Spink v. Lockheed Corp.

Decision Date18 July 1995
Docket NumberNo. 92-56094,92-56094
Citation60 F.3d 616
Parties68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 625, 64 USLW 2088, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. 1648, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5541, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9429, Pens. Plan Guide P 23911I Paul L. SPINK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED CORPORATION; Daniel M. Tellep; Robert A. Furman; Vincent N. Marafino; K.H. Anderson; L. Bernard; R.W. Berry; P.N. Braun-Agel; D.L. Bronco; R.H. Northcutt; W.E. Skowronski; A.G. Van Shaick; W.T. Vincent, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Theresa M. Traber, Bert Voorhees, Traber & Voorhees, Pasadena, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.

Gordon E. Krischer, David E. Gordon, Paul Borden, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before: D.W. NELSON, REINHARDT, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge:

Paul Spink filed a complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals against Lockheed Corporation and certain individual defendants (collectively "Lockheed"). Spink alleged that Lockheed's retirement plan violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1001 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA 1986), Pub.L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986). The complaint also included individual claims based on ERISA and the federal common-law doctrine of equitable estoppel. The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Spink appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Because we are reviewing a dismissal of Spink's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we accept as true all the following material allegations of the complaint. See Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 472 (9th Cir.1994).

Spink worked for various subsidiaries and divisions of the Lockheed Corporation between 1939 and 1950. In May 1979, Spink again began working for Lockheed at the age of 61. At the time he was rehired, the terms of the Lockheed Corporation Retirement Plan for Certain Salaried Employees (Plan) lawfully excluded Spink from participating because he was over sixty years old. The Plan is a noncontributory defined benefit plan that covers substantially all salaried employees at Lockheed and certain subsidiaries.

Prior to rejoining Lockheed in 1979, Spink worked for Hughes Helicopters, where he expected to receive pension benefits if he continued to work through October 31, 1982. In an effort to recruit Spink from Hughes, Lockheed represented that if he accepted its offer of employment, Spink would participate in the Plan and would accrue credited service toward retirement benefits under the Plan during his subsequent employment with Lockheed. Lockheed personnel provided him with documents describing the benefits to which he would be entitled, and for the next four years sent him written year-end statements from the Plan notifying him of the amount of credited service he had accumulated as a Plan participant.

Lockheed notified Spink sometime in 1984 that he was not eligible to participate in the Plan because he was over sixty when hired.

In 1986, Congress passed OBRA 1986. OBRA 1986 amended ERISA, the ADEA, and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. Secs. 1 et seq., to bar age-based discrimination in participation and benefit accrual standards applied by employee benefit plans.

As a consequence of these amendments, for plan years beginning after January 1, 1988, the effective date of the amendments, Lockheed was required to allow employees hired after age sixty to participate in the Plan. Spink became a participant on December 25, 1988 (the first day of the Plan's 1988 plan year). In 1989, Lockheed informed him that it did not intend to credit him with accrued benefits based on his years of service with Lockheed prior to December 25, 1988. The Plan specifies that an employee who was previously excluded from the Plan would "not receive Credited Service for his pre-Member service[ ]" under the terms of the Plan. Plan Sec. 2.01(C).

On May 8, 1990, Lockheed amended the Plan, establishing a "1990 Special Retirement Opportunity" (SRO) and a "1990 Voluntary Retirement Program" (VRP), which were available to certain employees until June 30, 1990 (collectively the "1990 Plan amendments"). These programs offered increased retirement benefits to eligible employees as an incentive to terminate their employment. The increased benefits were paid out of the Plan's surplus assets. To partake in the increased pension benefits, Lockheed required employees to release virtually all potential employment-related claims they might have against Lockheed. Although he was eligible for the SRO option, Spink did not elect it because he did not wish to waive any ADEA and ERISA claims he may have against Lockheed. Spink retired in June 1990.

On February 5, 1992, Spink filed a five-count complaint against Lockheed. He brought all counts in his individual capacity, and also designated Counts I through III as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated employees. Counts I and II allege that the OBRA 1986 amendments to ERISA and ADEA entitle Spink and similarly situated employees to benefits under the Plan calculated on the basis of periods worked both before and after the effective date of the statute. Count III alleges that the 1990 Plan amendments constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and a prohibited transaction under ERISA. Count V alleges that because Spink relied on representations made by Lockheed, Lockheed is estopped from denying him benefits based on all of his employment since his rehire in 1979. Spink withdrew Count IV.

Lockheed moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the district court granted Lockheed's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Spink timely appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Tri Capital Corp., 25 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 580, 130 L.Ed.2d 495 (1994). In addition, "[t]he interpretation of ERISA, a federal statute, is a question of law subject to de novo review." Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 310, 312 (9th Cir.1993).

III. Age Discrimination Claims under ERISA and ADEA

We first consider whether the OBRA amendments to the ADEA and ERISA prohibit Lockheed from excluding Spink's and putative class members' pre-1988 years of service when calculating their accrued benefits. We conclude they do.

Prior to OBRA 1986, the ADEA and ERISA permitted an employer to deny participation in its pension plan to an employee who was over age sixty when hired if the plan's retirement age was sixty-five. See ERISA Sec. 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1052(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1988); ADEA Sec. 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623(f)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1988). Congress enacted OBRA 1986 to change this situation.

The overall objective of the OBRA amendments was to "prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment." ERISA Sec. 2, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 (1988). To that end, Sec. 9202 of OBRA 1986 amended ERISA by adding:

[A] defined benefit plan shall be treated as not satisfying the requirements of this paragraph if, under the plan, an employee's benefit accrual is ceased, or the rate of an employee's benefit accrual is reduced, because of the attainment of any age.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (1988). Similarly, OBRA Sec. 9201 amended the ADEA by providing:

[I]t shall be unlawful for an employer, an employment agency, a labor organization, or any combination thereof to establish or maintain an employee pension benefit plan which requires or permits--

(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the cessation of an employee's benefit accrual, or the reduction of the rate of an employee's benefit accrual, because of age,

....

ADEA Sec. 4(i)(1), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623(i)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). With regard to the effective date of these sections, OBRA 1986 provides:

The amendments made by sections 9201 and 9202 shall apply only with respect to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 1988, and only to employees who have 1 hour of service in any plan year to which such amendments apply.

Pub.L. No. 99-509, Sec. 9204(a)(1); 100 Stat.1979 (1986), codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623 note.

The parties agree that OBRA 1986 prohibits terminating or reducing the rate of benefit accrual because of the employee's age after January 1, 1988. They part ways over whether this prohibition requires that employers consider service years before the effective date of OBRA 1986 in calculating benefit accrual.

As with every question of statutory interpretation, we start with the language of the statute. The most natural reading of the text of OBRA 1986 Secs. 9201 and 9202 compels us to conclude that pre-enactment service years must be included in benefit accrual calculation. OBRA prohibits age-based reduction in "the rate of benefit accrual." Denying credited service years that an employee would have accumulated but for prior age-based exclusion from the Plan results in a reduced rate of benefits for that employee. Therefore, denying credited service years that an older employee would otherwise have accumulated is unlawful under OBRA. 1

In the context of this case, the Plan provides that "eligibility for benefits under the Plan and the amount of a Member's benefit are determined on the basis of service." Plan Sec. 4.01. An employee could participate in the Plan, and therefore accumulate credited service years, "upon being employed in a Covered...

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