Spierer v. Rossman
| Decision Date | 14 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–3171.,14–3171. |
| Citation | 798 F.3d 502 |
| Parties | Robert E. SPIERER, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Corey E. ROSSMAN, et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jeanine Kerridge, Attorney, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Dane A. Mize, Skiles Detrude, John C. Trimble, Robert M. Baker, IV, Attorney, Lewis Wagner, LLP, James Gregory Garrison, I, Joshua Taylor, Attorney, Garrison Law Firm, LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Carl A. Salzmann, Salzmann Law, Bloomington, IN, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
After a night of heavy drinking, Lauren Spierer, a twenty-year-old Indiana University student, left the apartment of a classmate and disappeared. Four years later, she remains missing. Lauren's parents brought suit against three students who were with Lauren in the hours before her disappearance, alleging negligence and violations of Indiana's Dram Shop Act. After some claims were dismissed but before discovery was conducted, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could only speculate about whether the defendants were the proximate cause of any injury sustained. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed, contesting both the dismissal of claims and the award of summary judgment for the defendants. We affirm.
Because the district court granted summary judgment before general discovery was conducted, the facts are limited largely to those stated in the complaint. As alleged, the pleadings attempt to impose a measure of cohesion onto events spanning several hours and locations and involving various individuals—each of whom had been drinking alcohol, in some cases heavily. The result, by no fault of the plaintiffs, is that much of what we would like to know is missing, while much of what we do know defies apparent logic.
What we know with certainty is that this case is a tragedy. On June 2, 2011, Jason Rosenbaum, a student at Indiana University, threw a party at his apartment. Among his guests were fellow students Lauren Spierer, Corey Rossman, and Michael Beth, who, by all appearances, were well-acquainted with each other. Rosenbaum served alcoholic drinks at his party, and Lauren—scarcely five feet tall and one hundred pounds—was among those served.
She was not alone. For his part, Rossman drank heavily, and eventually he and Lauren left the party and went to his apartment which was located in the same complex. Rossman's roommate, Michael Beth, had been at Rosenbaum's party and returned to the apartment where he encountered the two. Despite the fact that Lauren was visibly intoxicated, Rossman encouraged her to join him at a bar named Kilroy's that was located a few blocks from the apartment. He informed Beth that he wanted to have “three more drinks at the bar and then [he would] be feeling good.”
Approximately one hour after leaving Rosenbaum's party, Lauren and Rossman went to Kilroy's where Lauren was observed stumbling and requiring Rossman's assistance to walk. Disregarding her precarious condition, Rossman bought Lauren several drinks; eventually she lost her shoes and mobile phone. They remained at Kilroy's until approximately 2:30 in the morning.
After leaving Kilroy's, the pair initially headed to Lauren's apartment complex where they encountered other students outside the elevator on Lauren's floor. Rossman got into a physical altercation with one of those students who took issue with him for failing to assist the visibly intoxicated Lauren into her apartment. Instead of escorting Lauren from the elevator to her apartment—a distance less than a hundred yards—the pair set off for his apartment where Rossman was observed en route carrying Lauren slung across his back.
At around 3:30 in the morning, Michael Beth (Rossman's roommate) returned to the apartment and was startled to find Rossman and Lauren there. At first, he suspected that they were burglars because the apartment had been the site of previous crimes. Instead, he encountered Lauren, who appeared even more intoxicated than she had been earlier in the evening. The pleadings suggest that Rossman went to sleep at this point and that Beth was left alone with Lauren. In light of her condition—she was slurring her speech, for example—Beth tried to convince Lauren to sleep on the couch in the apartment. Lauren, however, wanted to go back to her apartment. For reasons that are not clear, instead of escorting Lauren back to her apartment, Beth brought her to Rosenbaum's apartment, which had been the site of the party earlier that evening.
Rosenbaum also grew concerned when he saw Lauren's condition. He attempted to contact several of her friends for the purpose of arranging a ride back to her apartment but was unable to arrange transport. At this point, Beth left his apartment. Shortly afterwards, at approximately 4:30 a.m., Rosenbaum allowed Lauren to leave his residence on her own and briefly observed her walking in the direction of her apartment. He was the last known person to see Lauren alive. A security camera located along Lauren's return route did not capture any images of her walking home.
Despite four years of extensive searching, there is no credible information about what happened to Lauren after she left Rosenbaum's apartment. Taking matters into their own hands, Lauren's parents filed this suit, alleging that Rossman, Rosenbaum, and Beth were negligent, both at common law and by Indiana statute, for failing to fulfill their duty to care for Lauren in her incapacitated condition. Additionally, the plaintiffs brought a Dram Shop claim against Rossman and Rosenbaum for furnishing Lauren with alcohol despite knowing that she was intoxicated at the time.
The defendants each filed motions to dismiss and discovery was stayed pending their resolution. The district court granted Beth's motion and dismissed all claims against him. Also, it dismissed the claims for common law negligence against Rossman and Rosenbaum but denied their respective motions to dismiss the other claims.
After the resolution of the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs cast a wide net on discovery. To that end, they sought to conduct upwards of fourteen depositions, twelve of them of non-parties, in multiple locations, including New York, Boston, Detroit, and Chicago; they also issued subpoenas for an array of academic, disciplinary, telephone, and other records from various individuals.
After the stay of discovery was lifted but before the parties exchanged initial disclosures, Rosenbaum moved for summary judgment (and was later joined by Rossman) on the grounds that the plaintiffs were unable to offer proof that the defendants were the proximate cause of any verifiable injury to Lauren—disappearance, by itself, is not legally deemed an injury, so proof of some injury was required to support their claims. The defendants also moved to quash the non-party subpoenas and to limit discovery to the issue of proximate cause, that is, to address only evidence related to whether the defendants' actions caused severe injury or death to Lauren.
A series of back-and-forth filings ensued that culminated with the district court upholding the magistrate judge's decision to limit discovery to the issue of proximate causation. Additionally, because the plaintiffs had responded to defendants' summary judgment motions, those motions were deemed ripe for adjudication and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge three rulings: the decision to limit discovery, the grant of summary judgment, and the dismissal of the common law negligence claims. They argue that the summary judgment motions were premature and that the defendants failed to meet their burden to demonstrate the absence of material fact regarding causation. Additionally, the plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of the common law negligence claims, contesting its reading of Indiana law that no duty of care existed and that Lauren did not constitute a child to support a common law claim for loss of services of a child. We review these arguments.
At the outset, we analyze two related issues that overlap due to some unique features of this litigation. The first is the decision by the magistrate judge (and adopted by the district judge) to suspend discovery pending the resolution of the summary judgment motions. This is a procedural issue that implicates the scope of a litigant's right to conduct discovery. The second issue involves the actual resolution of the summary judgment motions and the respective burdens carried by the litigants. In short, whether a party can move for summary judgment prior to discovery and whether a party can support its burden absent such discovery are separate inquiries that run together due to particularities of this case.
We review first whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide plaintiffs additional time for discovery. Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 885 (7th Cir.2005). In the absence of a local rule or court order stating otherwise, Rule 56(b) allows a party to move for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of discovery. No such rule or order exists here, so the defendants acted within their rights to move for summary judgment even though substantial discovery had not occurred. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). But moving for pre-discovery summary judgment does not automatically mean that a court has to entertain the motion. Rule 56(d) allows the nonmoving party to submit an affidavit or declaration requesting the court to defer or deny judgment in order to allow for appropriate discovery to address matters raised by the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Here, the plaintiffs took an unusual course of action: they responded to the motion and...
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