Spierling v. Ohl
| Decision Date | 20 February 1908 |
| Citation | 83 N.E. 1068,232 Ill. 581 |
| Parties | SPIERLING v. OHL. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Vermilion County; M. W. Thompson, Judge.
Action by John Spierling against Theodore Ohl. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
J. B. Mann, for appellant.
Buckingham & Troup, for appellee.
This was an action of ejectment brought by plaintiff to recover a strip of land 200 feet wide across a tract of land 356.4 feet wide. Plaintiff claimed title in fee. Defendant pleaded the general issue. By agreement of the parties the cause was tried by the court on a stipulation of facts, which was, in substance, that on March 14, 1905, plaintiff owned and was in possession of the lands described in the declaration; that prior to said date the Chicago & Southern Railway Company had filed a petition in the county court of Vermilion county to condemn said land for right of way; that on said March 14, 1905, plaintiff, by a statutory form of warranty deed, conveyed the land described in the declaration to said railroad company for the consideration of $485, which was paid; that said railroad company took possession of said land under said deed and dismissed its petition, and on June 24, 1906, conveyed said land by warranty deed to defendant, who thereupon took possession and has so remained in possession; and that the defendant has not used, and does not intend to use, said land for railway purposes. Plaintiff asked the court to hold as propositions of law that the railroad company acquired by the conveyance nothing but the right to use the land for right of way purposes, and that its title was the same as if it had acquired the land by the exercise of the right of eminent domain; that upon the abandonment of the land by the railroad company the title reverted to plaintiff; that the law does not permit a railroad company to sell land it has acquired for right of way by purchase; and that, when defendant accepted the conveyance from the railroad company, he took it with notice of the law governing such transactions. These propositions the court refused, and held in propositions of law asked by defendant that the deed from plaintiff vested in the railroad company a fee-simple title, and that the railroad company had a right to sell and convey the same and vest the title thereto in its grantee. No question was raised on the trial whether ejectment was the proper form of action or not. The court rendered judgment for defendant, and plaintiff has brought the case to this court by appeal.
So far as we are informed, this case presents a question that has not heretofore been presented to and passed upon by this court. Appellant relies upon Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 149 Ill. 457, 37 N. E. 78, and St. Louis & Belleville Railroad Co. v. Van Hoorebeke, 191 Ill. 633, 61 N. E. 326, but the question here presented was not involved in either of those cases.
It will be observed from the stipulation of facts that the deed was the ordinary statutory form of warranty deed, purporting to convey to the railroad company the title in fee simple, without any conditions or reservations. By section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution it is provided that ‘the fee of land taken for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners, subject to the use for which it is taken’; and appellant contends that a railroad company cannot acquire, by voluntary conveyance of the owner, any greater title than it would acquire by condemnation. While it appears that the railroad company sought to obtain the land for right of way purposes, the conveyance is not limited to such uses by the grantee, and, unless the law prohibits a railroad company from acquiring, by purchase, title in fee simple to its right of way, this deed must be held to have vested in the grantee the fee-simple title. In Nye v. Taunton Branch Railroad Co., 113 Mass. 277, after stating that the statutes of...
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Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Thompson
...right of way or for other railway purposes. Ill.R.S.1927, c. 114, § 20(3); Walker v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., supra; Spierling v. Ohl, 232 Ill. 581, 83 N. E. 1068, 13 Ann.Cas. 430; and see Rockford Trust Co. v. Moon, 370 Ill. 250, 18 N.E.2d 447; Noyes v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., Ill., 21 N.E......
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Coates & Hopkins Realty Co. v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co.
...F.2d 160; Midstate Oil Co. v. Railroad Co., 270 P. 216; Radetsky v. Jorgensen, 202 P. 175; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 150 S.E. 845; Spierling v. Ohl, 232 Ill. 581; Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 123 N.E. 1; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Town of Churdan, 195 N.W. 996; Des Moines City......
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Carter Oil Co. v. Welker
...of condemnation proceedings, in the absence of limitation, takes not a limited title but an estate in fee simple. Spierling v. Ohl, 232 Ill. 581, 83 N.E. 1068, 13 Ann. Cas. 430. Under the first mentioned statute it is held that to create a limited estate there need be no express words of li......
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