Spiers v. Consolidated Companies

Decision Date29 June 1961
Docket NumberNo. 45521,45521
Citation241 La. 1012,132 So.2d 879
PartiesLuther SPIERS v. CONSOLIDATED COMPANIES, Inc., et al.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Taylor, Porter, Brooks, Fuller & Phillips, Cadwallader & Perkins, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellants-relators.

Durrett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritchie, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee-respondent.

HAWTHORNE, Justice.

In this case we are called upon to review a judgment of the Court of Appeal which affirmed a judgment of the district court awarding to plaintiff Luther Spiers, a conductor for the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway, $50,000 for personal injury sustained by him. The defendants are Consolidated Companies, Inc., and its liability insurer, Travelers Insurance Company.

Plaintiff in brief filed in this court states that the original opinion of the Court of Appeal 'contains a detailed and fair statement of the case and is now reported as Spiers v. Consolidated Companies, 125 So.2d 795'; 1 hence we shall set forth only such facts as may be necessary for our decision in the case.

Defendant Consolidated Companies, Inc., maintained and operated through a subsidiary a large warehouse on the west side of the L. & A. right of way in the City of Baton Rouge. The L. & A. constructed a spur or side track along the western edge of its right of way parallel and adjacent to the warehouse in order to provide direct access to railway facilities for defendant and others. The area or space between the spur and the mainline tracks was 12.8 feet. In 1933, approximately 27 years ago, the railway and the defendant Consolidated entered into an agreement which provided with reference to this space:

'13. Carrier agrees to permit Shipper and assigns to use the space between Carrier's main line and the proposed spur track as a private driveway between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., it being expressly understood that this shall not constitute a dedication of this property to public use but is for the sole benefit of Shipper and assigns. Any vehicle using driveway shall at all times have a driver in charge so as to immediately move said vehicle on the approach of trains or as otherwise necessary * * *.'

The space covered by this agreement, situated between the spur or side track and the main line, was within the L. & A. railroad yards in the commercial district of the City of Baton Rouge. The maximum legal speed limit for trains in this area was eight miles per hour, and the rules of the railroad provided that trains should be operated in the yard limits in such a manner that the engineer should be able to stop short of obstructions or unlined switches.

Pursuant to the agreement between Consolidated and the railroad, for 23 years the space between the spur line and the main line was used not only by the trucks of Consolidated but also by those of other shippers and even the L. & A. Railway itself for loading and unloading freight from boxcars on the railway siding, and during this time it is evident that innumerable cars were loaded and unloaded. Due to the size of this area only very small trucks could use it for its intended purpose without obstructing the main track of the L. & A. Railway. Large trucks, of course, blocked the main line. During all these years trains, including freight trains, passenger trains, and switch engines, had occasion to stop innumerable times to permit trucks to be removed from the main line of the railway. The officials and employees of the railroad, including Spiers himself, knew of this situation and accepted it without complaint, and this is undisputed. The loading and unloading of boxcars at this particular site, pursuant to the agreement and with the full consent and approval of the railroad, had gone on for over 23 years Without injury to anyone.

Because of the position of the spur track in relation to the main line, the blocking of the main line when the area was being used was inevitable, and it is clear to us that the agreement between the railway and the defendant Consolidated contemplated the blocking of the main line because the use of the area as a private driveway was limited to the hours of daylight from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., because the agreement provided that a vehicle using the driveway should at all times have a driver in charge so that it could be immediately moved on the approach of trains, and also because the railroad had a right to install gates which Consolidated was to keep closed except when the space was in use for Consolidated's purposes. That the blocking of the main line was contemplated is further established by the fact that for a period of 23 years on innumerable occasions the line was blocked with the full knowledge, consent, and approval of the railroad, for certainly the railroad would not have permitted this practice to become established if the blocking of its line had not been contemplated by the agreement. Furthermore, if the space itself had been large enough to permit the loading and unloading of boxcars without blocking the main line, the trains could have passed even when a truck was using the space, and the provisions in the portion of the agreement which we have quoted would have been unnecessary.

Plaintiff Luther Spiers was a conductor in charge of L. & A. Freight Train No. 42 on its regular run from New Orleans to Kansas City. On the date of the accident, October 16, 1956, this train, consisting of over 100 cars, was proceeding north, and as it entered the railway yards it was travelling, according to the engineer as closely as he could estimate, at eight miles per hour. 2 The engineer stated that as he rounded a curve a few hundred feet south of defendant's warehouse, he observed that the main line was blocked by a truck; 3 that to avoid striking this truck it became necessary for him to make an emergency stop. Plaintiff, the conductor, was riding in the caboose, and the jar caused by the emergency stop knocked him from his seat. According to plaintiff, this fall caused a strain to his right side, and because of this he developed a right inguinal hernia. On October 27, 1956, 11 days after the accident, he underwent surgery for the correction of this hernia. On November 1, 1956, he was discharged from the hospital, and nine days later, on November 9, he suffered a heart attack which has rendered him totally and permanently disabled.

