Spinks v. State

• Decision Date: 23 July 1982
• Docket Number: No. 881S220,881S220
• Citation: 437 N.E.2d 963
• Parties: Bessie May SPINKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 963

437 N.E.2d 963

Bessie May SPINKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 881S220.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 23, 1982.

William T. Lawrence, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Joseph N. Stevenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Appellant Bessie Spinks was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-3 (Burns 1979), in a court trial by the Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division II, on December 16, 1980. She was thereafter sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Appellant now directly appeals and raises the following four issues:

(1) Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant's conviction.

(2) Whether the trial court's verdict is contrary to law.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in not granting Appellant's pro se request to have the court dismiss her personally retained counsel and appoint a public defender for her.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to fifteen years without enumerating reasons for aggravating Appellant's sentence beyond the criminal code's presumptive ten year term.

I

Appellant first asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, Spinks argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to negate her claim of self-defense.

Our standard of review for sufficiency questions is the same in all cases. This Court will consider only the evidence most favorable to the State with all logical inferences drawn therefrom. Harris v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 112. We will reverse a verdict not supported by sufficient evidence to preserve the constitutional right to due process. A verdict will not be disturbed, however, when there is substantial probative evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris v. State, supra; Williams v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 265, 379 N.E.2d 981. In reviewing a lower court's findings, we will not reweigh the evidence. Hooks v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 618.

When a self-defense claim is raised casting some reasonable doubt as to guilt, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not meet at least one of the elements necessary to prove that justification. Cox v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 737; Loyd v. State, (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 1260. Self-defense is proved by showing that the defendant acted without fault, was in a place where he had a legal right to be, and was in real danger of death or great bodily harm or was in such apparent danger as caused him in good faith to fear death or bodily injury. Cox v. State, supra; Berry v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 432, 376 N.E.2d 808. In Indiana, using deadly force for self-defense is justified only when a person reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury. Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1982). Even if a person is assaulted, the trier of fact can rightfully find that a reasonable person in the same circumstance would not have been placed in reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm and therefore would not have been justified in the use of deadly force in self-defense. Loyd v. State, supra. The final determination of whether the State has met its burden to negate Appellant's claim rests with the trier of fact. A conviction in spite of a claim of self-defense will be reversed only if no reasonable person could say that the self-defense issue had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the probative evidence most favorable to the State was substantial. Decedent's blood alcohol count was high enough for the court to reasonably conclude that the victim was extremely intoxicated and somewhat incapacitated (327 milligrams ethanol per deciliter blood). The several police witnesses all testified that Spinks did not exhibit any of the familiar signs of intoxication when she was arrested soon after the killing, but rather talked rationally and asserted her rights. By Spinks' own account, she was able to stand up and break the victim's grasp on her neck when the victim allegedly attacked. Spinks was slightly taller and approximately one hundred pounds heavier than the victim. Despite the purported attack and ensuing struggle, Spinks was neat and presentable to the police when they arrived. When arrested, Spinks did not complain about any injuries she sustained due to fighting. The arresting police officers also testified that they did not notice any wounds or unusual marks on Spinks, although they had specifically looked for such marks since they had been informed about the alleged fight. A comparison of the superficial scratches in Spinks' "mug shot" with the gross abrasions and multiple bruises predominant in decedent's post-mortem photographs permits the reasonable conclusion that any alleged fight was very one-sided in Appellant's favor. In addition, the attending pathologist testified that strangulation was probably by use of a ligature applied to the victim's neck from behind. He based this opinion on the character of the markings on the victim's neck and on the lack of damage to the victim's fingers and hands. A twisted and stretched girl's nightgown found on the bed beside the victim's dead body may reasonably have been found to be the ligature used in this homicide.

The finder of fact properly decided that the above recited evidence was contradictory to and more persuasive than Appellant's story. All of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that a reasonable person in Spinks' situation would not in good faith have been caused to fear death or bodily injury. Further, the evidence is sufficient to support findings that Spinks was in no real danger of death or great bodily injury and that Spinks did not act without fault. Spinks' claim of self-defense was properly rejected upon the court's finding that Spinks failed to prove at least one of the requisite elements of self-defense. Appellant's request for review on sufficiency grounds therefore amounts to no more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence. This we will not do.

II

Appellant's second issue is whether the trial court's verdict is contrary to law. In Indiana, a verdict will be disturbed as being contrary to law only when there is an absence of substantial evidence on an essential element of an alleged crime. Beatty v State, (1963) 244 Ind. 598, 194 N.E.2d 727. Under Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-3 (Burns 1979), the essential elements for a voluntary manslaughter conviction are:

1. Intentionally or knowingly

2. Killing

3. Another human being.

"Intentionally" and "knowingly" are defined in Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-2 (Burns 1979):

"(a) A person engages in conduct "intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.

(b) A person engages in conduct "knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so."

In the present case, Appellant argues that the verdict was contrary to law because there was a lack of evidence as to the requisite element of "knowingly or intentionally." Specifically, Spinks asserts she acted in self-defense. We have already held that there is sufficient evidence in this case to justify the trial court's rejection of Appellant's self-defense argument. Spinks alternatively contends that she was too intoxicated at the time of the killing to form the requisite intent for voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary intoxication is no defense to a crime unless the defendant is shown to have been so intoxicated as to have been incapable of forming the crime's requisite intent. Cowans v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 54.

There is sufficient evidence in this case to reasonably support the trial court's holding that Spinks was not so intoxicated as to have been incapable of acting "knowingly or intentionally." Appellant was orderly in appearance and conduct immediately following the killing. The arresting police officers testified that Spinks did not overtly manifest being intoxicated at the time of her arrest but rather appeared sober and acted rationally. Spinks' own clear account of most of the events surrounding the killing and her admitted presence of mind to search for the victim's pulse and to call and arrange for someone to attend to her daughter before having the homicide reported to the police further belie her intoxication defense.

We hold that there was sufficient evidence to lead the trier of fact to the judgment that Appellant was not so intoxicated as to have been incapable of "knowingly or intentionally" killing the victim. This verdict will not be set aside as contrary to law.

III

Appellant's next alleged error asserts that the trial court erred in ignoring Appellant's pro se request for removal of her private counsel and for appointment of a public defender to represent her.

A defendant charged with a crime is guaranteed the right to be represented by counsel by Article I, Sec. 13 of the Indiana Constitution and by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. A failure to permit any defendant to have counsel represents a deprivation of that defendant's constitutional right to due process. This guarantee of the right to be represented includes the right for an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have counsel provided at State expense. It is a judicial function, however, to determine whether counsel should be appointed at public cost, and this determination is within the discretion of the trial judge. Moore v. State, (1980) Ind., 401 N.E.2d 676; Pallett v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 396, 381 N.E.2d 452; Fulks v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 81, 262 N.E.2d 651.

Spinks initially retained private counsel for her defense in this matter. On October 21, 1980, the date the matter was set for a guilty plea, the trial court judge received from Spinks a...