Spillers v. Mont. Third Judicial Dist. Court, OP 19-0109
| Docket Nº | OP 19-0109 |
| Citation | 456 P.3d 560, 398 Mont. 323, 2020 MT 8 |
| Case Date | January 21, 2020 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
398 Mont. 323
456 P.3d 560
2020 MT 8
Jay SPILLERS, Petitioner,
v.
Montana THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Anadonda-Deer Lodge County, the Honorable Ray Dayton, Presiding, Respondent.
OP 19-0109
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs: October 2, 2019
Decided: January 21, 2020
For Petitioner: Torrance L. Coburn, Tipp Coburn and Associates PC, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent: Tammy A. Hinderman, Special Assistant Attorney General, DPHHS Office of Legal Affairs, Helena, Montana
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Jay Spillers filed a complaint alleging violations of state and federal antidiscrimination statutes. The Third Judicial District Court
held that because Montana’s antidiscrimination statutes do not provide for a trial by jury, and because state procedural rules govern procedures in state courts, Montana law precluded a jury trial on Spillers’s federal discrimination claims even though federal law allows a jury trial for federal claims. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Jay Spillers has a visual disability. In 2016, he applied for an administrative assistant position advertised by the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services ("DPHHS"). He was not interviewed for the position and was not hired. The applicants DPHHS interviewed were nondisabled females, and the eventual hiree was a nondisabled female.
¶3 Spillers brought claims in August 2017 under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2012) ; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ; the Montana Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Title 49, MCA; and the Governmental Code of Fair Practices, §§ 49-3-101 to -315, MCA. Spillers alleged that DPHHS engaged in intentional employment discrimination on the basis of his sex and/or disability, in violation of the above statutes. He sought recovery of damages for economic losses, mental anguish, pain and suffering, and other nonpecuniary losses, as well as punitive damages. Spillers demanded a jury trial on all factual issues in his complaint.
¶4 In February 2019, DPHHS filed a motion to strike Spillers’s demand for jury trial. DPHHS contended that the claims brought under Montana law—the MHRA and Governmental Code of Fair Practices—do not allow for jury trials and that the MHRA’s exclusivity provision applied to all of Spillers’s claims. DPHHS asserted that although Spillers’s ADA and Title VII claims provided for a jury trial, that right applied only in federal court and not in state court. DPHHS argued that because the Montana-law claims are not subject to jury trial, the entirety of the matter should proceed to a bench trial as authorized by the MHRA.
¶5 The District Court agreed. It concluded that because Montana procedural law does not provide for a jury trial in discrimination cases, Spillers did not have a right to a jury trial on his federal discrimination claims. Spillers petitioned this Court for a writ of supervisory control, seeking reversal of the District Court’s order striking his jury demand. We accepted supervisory control to consider whether Spillers is entitled to a jury trial in state court on his federal antidiscrimination claims.
Spillers v. Third Judicial Dist. , No. OP 19-0109, Or. (Mont. Feb. 21, 2019); M. R. App. P. 14. We now hold that he is.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 The District Court’s determination that Montana law precluded a jury trial on Spillers’s federal claims is a conclusion of law, which we review for correctness. Dukes v. Sirius Constr. , 2003 MT 152, ¶ 11, 316 Mont. 226, 73 P.3d 781 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment based on disability and guarantees equal opportunities for those with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act") created a right to recover additional compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional violations of Title VII and the ADA.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The 1991 Act further provided a party seeking such damages the right to demand a jury trial. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
¶8 The MHRA prohibits certain types of discrimination in employment on the basis of one’s gender or physical disability, among other bases. Section 49-2-303(1)(a), MCA. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry has the authority to enforce the MHRA. Section 49-2-210, MCA. The MHRA establishes administrative procedures and legal remedies to redress acts constituting unlawful discrimination. The MHRA’s exclusivity provision, § 49-2-512(1), MCA, provides:
The provisions of this chapter establish the exclusive remedy for acts constituting an alleged violation of chapter 3 [Governmental Code of Fair Practices] or this chapter, including acts that may otherwise also constitute a violation of the discrimination provisions of Article II, section 4, of the Montana constitution or 49-1-102. A claim or request for relief based upon the acts may not be entertained by a district court other than by the procedures specified in this chapter.
