Spicer v. Trust

• Citation: 336 S.W.3d 466
• Decision Date: 29 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. SC 91117.,SC 91117.
• Parties: Gwen Marie SPICER, Appellant,v.DONALD N. SPICER REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, et al., Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

336 S.W.3d 466

Gwen Marie SPICER, Appellant,

v.DONALD N. SPICER REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, et al., Respondents.

No. SC 91117.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

March 29, 2011.

Ron Ribaudo, The Ron Ribaudo Law Firm, Valley Park, for Gwen Spicer.Gregory G. Fenlon, Clayton, for trust and trustee.WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Chief Justice.I. Introduction

Ms. Gwen Marie Spicer (“Appellant”) appeals a judgment granting a motion to enforce settlement and ordering her to sign a consent order and judgment. Appellant argues, among other things, that the judgment should be vacated and that the initial judgment in the suit, which was set aside, should be reinstated.

This Court finds that the initial judgment is the final judgment in this case. Because that judgment was not timely appealed, this Court must dismiss the appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Several years after Appellant and Donald Spicer (“Donald”) were married, they purchased real property located at 5367 Southview Hills Court in St. Louis, Missouri.¹ Marital difficulties ensued, causing Appellant to move into a separate home, while Donald continued to reside on the property.

On or about May 31, 2007, Donald executed a General Warranty Deed, purportedly conveying a one-half undivided interest in the property unto the Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust U/T/A dated February 7, 2002. Donald died July 3, 2007, while he and Appellant were still lawfully married. Per the trust provisions, Steven G. Spicer became the successor trustee of the trust.

Appellant filed a petition to quiet title on August 21, 2007, naming the trust as the sole defendant. The petition, in essence, sought to have the deed canceled, alleging that Appellant and Donald had purchased the home as tenants by the entirety and, upon Donald's death, she lawfully became the sole and fee simple owner of the property. Further, Appellant maintained that she had never executed a marital waiver, consent, conveyance or the like in connection with the property. Counsel entered and filed an answer on the trust's behalf, stipulating to the bulk of Appellant's petition, but contending that the deed effectively operated as a unilateral termination of the tenancy by the entirety.

Three months later, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, praying that the deed be canceled and that the trust be required to pay her attorney's fees and court costs. The trial court granted Appellant's motion on January 22, 2008, ordering the deed be canceled, while crossing-out the provision in the judgment awarding attorney's fees and court costs (“Judgment I”).

Sixteen days later, the trustee, who was not named in the pleadings, filed a “Motion of Trustee, Appearing by Special Appearance, to Set Aside Judgment and to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” (the “Trustee's Motion”). The Trustee's Motion asserted that “the only defendant before the [c]ourt is the trust named by Plaintiff.” As such, the Trustee's Motion argued that the trust was not a legal entity capable of being sued and that the failure to either name the trustee or the beneficiaries as parties, who the trustee alleged were necessary parties, was a jurisdictional defect in the case.

On February 25, 2008, 34 days after Judgment I's entry, the court granted the Trustee's Motion to set aside Judgment I, but declined to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, the court ordered Appellant to amend her pleadings to include the trustee. After Appellant filed amended pleadings to include the trustee and certain beneficiaries of the trust, the case proceeded. ²

Just before trial was to commence, attorneys for both sides engaged in a series of settlement negotiations. Although a purported settlement was reached between the attorneys, Appellant denied its validity. The trustee and his accompanying defendants filed a motion to enforce the alleged settlement. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the parties had reached a valid settlement. Accordingly, on June 24, 2009, the trial court ordered the parties to sign a consent order and judgment. To date, the consent judgment has not been signed. Appellant filed a motion to stay the judgment, which was granted, and, on August 27, 2009, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.

