Spicer v. State
Decision Date | 11 June 1914 |
Docket Number | 515 |
Citation | 65 So. 972,188 Ala. 9 |
Parties | SPICER v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Covington County; A.H. Alston, Judge.
Sam Spicer, Jr., was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Henry Opp and Powell & Albritton, all of Andalusia, for appellant.
R.C Brickell, Atty. Gen., W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and W.L Parks, of Andalusia, for the State.
Appellant was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life for the murder of his wife.
Deceased was shot with a shotgun, shortly after dark, and about the time she was finishing up her day's work. She had just about finished cleaning up her dining room after supper, and the other members of the family--her husband and two small children--were preparing to retire for the night. At the moment she was shot she was coming off a gallery or porch into one of the rooms. The person who did the shooting was just outside of the house and only a few feet--10 or 15--from the porch.
The deceased, in her dying declaration, described the circumstances of the shooting as follows, according to the testimony of the physician who attended her and dressed her wound:
The witness was here again examined by the attorney for the state, and testified as follows:
"Mrs. Spicer did not tell me that she saw Joe Green shoot her."
Being asked by the attorney for the state what Mrs. Spicer said about Joe Green's shooting her, the witness testified as follows:
The witness was here examined by the attorney for the defendant, and testified as follows:
The defendant's description of the shooting was, in substance, that he was preparing to retire for the night, had stepped out of doors a few minutes before the shooting. He says, among other things:
The witness was asked the following questions, and gave the following answers:
The record presents many close and difficult questions as to the admissibility and relevancy of evidence. While no entirely new rules of evidence are involved, the application of old rules to new circumstances and conditions is involved. As to some of the questions we are unable to find authorities exactly in point, and can therefore appreciate some of the difficulties which the trial court and counsel have encountered in this case.
Special counsel was employed in the prosecution of the case in the lower court, and, on appeal, in this court. The case has been fully and ably argued by counsel both for the state and for the defense, and their presentation thereof has greatly aided us in our examination of the record.
The state contends that the evidence tends to establish one of three theories: (1) That the defendant used the negro boy, Joe Green, to place the gun and did the shooting himself; (2) that the defendant procured the negro boy, Joe Green, to do the shooting, and defendant then killed Joe Green to suppress his testimony and conceal the crime; (3) a conspiracy between defendant and Joe Green to kill Mrs. Spicer in order to procure the $17,000 of insurance on the life of Mrs. Spicer in favor of the defendant, defendant agreeing to make some division of the proceeds with Joe Green.
The evidence is voluminous. It consists of nearly 300 pages of closely typed matter, The evidence takes a very wide range. It is admitted by the state, and was so charged by the court to the jury, that the evidence to show the defendant's guilt was wholly circumstantial.
There were scores of exceptions and questions reserved as to the admission and the rejection of evidence. All these have been examined, but it is impossible to treat each exception separately. We will, of necessity, have to group the objections and exceptions touching the evidence, and treat each class merely.
On the trial the state sought to prove, and did prove, that the defendant had procured several policies of insurance, in his favor, on the life of his wife; such policies aggregating about $17,000. This fact was admissible as tending to show motive on the part of defendant to take the life of the insured--deceased. Wills on Circum. Ev. pp. 154e, 120, 359g, and authorities cited; Com. v. Clemmer, 190 Pa. 202, 42 A. 675; Com. v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452; State v. Rainsbarger, 74 Iowa, 196, 37 N.W. 153; Brandt v. Com., 94 Pa. 290.
The trial court, however, allowed the state too...
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Lane v. State
..." ‘ "Motive is defined as ‘an inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to do or commit the crime charged.’ Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 11, 65 So. 972, 977 (1914). Motive has been described as ‘that state of mind which works to "supply the reason that nudges the will and prods the......
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State v. Mcmahan
...which is in the possession of opposing counsel, but which is not offered in evidence." (16 C. J. 858, § 2161, note, 71; Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 65 So. 972; Wendling v. Comm. 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205; v. Nields, 70 Cal.App. 191, 232 P. 985.) If any error was committed by reason of fail......
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Russell v. State
...Motive is defined as "an inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to do or commit the crime charged." Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 11, 65 So. 972, 977 (1914). Motive has been described as "that state of mind which works to ‘supply the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind......
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Billups v. State, No. CR-05-1767 (Ala. Crim. App. 11/13/2009)
...has stated: "`"Motive is an inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to do or commit the crime charged." Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 26, 65 So. 972, 977 (1914). Motive is "that state of mind which works to `supply the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the ......