Spindle v. Hyde

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri
Writing for the CourtLamm
Citation247 Mo. 32,152 S.W. 19
PartiesSPINDLE v. HYDE et al.
Decision Date30 November 1912
152 S.W. 19
247 Mo. 32
SPINDLE
v.
HYDE et al.
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.
November 30, 1912.
Rehearing Denied December 24, 1912.

1. JUDGMENT (§ 251) — ISSUES — VARIANCE.

A decree setting aside a sheriff's sale and deed at the suit of a judgment creditor, because of the sheriff's failure to set off a homestead to the debtor, was wholly outside the issues and unauthorized, where the issue was merely whether the sale and deed were in fraud of creditors.

2. JUDGMENT (§ 533) — VALIDITY — SETTING ASIDE CONVEYANCES.

In a judgment creditor's suit to set aside conveyances, a decree holding the conveyances invalid, and at the same time treating them as the basis of a valid contract, was inconsistent.

3. JUDGMENT (§ 250) — ISSUES — FRAUD — EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.

Where the bill, in an action to avoid conveyances of the debtor's property before plaintiff acquired a judgment against him for alimony, relied solely and expressly upon fraud, a decree holding the conveyances a blanket, equitable mortgage, and making no mention of fraud, was not responsive to the issues.

4. JUDGMENT (§ 252) — RELIEF — ISSUES.

The rule in equity, that under the general prayer for relief a party may have any relief to which he may show himself entitled, is limited to relief founded on and consistent with the facts set out in the bill.

5. JUDGMENT (§ 1) — DEFINITION.

A "judgment" is but the conclusion in a syllogism having for its major and minor premises the issues raised by the pleadings and the proofs thereon. A judgment is the sentence of the law upon the record.

6. JUDGMENT (§ 250) — PLEADING (§ 403) — ISSUES — CURE OF ERROR.

Where the answer, in an action to set aside conveyances as fraudulent, was in no sense a cross-petition or cross-bill that would entitle defendants, under Rev. St. 1909, § 2535, to have title defined, determined, and decreed, it did not aid the bill, which relied solely and expressly upon fraud, nor authorize a decree holding the conveyances to be equitable mortgages.

7. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 237) — SUIT BY PURCHASER AT SHERIFF'S SALE.

While the judgment creditor, after purchasing at the execution sale, may sue in equity to set aside the debtor's prior conveyance of the property as, in fraud of creditors, the more equitable practice is to sue to set aside such conveyance after judgment and before execution, and thus clear the title and prevent a possible sacrifice of the property on the sale.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Chariton County; Jno. P. Butler, Judge.

Action by Kate Spindle against Lucius D. Hyde and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

J. A. Collett, of Salisbury, and W. M. Williams, of Boonville, for appellants. H. J. West, of Brookfield, for respondent.

LAMM, J.


Plaintiff, for three weeks the wife of Lucius D. Hyde, and residing with him during that time in Chariton county, where he lived, then sued him in the Jackson circuit court for divorce. The relief she obtained in that suit was threefold, viz.: First, a judgment, in January, 1903, for $5,250 alimony; second, the restoration of her maiden name; and, third, the marital bonds binding her to Lucius were cut in twain.

Subsequently, in February, 1904, having sued out execution and caused certain real estate in Chariton county to be levied on as his property, it was struck off to her under the hammer at sheriff's sale, and she received a sheriff's deed. Presently she brought this suit against him and his brother, Walter E. Hyde, the object and general nature of which was to set aside certain recorded conveyances purporting to transfer the land to Walter, which said conveyances are said to have been made in fraud of her right as a subsequent creditor.

From a decree in her favor, but subjecting the land to a lien in favor of Walter in the sum of $1,250, defendants appeal. Plaintiff set out to appeal also, but abandoned it, and rests content with her decree.

There is a main question duly raised below and stoutly pressed here, viz.: Is the decree responsive to the pleadings and issues in the cause? That question seeks an analytical examination of the pleadings and decree with precision and particularity. As the question lies at the threshold, let us attend to it in its logical order.