III. Standard of Review

“In all appeals, this Court is required to examine its jurisdiction sua sponte.” In re Marriage of Werths, 33 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Mo. banc 2000)

IV. Rules 75.01 and 81.05 Provide for Finality of Judgments and Timeliness of Appeals

Rule 75.01 provides that “the trial court retains control over judgments during the 30–day period after entry of judgment and may, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend or modify its judgments within that time period.” ³ After the expiration of the 30 days provided by Rule 75.01, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction, unless a party timely files an authorized after-trial motion.⁴ (emphasis added) See Rule 81.05; Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Mo. banc 1987) (per curiam). Following divestiture, any attempt by the trial court to continue to exhibit authority over the case, whether by amending the judgment or entering subsequent judgments, is void. See State ex rel. Berbiglia, Inc. v. Randall, 423 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. banc 1968); State ex rel. Lafayette County Comm'n v. Ravenhill, 776 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Mo. banc 1989). However, “[w]here the ‘judgment’ in question is not final, Rule 75.01 does not apply ... and the trial court retains jurisdiction to enter a final judgment.” Williams v. Williams, 41 S.W.3d 877, 878 (Mo. banc 2001) (citations omitted).⁵

A. Judgment I was a Final Judgment

“If an intended judgment does not dispose of all issues and all parties in the case or does not form a final disposition of the matter it is not a final, appealable judgment....” Avidan v. Transit Cas. Co., 20 S.W.3d 521, 523 (Mo. banc 2000) (quoting Wallace v. Hankins, 541 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo.App.1976)). To that end, “it is well established that a judgment or decree in a quiet title action must affirmatively adjudge the title of the several parties.” Harrington v. Muzzy, 258 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Mo. banc 1953)

The instant case is predicated on a quiet title action, in which Appellant petitioned for the deed to be canceled and the trust to pay attorney's fees and court costs. Judgment I disposed of all the issues and parties in the action, ordering that the deed be canceled and denying Appellant's request for attorney's fees and court costs. As the deed was the only impediment to Appellant's absolute claim to title, cancellation of the deed adjudged the title of the several parties. There was nothing left for the court to do and, accordingly, Judgment I formed a final disposition of the quiet title action.

Respondents' contention that the issue of attorney's fees remained outstanding is without merit. The trial court chose not to award Appellant attorney's fees and court costs, by crossing-out that provision in the judgment and placing the judge's signature next to it.

B. The Trial Court Lost Jurisdiction Over the Case

Judgment I was entered January 22, 2008. Because it was a final judgment, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case 30 days after its entry. See Rules 75.01 and 81.05(a)(1); Sprung, 727 S.W.2d at 886. On February 25, 2008, the court had no authority to set aside Judgment I.

Respondents argue that the Trustee's Motion, filed 16 days after Judgment I's entry, constituted an authorized after-trial motion, permitting the trial court to set aside Judgment I in excess of 30 days after its entry. Pursuant to Rule 81.05(a)(2), “the timely filing of either a motion for a new trial or an ‘authorized after-trial motion’ extends a trial court's jurisdiction for up to ninety days after the filing of the motion.” Massman Const. Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 914 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo. banc 1996); accord Rule 81.05(a)(2). The provisions of Rule 81.05 are, however, expressly limited to parties. Rule 81.05 (“If a party files an authorized-after trial motion ...”); Cf. State ex rel. Wolfner v. Dalton, 955 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. banc 1997).

The trustee clearly was not a party to the lawsuit. Until the trustee's Motion was filed, neither the trustee's name nor any reference to him appeared in the petition or the pleadings. The Trustee's Motion itself acknowledges that “the only defendant before the [c]ourt is the trust named by Plaintiff.”

Wolfner is analogous. 955 S.W.2d 928. In Wolfner, parties to a quiet title action commenced an original proceeding in prohibition to prevent enforcement of an order granting nonparties' Rule 74.06(b) motion to set aside the judgment. Id. Among other things, the nonparties claimed an interest in the property and alleged they had filed motions to intervene that had yet to be called for hearing. This Court held no relief could be afforded under Rule 74.06(b) because its provisions “are limited to parties.” Id. at 930. This Court went on to explain that the purported motions to intervene “were not properly completed, nor called for hearing, until after the [judgment] had become final and the trial court had already lost jurisdiction of the case.” Id. at 929–31. Specifically, this Court noted that:

An individual cannot be divested of any interest in real property without having been a party to the litigation. This justifies adding such an individual to a lawsuit even after a decree has been entered. However, the power of the trial court to do anything in a lawsuit after all issues have been resolved is limited to thirty days, as set out in Rule 75.01.

Id. at 931.

Just as Wolfner interpreted Rule 74.06(b) to be limited to parties, it is equally clear that only a party may trigger the extension of the trial court's jurisdiction permitted under Rule 81.05(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 81.05(a)(1), because no party filed an authorized post-trial motion, Judgment...