SPICER v. JUNE F. EARL.

1 N.W. 923

41 Mich. 191

FREDERICK SPICER v. JUNE F. EARL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 17, 1879

An infant is bound by his executed contract of service, if such contract is, under all the circumstances, reasonable, or not so unreasonable as to be evidence of fraud or undue advantage.

COOLEY, J.

Earl sued Spicer to recover for services as a miller.The services commenced July 5, 1877, and continued until May 14, 1878.Earl claims to have been an infant until March 8, 1878.He however, made the contract of services on his own behalf, and it does not appear that Spicer knew he was under age.When Earl left the service of Spicer, in May, the parties attempted to settle, but failed.Earl claimed that the contract between the parties had been that he was to be paid one dollar a day for his services, and to have his board.Spicer admitted that this was the first arrangement, but claimed that it had been subsequently changed and the wages reduced.Earl had had his board for the whole period and some payments in monev, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that he had at any time repudiated the contract as he understood it.On the contrary, he seems to have continued to work under it for more than than two months after he came of age, and only dissented from it after the failure to settle.He then brought suit on a quantum meruit.

The circuit judge instructed the jury that if the plaintiff was an infant when he made the contract for services he was not bound by it, and could collect the value of his services for the time he worked, unless he had affirmed it after coming of age, and he submitted it to the jury to determine whether anything had been done by him after coming of age by way of affirming or ratifying.The verdict indicates that the jury gave the plaintiff what they believed was the value of his services, and disregarded the contract.

The principle laid down in the case of Squiers v Hydliff,9 Mich. 274, governs this case.It was there held that an infant was bound by his executed contract of service if it was reasonable under all the circumstances, or not so unreasonable as to be evidence of fraud or undue advantage.It is true the contract in that case was one for necessaries exclusively, while this was for necessaries only to the extent of the board; but the fact that something more was to be paid to the infant is not very important.Family servants and many others are commonly employed on the same terms as was this infant.It would be absurd, as well as mischievous, that the right to disaffirm should depend on the circumstance that the employer was to pay something besides the servant's support.It was well said by Justice Christiancy, in the case mentioned, that "it is essential to the protection of infants that they should be bound by contracts of this kind after they have been executed, and this idea of protection lies at the basis of the whole law of infancy.Should the law...