The cause was tried on an amended bill, full and rich in averment of detail, and as presently seen, leaving no room for cavil or wabble on the theory of the pleader. Summarized, its averments follow: After describing certain real estate, aggregating 445 acres, it avers: That Lucius, on October 22, 1894 (nearly 10 years before the matrimonial venture of Lucius and Miss Spindle), owned it in fee simple, and was in possession; that it was then subject to a deed of trust conveying it to one Rouse, trustee for the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, executed by him in January, 1894, to secure $4,500 of borrowed money. (This deed of

152 S.W. 20

trust is not assailed.) After describing 80 acres (a different tract), the bill next avers that at the same time Lucius owned that tract in fee simple, and was in possession thereof, subject, however, to a vendor's lien in favor of Chariton county for about $75. (This tract, for convenience, will be called "swamp land.") That in October, 1894, one Ehrhardt recovered judgment against Lucius in the Chariton circuit court for the sum of $427.89. That at that time Lucius was greatly in debt, and, while he owned some other property of small value, he had only property enough, if honestly applied, to pay his debts. One other item of several thousand dollars indebtedness, due Wilding and Scrivenor, is set forth. That Wilding and Scrivenor, with other creditors, were pressing for payments of their claims and threatening suit. That Walter was acquainted with the financial condition of Lucius, and knew he was being pressed for payment by his creditors. At this point the bill may as well speak sweepingly for itself, thus: "That the defendants, well knowing all of the facts aforesaid, and in order to cheat and defraud and hinder and delay the existing and subsequent creditors of Lucius D. Hyde, and especially said Wilding and Scrivenor, out of their just claims and demands against him, fraudulently designed and conspired together, at the time of the rendition of said judgment and subsequently, to put the apparent title to all of said lands beyond the reach of said creditors; and, in order to accomplish such design and conspiracy, they agreed to put the apparent title to all of said lands in the name of Walter E. Hyde, with the understanding that he was to hold said title in secret trust for the use of Lucius D. Hyde, Walter E. Hyde to advance whatever money was necessary to make such change in the apparent ownership, and to reimburse himself out of said lands for such moneys as he might so expect."

In order that the understanding of the chancellor might be informed and his conscience be awakened by full information to that end, and that a schedule of particulars, the steps taken to consummate the alleged fraudulent conspiracy and covinous contrivance aforesaid, might be blazoned forth, the bill goes on to set forth such bill of particulars. Before each item thereof is an earmarking allegation to the effect that the thing about to be complained of was done "in pursuance of said fraudulent design and conspiracy," or "in further pursuance of said fraudulent design and conspiracy." After each item are such characterizing averments as this, viz.: That the act so pleaded as a specification, a fraudulent step, was "solely in furtherance of the fraudulent design and conspiracy aforesaid."

The first act so characterized is that in February, 1895, Lucius conveyed to Walter the swamp land by a warranty deed, without consideration, but with a falsely recited consideration of $1,000.

The next step in the alleged fraud is that a few days thereafter, in the same month, he conveyed, by a like deed, to Walter 80 acres of the land first referred to in the bill, and that this conveyance was without consideration, but under a falsely recited one of $2,000.

The next fraudulent step is that Lucius failed to pay the Ehrhardt judgment, and "by a failure to pay the same caused and permitted an execution to be issued"; that the sheriff levied it upon all the land, except the two 80-acre tracts theretofore conveyed to Walter, and, at the regular April term of the Chariton circuit court, sold it under that execution; that at that sale Walter was the purchaser at an inadequate consideration of $488, and received a sheriff's deed; that Lucius permitted such pretended sale, not only to put the apparent title in Walter, but in order to cheat and defraud and hinder and delay his creditors.

The next act of fraud is said to be that Lucius refused to pay the vendor's lien held by Chariton county on the swamp land, and thereby "caused and permitted" the county to institute suit in 1897 to enforce the lien; that the lien was enforced, and the swamp land, sold under the judgment, was purchased by Walter, who received a sheriff's deed; that in that sale Walter was acting for Lucius; that the deed recited a $600 consideration, but in truth nothing was paid, except enough to satisfy the lien.

The next fraudulent step is said to be that Walter procured a patent to issue from the county in his own name, as assignee of Lucius, to the swamp land.