¶9 Thus, the MHRA’s exclusive remedial scheme limits the plaintiff to the specific procedures and remedies established in the MHRA.1 Saucier ex rel. Mallory v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mont., Inc. , 2008 MT 63, ¶ 39, 342 Mont. 29, 179 P.3d 481 ; see also
Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 2010 MT 246, 358 Mont. 193, 244 P.3d 321. If the agency dismisses a discrimination claim, the charging party "may commence a civil action for appropriate relief on the merits of the case[.]" Section 49-2-511(3)(a), MCA ; see also Griffith , ¶ 36. We have held that a state discrimination claim in district court may not be tried before a jury, Saucier , ¶ 42, and the parties do not argue otherwise.
¶10 Spillers argues that his federal claims are separate and distinct from the state claims, with a separate right to a jury trial granted by federal law and authorized by Montana law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a ; M. R. Civ. P. 38, 39. He asserts that although his claims center on allegations of the same discriminatory conduct, the MHRA, Title VII, and the ADA each grant substantive rights. He argues that not every violation of the MHRA constitutes a violation of federal law and thus the claims should be considered separately. He points out that the MHRA does not allow recovery of punitive damages, whereas Title VII and the ADA allow such damages in the case of intentional discriminatory conduct. Section 42-2-506(2), MCA; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Spillers contends that under Landgraf v. USI Film Prods ., 511 U.S. 244, 281, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the right to a jury trial under § 1981a is a substantive right to his federal discrimination claims over which the District Court exercises concurrent jurisdiction.
¶11 DPHHS responds that the MHRA’s exclusivity provision clearly and unambiguously applies to a claim for relief based on acts that might constitute a violation of those state antidiscrimination laws, regardless of whether the claim arises under state or federal law. DPHHS asserts that because Spillers’s federal claims are based upon the same acts constituting alleged violations of Montana’s antidiscrimination statutes, those claims are governed exclusively by the MHRA. DPHHS argues that the MHRA’s preclusion of a jury trial is purely procedural; it applies "solely to secondary conduct—how a discrimination claim will be administered by the state court system—not to the conduct giving rise to the claim." It contends that by assigning the role of trier of fact to the judge, rather than to a jury, the MHRA does not create or eliminate a federal cause of action or change the extent to which a defendant is liable for discrimination under federal law. Thus, because of the MHRA’s exclusivity provision and the general principle that state procedure controls in state courts, Montana law applies, and Spillers does not have a right to a jury trial in state court.
¶12 In
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly , 494 U.S. 820, 821, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1567, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990), the United States Supreme Court concluded that "Congress did not divest the state courts of their
concurrent authority to adjudicate" civil actions brought under Title VII. It is undisputed that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Spillers’s federal antidiscrimination claims and thus had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to hear such claims. State courts acting in Title VII and ADA cases are required to apply federal...
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Hill v. Big Horn Cnty. Elementary Sch. Dist. 2, CV 20-42-BLG-SPW-TJC
...§ 1981 claims are federal questions independent from any administrative claims under the MHRA. Spillers v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 456 P.3d 560, 565 (Mont. 2020). Second, Hill's contract claims share the same operative nucleus of facts with the § 1981 claims such that this Court finds i......
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Hill v. Big Horn Cnty. Elementary Sch. Dist. 2, CV 20-42-BLG-SPW-TJC
...§ 1981 claims are federal questions independent from any administrative claims under the MHRA. Spillers v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 456 P.3d 560, 565 (Mont. 2020). Second, Hill's contract claims share the same operative nucleus of facts with the § 1981 claims such that this Court finds i......