Spinrad v. Comair, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–CV–4111.,09–CV–4111.
• Parties: Miriam SPINRAD, Plaintiff, v. COMAIR, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

825 F.Supp.2d 397

Miriam SPINRAD, Plaintiff,

v.COMAIR, INC., Defendant.

No. 09–CV–4111.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Nov. 23, 2011.

Peter A. Frankel, Law Offices of Peter A. Frankel, New York, NY, for the Plaintiff.

George P. McKeegan, McKeegan & Shearer, P.C., New York, NY, for the Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge:

+-------------------+
                ¦Table of Contents  ¦
                +-------------------+
                

                I.   Introduction                                                       400
                II.  Facts and Procedural History                                       400
                III. Summary Judgment Standard                                          402
                IV.  Choice of Law                                                      402
                

     A.   New York Choice of Law Doctrine                               402
                     B.   Potentially Applicable Tort Law                               402
                

          1.  New York Negligence Standard                              402
                          2.  Virginia Negligence Standard                              403
                

     C.   Virginia Law Applies                                          403
                

                V.   Preemption Doctrine                                                403
                

     A.   General Principles                                            403
                     B.   Express Preemption                                            404
                     C.   Implied Preemption                                            404
                

          1.  Field Preemption                                          405
                          2.  Conflict Preemption                                       405
                

                VI.  Relevant Federal Law                                               406
                

     A.   The Federal Aviation Act                                      406
                     B.   The Airline Deregulation Act                                  407
                

          1.  General Principles                                        407
                          2.  Relevant Statutory Terms: “Related To” and “Service”      407
                

     C.   Implementing Regulations                                      409
                

                VII. Plaintiff's State–Law Negligence Claim is Not Preempted by Federal 410
                     Law
                

     A.   The Federal Aviation Act                                      410
                     B.   The Airline Deregulation Act                                  412
                

                      Comair Is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
                VIII. Negligence Claim                                                  414
                IX.   Conclusion                                                        414
                

I. Introduction

This case presents a close question on preemption. It falls within the ill-defined borderland between areas subject to exclusively federal regulation and those in which the states have traditionally exercised their powers by way of the common law.

Defendant Comair, Inc. (“Comair”) moves for summary judgment dismissing the state-law negligence claim of plaintiff Miriam Spinrad. Plaintiff slipped, fell, and was injured while disembarking from defendant's airplane. She claims that defendant failed to take reasonable care to ensure that she could leave the airplane safely. In the present motion, defendant contends that any state-law negligence claims asserted by plaintiff are preempted by federal law. Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if the court concludes that plaintiff's state-law action is not preempted by federal law, summary judgment is appropriate since no reasonable jury could conclude that any negligence by Comair was the proximate cause of Spinrad's injuries.

Summary judgment is denied. For the reasons explained below, federal preemption does not bar plaintiff's claim, based on state common law: plaintiff provides substantial evidence supporting her claim that defendant should have provided safer means, and assisted her, in disembarking. The Federal Aviation Act (the “FAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq., neither explicitly nor impliedly bars Spinrad from bringing a negligence claim based on her theories against Comair, although it would bar a claim based on a theory of defective design. And the Airline Deregulation Act's (“ADA”) express preemption clause, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b), does not preempt plaintiff's claim. As to the negligence claim itself, summary judgment is inappropriate, because a reasonable jury could conclude that Comair's alleged failure to take adequate care to ensure that plaintiff could safely exit their airplane was the proximate cause of her injuries.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff Miriam Spinrad, now seventy-two years old, was a passenger on a July 2008 flight operated by defendant; she and her husband were traveling from New York to Florida. See Defendant's Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 1; Plaintiffs Local Rule 56.1 Responses and Statements of Additional Material Facts ¶ 1. Ms. Spinrad and her husband boarded the plane via a portable staircase after being taken by elevator to the tarmac and to the plane by bus. See Dep. of Miriam Spinrad (“M. Spinrad Dep.”) 30 (Def. Ex. E); Dep. of Bernard Baruch Spinrad (“B. Spinrad Dep.”) 9 (Def. Ex. F). Defendant was aware that plaintiff and her husband would need assistance boarding and exiting the plane and with their luggage. See Passenger History Record (Def. Ex. O).

While the plane was en route to its destination in Florida, another passenger became ill, and the flight was diverted to Norfolk, Virginia, for an emergency landing. M. Spinrad Dep. 38–39. Plaintiff and her fellow passengers remained seated while the passenger who was ill was removed from the plane. The passengers were then asked to leave the airplane so that it could be serviced. See id. at 39–40.

Because the flight on which plaintiff traveled had been diverted to Norfolk—and such flights often leave the airport at which they have had an unscheduled landing shortly after their arrival, with little notice—it was decided that the passengers were to exit the plane via its “integral airstairs,” rather than by jetway or by truck-mounted stairs, both of which are normally used at the plane's expected termination point. See Dep. of Davor Ilic 11–18 (Def. Ex. H). Integral airstairs are stairs built into the inside of the main cabin door of the plane. They are used so that airplane passengers are able to exit without utilizing ground support or a jetway connected directly to an airport terminal. See Dep. of Mary Arbogast (“Arbogast Dep.”) 27, 29–30 (Def. Ex. G). The latter permits passengers to step directly out of the plane without traversing any steps.

As the passengers began to leave the airplane, a Comair flight attendant standing in the main cabin door urged them to be careful as they exited. While the parties disagree on the evidence, there is support for the plaintiff's contention that no appropriate employee was present at the bottom of the stairs to direct or assist her, although having an employee at the bottom of the stairs is a common practice, see id. at 42–45; a Delta ramp agent, responsible for securing the plane and removing bags, was present, although it appears from the record that he stood some ten to fifteen feet away from the exiting passengers and was not charged with helping passengers exit. See Dep. of Davor Ilic 5, 31–32. Passengers leaving the plane were able to hold onto a handrail, but it terminated several steps above the end of the airstairs closest to the ground. See M. Spinrad Dep. 49. Approximately a foot of space existed between the final step of the airstairs and the tarmac—a drop greater than that of the risers on the stairs above. See Arbogast Dep. 46; see also Photographs of Aircraft Stairs (Def. Ex. N).

Plaintiff—then sixty-eight years old, and accompanied by her husband, who needed a cane—carried a small bag on her shoulder as she exited the plane after her spouse. She and her husband had not asked for special assistance in getting off of the aircraft, although, as already noted, the airline had been informed that the couple needed special assistance exiting the plane and with their luggage. As plaintiff reached the bottom of the airstairs, she stepped forward, lost her balance, and fell. Two bones in her left leg and a bone in her right foot were broken. See M. Spinrad Dep. at 43, 58. She was treated at a hospital in Norfolk, Virginia, and then flown to a hospital in Manhattan, where she spent three nights. No surgery was required, see id. at 59–60, 63, 67, but physical therapy was needed. A cane is now required when plaintiff leaves her house. See id. at 69, 72–73.

Spinrad sued Comair in a New York state court in August 2009, alleging in her single-count complaint that her injuries were caused by defendant's negligence. See Complaint 1–3 (Def. Ex. A). Comair removed the case to this court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Defendant now moves for summary judgment.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1999). After construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is to be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–50, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining whether the party seeking summary judgment has met its burden, “the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010).

IV. Choice of LawA. New York Choice of Law Doctrine

A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor...