Spires v. Hurley

Decision Date29 July 2015
Docket NumberCase No. 4:12-CV-773 CAS-NAB
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
PartiesWILLIAM W. SPIRES, JR., Petitioner, v. JAMES HURLEY, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the court upon Petitioner William W. Spires, Jr. ("Spires") Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 13.] Respondent James Hurley ("Respondent") filed a response. [Doc. 26.] Spires filed a reply brief. [Doc. 32.] This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). [Doc. 21.] For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be denied.

I. Background

Spires was charged in an information with attempted forcible rape and burglary in the first degree. (Resp't Ex. B at 4-5.) On May 10, 2011, Spires pled guilty to attempted forcible rape. (Resp't Ex. C at 3-8.) The State dismissed the charge of burglary in the first degree. (Resp't Ex. C at 19.) The Court sentenced Spires to thirteen years and six months in the Missouri Department of Corrections. (Resp't Ex. C at 10.)

On April 6, 2012, Spires filed a motion for leave to appeal out of time with the Missouri Supreme Court. (Resp't Ex. E.). The Missouri Supreme Court denied Spires' motion without prejudice to filing a motion for leave to file a notice of appeal out of time with the Missouri Court of Appeals- Eastern District on April 20, 2012. (Resp't Ex. E at 20.) On April 30, 2012, Spires filed a motion for leave to file an appeal out of time with the Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District. (Resp't Ex. E at 22-23.) On the same date, Spires filed his original petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. [Doc. 1.] The Missouri Court of Appeals- Eastern District denied Spires' motion on May 3, 2012. (Resp't Ex. E at 30.) On May 11, 2012, Spires filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Rehearing en banc or transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. (Resp't Ex. E. at 31-33.) On July 12, 2012, the Missouri Court of Appeals- Eastern District struck Spires' motion, because the allegations were scurrilous and the filing violated Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.17(d) and 83.02. (Resp't Ex. E. at 37.) Spires filed an Amended Petition in this court on August 31, 2012. [Doc. 13.]

II. Standard of Review

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("AEDPA"), applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after this statute's effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). In conducting habeas review pursuant to § 2254, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings (1) resulted in a decision that is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless thepetitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase "clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). "In other words, clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. To obtain habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent which he thinks the state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied. Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408). "A federal habeas court making the unreasonable application inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively reasonable." Penry, 532 U.S. at 793. "A state court decision involves 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record."Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). A "readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). AEDPA's highly deferential standard demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Id.

III. Discussion

Spires presents five grounds for relief.2 First, Spires claims that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to appeal and the right to counsel on appeal. Spires also contends that he was forced to plead guilty to a crime that does not exist, the statute that he was sentenced under is unconstitutional, and he was denied due process, because the state changed the substance of the sentence materially long after the sentence is in fact imposed. Finally, Spires contends that he is actually innocent.

The Respondent contends that all of Spires' claims, except his claim that his sentencing statute is unconstitutional, are procedurally defaulted, because he did not file a timely appeal in state court. The Respondent also asserts that Spires' claims lack merit.

A. Procedural Default of Claims

A state prisoner's petition for federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.SC. § 2254 may only be granted if the prisoner has exhausted his state law remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). "Ordinarily a federal court reviewing a state conviction in a [§ 2254] proceeding may consider only those claims which the petitioner has presented to the state court in accordance with state procedural rules." Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2012). "In Missouri, a claim must be presented at each step to avoid default." Id. at 1087 (citing Jolly v. Gammon, 28 F.3d 51, 53 (8th Cir. 1994)). "Requiring the exhaustion of state remedies both allows the states to correct any possible constitutional violations without unnecessary intrusion by the federalcourts and allows the state courts to create a factual record should the matter proceed to federal court." Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (8th Cir. 1997).

Spires' federal habeas claims are defaulted, because he never filed a direct appeal or a motion for post-conviction relief in Missouri state court. In Missouri, there is no right to appeal without statutory authority. State v. Larson, 79 S.W.3d 891, 892 (Mo. 2002). Appellate jurisdiction exists for civil and criminal cases only after final judgment and final judgment occurs in a criminal case only when a sentence is entered. Larson, 79 S.W. 3d at 893. "In the context of a direct appeal following a guilty plea, however, the right to a direct appeal is limited." State v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). "In Missouri, the general rule is that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including statutory and constitutional guarantees." Id. "In a direct appeal of a judgment and sentence entered as a result of a guilty plea, the state court's review is limited to claims involving subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court and the sufficiency of the information or indictment." Id.

Spires pled guilty to attempted forcible rape. In Missouri, a defendant must file a notice of appeal within 10 days after the judgment or order appealed from becomes final. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 81.04(a). "A final judgment occurs only when a sentence is entered." State v. Williams, 871 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc). Therefore, if he wanted to file a direct appeal his notice of appeal should have been filed no later than the date his judgment became final. Spires did not file a notice of appeal by the appeal deadline. If a notice of appeal is not filed within ten days after the judgment becomes final, the defendant or the state, may file a notice of appeal in the trial court, if, within twelve months after the judgment becomes final, a motion for leave to file such notice is filed in the appropriate appellate court and it sustains the motion and grants such leave. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.03. "Such order may be made by the appellate court, in its discretion, for goodcause shown." Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.03. Spires filed his motion for leave with the Missouri Supreme Court within twelve months of the final judgment. (Resp't Ex. E. at 31-33.) In his motion, Spires did not give a reason for his failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Spires asserted only the grounds he was presenting in support of the appeal of his conviction. The Missouri Court of Appeals and the Missouri Supreme Court denied his motions for leave to file an appeal out of time.

Second, Spires did not file a timely motion for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. "Rule 24.035 is the exclusive procedure by which a person convicted of a felony on a guilty plea may seek...

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