After the accident plaintiff instituted suit in the United States district court to recover from the railroad a large sum for injuries sustained by him in the course of his employment. In his petition he alleged that the accident with which we are here concerned was caused by the negligence of the railroad in permitting its main line to be blocked by a truck or other vehicle of one of its customers at or near the end of a curve, where to the knowledge of the railway, its agents, servants, and employees it would be difficult for an engineer to see a vehicle blocking the main line until the train was near it; that the railway permitted the truck to be left standing on the main line which was not a street or crossing, and that this constituted negligence; further, that the railway engineer on the train was negligent in failing sooner to see the truck and in travelling at the speed at which he was operating, and was also negligent in the manner in which he suddenly and abruptly stopped the train, causing plaintiff to be thrown forward and sustain injuries. In a compromise settlement the railway paid the plaintiff $20,000. Plaintiff reserved his right against Consolidated but reduced his demand against Consolidated to $50,000, the amount of liability insurance carried by Consolidaed with Travelers Insurance Company. This requirement was made by the railroad to lessen any friction existing between it and Consolidated, one of its valued shippers.

The basis of plaintiff's suit against Consolidated is either that the disabling heart attack was the direct result of the injury sustained in the accident of October 16, 1956, which was caused by defendant's negligent blocking of the railroad line, or that the negligent blocking of the main line of the railway by defendnt's truck caused the emergency stop of the train, that the emergency stop caused his fall, that the fall caused the hernia, that the hernia necessitated the operation, and that the operation brought on the disabling heart attack.

Defendant contends that because of the unusual and peculiar circumstances which existed in this case it was not guilty of negligence, or that even if it were negligent, its negligence was not as a matter of law the proximate and contributing cause of the accident; that the negligence of the engineer in failing to make a gradual, normal stop when he had ample time to do so was the sole proximate cause of the accident; and also that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a causal relationship between the accident, the operation, and the disabling heart attack. 4

The case in the district court was tried before a jury, which awarded plaintiff $50,000. The district judge overruled defendant's motion for a new trial, and stated that there was some evidence to support the jury's verdict although personally he might have some doubt about it, and that he would not reduce the award although he considered it generous.

The Court of Appeal on original hearing reversed the judgment of the lower court and held that the negligence of the driver of the truck was not the proximate cause of the accident, and that the negligence of the engineer was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Judge Tate dissented, being of the opinion that the majority had correctly stated the law but basing his dissent on his interpretation of certain facts found by the majority. He subsequently wrote what is styled an 'addendum to dissent', in which he stated that he erred in his original dissent when he said that he agreed with the legal principles...

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12 cases
  • Sparacello v. Andrews
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • December 23, 1986
    ...153 So.2d 869 (La.1963) Townsend v. Missouri Pacific R.C. 163 La. 872, 113 So.2d 130 (La.1927) Spiers v. Consolidated Company 241 La. 1012, 132 So.2d 879 (La.1961) In a jury trial, the judge is not required to give the precise instructions submitted by either party, but must give instructio......
  • Vidrine v. General Fire & Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • October 27, 1964
    ...the failure to use such care as is necessary to avoid danger which should and could have been anticipated. Spiers v . Consolidated Companies, 241 La. 1012, 132 So.2d 879; Larned v. Wallace, La.App. 3 Cir., 146 So.2d 434; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956), Sections 16.1 (p. 896), 16.......
  • Reeves v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1973
    ...244 La. 631, 153 So.2d 869 (1963); Townsend v. Missouri Pac. R.S., 163 La. 872, 113 So. 130 (1927). See also Spiers v. Consolidated Companies, 241 La. 1012, 132 So.2d 879 (1961). Applying these principles to the facts of this case, plaintiff's conduct was not a legal cause of the collision ......
  • Dartez v. City of Sulphur
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • October 27, 1965
    ...instead, nor to guard against resulting harms so highly extraordinary as to be unforeseeable within reason. Spiers v . Consolidated Companies, 241 La. 1012, 132 So.2d 879; Green v. State, La.App. 1 Cir., 91 So.2d 153; Restatement of Torts 2d (1965), Section 435; Annotation, Negligence--Caus......
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