The next fraudulent step is said to be that in 1899 Lucius failed and refused to pay the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company debt, and thereby "caused and procured" the deed of trust to be foreclosed; that at such foreclosure sale Walter became the purchaser, and received a trustee's deed expressing a consideration of $5,500; that he did not buy the land for himself, but for Lucius, and actually paid only the principal debt, with a small amount of accrued interest; that he then borrowed $4,500 from another insurance company (the Prudential),...

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14 practice notes
  • Friedel v. Bailey, No. 29779.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 20 novembre 1931
    ...decree must conform not only to the evidence but also to the pleadings." [21 C.J. 671, sec. 854; 10 R.C.L. 555, sec. 338; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32, 152 S.W. 10; Black v. Early, 208 Mo. 281, l.c. 313, 106 S.W. 1014; Schneider v. Patton, 175 Mo. 684, 75 S.W. 155; Reed v. Bott, 100 Mo. 62, ......
  • Boillot v. Income Guar. Co., No. 19139.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • 23 mai 1938
    ...Stewart v. Omaha L. & T. Co., 283 Mo. 364; Scott v. Lusherman, 273 Mo. 363; Zasenowich v. American Mfg. Co., 213 S.W. 799; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32; 310 Mo. 339, 275 S.W. 579; 273 S.W. 145; 31 S.W. (2d) 86. (8) (a) The positive authority of a decision is coextensive only on the facts on ......
  • Boillot v. Income Guar. Co., No. 19236.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • 23 mai 1938
    ...Stewart v. Omaha L. & T. Co., 283 Mo. 364; Scott v. Lusherman, 273 Mo. 363; Zasenowich v. American Mfg. Co., 213 S.W. 799; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32; 310 Mo. 339, 275 S.W. 579: 273 S.W. 145; 31 S.W. (2d) 86. (8) (a) The positive authority of a decision is coextensive only on the facts on ......
  • Castorina v. Herrmann, No. 34334.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 21 avril 1937
    ...9 Am. St. Rep. 344; Woodard v. Mastin, 106 Mo. 324, 17 S.W. 308; Welch v. Mann, 193 104 S.W.2d 300 Mo. 304, 92 S.W. 98; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32, 152 S.W. 17; Oldham v. Wade, 273 Mo. 231, 200 S.W. 1053; Dalton v. Barron, 293 Mo. 36, 239 S.W. 97.] In such a situation, the courts favor the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
14 cases
  • Friedel v. Bailey, No. 29779.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 20 novembre 1931
    ...decree must conform not only to the evidence but also to the pleadings." [21 C.J. 671, sec. 854; 10 R.C.L. 555, sec. 338; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32, 152 S.W. 10; Black v. Early, 208 Mo. 281, l.c. 313, 106 S.W. 1014; Schneider v. Patton, 175 Mo. 684, 75 S.W. 155; Reed v. Bott, 100 Mo. 62, ......
  • Boillot v. Income Guar. Co., No. 19139.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • 23 mai 1938
    ...Stewart v. Omaha L. & T. Co., 283 Mo. 364; Scott v. Lusherman, 273 Mo. 363; Zasenowich v. American Mfg. Co., 213 S.W. 799; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32; 310 Mo. 339, 275 S.W. 579; 273 S.W. 145; 31 S.W. (2d) 86. (8) (a) The positive authority of a decision is coextensive only on the facts on ......
  • Boillot v. Income Guar. Co., No. 19236.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • 23 mai 1938
    ...Stewart v. Omaha L. & T. Co., 283 Mo. 364; Scott v. Lusherman, 273 Mo. 363; Zasenowich v. American Mfg. Co., 213 S.W. 799; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32; 310 Mo. 339, 275 S.W. 579: 273 S.W. 145; 31 S.W. (2d) 86. (8) (a) The positive authority of a decision is coextensive only on the facts on ......
  • Castorina v. Herrmann, No. 34334.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 21 avril 1937
    ...9 Am. St. Rep. 344; Woodard v. Mastin, 106 Mo. 324, 17 S.W. 308; Welch v. Mann, 193 104 S.W.2d 300 Mo. 304, 92 S.W. 98; Spindle v. Hyde, 247 Mo. 32, 152 S.W. 17; Oldham v. Wade, 273 Mo. 231, 200 S.W. 1053; Dalton v. Barron, 293 Mo. 36, 239 S.W. 97.] In such a situation, the courts favor the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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