Spirit Lake Tribe v. State of North Dakota

Decision Date24 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-1819,00-1819
Citation262 F.3d 732
Parties(8th Cir. 2001) SPIRIT LAKE TRIBE, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEVILS LAKE SIOUX TRIBE, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 101 RANCH, A NORTH DAKOTA PARTNERSHIP, RUTH WARD, RALPH WARD, STEVE A. WARD, IMOGENE CHRISTENSEN, CLAIRE ENGELHARDT, CARLYLE BRYE, ARNOLD YRI, VERNYLL YRI, REGINAL HERMAN, EILEEN HERMAN, CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON, MELVIN DIEHL, DUSTIN KING, ESTATE OF MABEL SOLHEIM, ESTATE OF MINNIE JOHNSTON, FRANCIS P. SCHNEIDER, GLORIA SCHNEIDER, APPELLEES. Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Bye, Bright, and Magill, Circuit Judges.

Bye, Circuit Judge

Devils Lake is a large, freshwater lake in northeastern North Dakota. The lake has no natural outlets, so its water level and size fluctuate considerably in response to changing climatic conditions. In the recent past, increased rainfall has slowly raised the water level and expanded the shores of the lake. The incremental expansion has swallowed whole towns, farms, and roads producing breathtaking results. The significant hydrological phenomenon at Devils Lake forms the backdrop for an equally momentous legal event--a long-simmering dispute concerning ownership of the lake itself.

The Spirit Lake Tribe resides on land that abuts the lake. The Tribe contends that an 1867 treaty gave it title to the lakebed, to be held in trust by the federal government. The Tribe filed the present lawsuit in 1986 seeking to declare its rights to the lake, to enjoin multiple defendants from using the lake, and to recover damages for various wrongful uses of the lake. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and the Tribe instituted the present appeal. We affirm the judgment of the district court with one exception. We vacate the portion of the summary judgment pertaining to the federal government, and remand the action to the district court to dismiss the government for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

We recounted the factual underpinnings of this action in an earlier appeal. Devils Lake Sioux Tribe v. State of N.D., 917 F.2d 1049, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 1990) (Devils Lake II). A brief overview of the facts at this juncture will serve to frame our discussion.

In an 1867 treaty, ancestors of the modern-day Tribe received vast lands in the Dakotas and Minnesota as a reward for their loyalty to the government during the Sioux Uprising of 1862. Article IV of that treaty established the Fort Totten Reservation for the use of the Tribe.

Article IV described the northern boundary of the Reservation as follows: "Beginning at the most easterly point of Devil's Lake; thence along the waters of said Lake to the most westerly point of the same...." The phrase "thence along the waters" has been interpreted by various parties (at various points in time) to refer to the northern shore of the lake, the southern shore of the lake, and even a variety of lines drawn across the middle of Devils Lake. The proper interpretation is critical. For example, if the boundary is the northern shore, then the Reservation includes Devils Lake. Conversely, if the southern shore forms the boundary, then the lake lies outside the Reservation. See Devils Lake II, 917 F.2d at 1051.

On June 9, 1986, the Tribe filed this action to quiet title to Devils Lake. The Tribe named the federal government, the State of North Dakota, the Garrison Division Conservancy District (an arm of the State), and numerous private landowners as defendants. The Tribe contends that the 1867 treaty established the northern shore of Devils Lake as the northern boundary of its reservation, and that the government has held title to Devils Lake in trust for the Tribe for more than a century. At worst, the Tribe argues, the 1867 treaty is ambiguous. The Tribe points out that courts traditionally resolve ambiguities in treaties in favor of Indian tribes. Under either approach, the Tribe asserts entitlement to Devils Lake.

The federal government disputes the Tribe's claim to the lake. The government claims that Devils Lake was not included in the 1867 treaty that formed the reservation. The government asserts that it continued to hold title to Devils Lake until 1889, when it conveyed the lake to the State of North Dakota at its statehood under the "equal footing" doctrine. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1894) (explaining that the government cedes navigable waterways to States when they join the Union). According to the government, the State held complete title to Devils Lake until 1971. In 1971, the State quitclaimed title to a portion of the lake to the government to permit construction of a massive public works project called the Garrison Diversion Unit.

In 1989, the district court granted the federal government's motion for summary judgment. Devils Lake Sioux Tribe v. State of N.D., 714 F. Supp. 1019 (D.N.D. 1989) (Devils Lake I). The district court held that the Tribe had already resolved its claim to Devils Lake as part of a 1977 Indian Claims Commission (ICC) settlement. Id. at 1022-26. The Tribe appealed, and we reversed the district court's decision. Devils Lake II, 917 F.2d at 1056-57. We discerned factual disputes regarding the precise issues resolved in the 1977 ICC proceeding, and held that "[t]he record does not support a summary judgment on a theory that the 1977 settlement disposes of the Tribe's alleged rights.... [T]his issue requires further development on the merits." Id. at 1056.

The parties returned to the district court. They spent several years attempting to settle the case, but settlement talks failed to bear fruit. In 1998, the parties revived their case before the district court. After revival, court and counsel agreed to bifurcate proceedings. In the first phase, the federal government and the State would raise preliminary procedural and jurisdictional defenses. If the Tribe prevailed, the parties would then try the case on the merits and resolve the question of ownership.

The district court entertained the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the phase-one preliminary questions and heard extended argument. On January 24, 2000, the court issued a 17-page opinion granting summary judgment. The court held that the Tribe's suit against the federal government was time-barred. In addition, the court held that "issue preclusion"1 prevented the Tribe from litigating the ownership of Devils Lake because the Tribe could have raised that issue (but did not) in a 1951 ICC suit. After dismissing the federal government, the court determined that the government was an indispensable party to the proceedings, and that the Tribe's suit against the State and the other defendants could not continue absent the government. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Accordingly, the court entered a final judgment adverse to the Tribe.

II.

The Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA), Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176, authorizes lawsuits against the federal government "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). "Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States' title to real property." Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983) (Block I). The Supreme Court has held that the QTA provides the only basis for an Indian plaintiff's quiet title action against the federal government. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841-44 (1986).

The Tribe's suit against the federal government relies upon the QTA. We conclude, however, that QTA relief is not available because the Tribe failed to comply with the pertinent statute of limitations.

A.

The QTA contains a generous 12-year statute of limitations, which provides that an "action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Because the QTA waives the government's sovereign immunity from suit, Block I, 461 U.S. at 280, a plaintiff must comply with the limitations period to effectuate that waiver. Hence the QTA statute of limitations acts as a jurisdictional bar unlike most statutes of limitations, which are affirmative defenses. See State of N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Block, 789 F.2d 1308, 1310 (8th Cir. 1986) (Block II).

The 12-year limitations period begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of the government's adverse land claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). This standard does not require the government to provide explicit notice of its claim. The government's claim need not be "clear and unambiguous." Block II, 789 F.2d at 1313. "Knowledge of the claim's full contours is not required. All that is necessary is a reasonable awareness that the Government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiff's." Id. (quoting Knapp v. United States, 636 F.2d 279, 283 (10th Cir. 1980)).

Further, the government's interest "need not amount to full legal title.... As long as the interest claimed is a 'cloud on title,' or a reasonable claim with a substantial basis, it constitutes a 'claim' for purposes of triggering the twelve-year statute of limitations." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1991). Even invalid government claims trigger the QTA limitations period. See id. Simply put, the limitations period is triggered when a landowner has reason to know that the government claims some type of adverse interest in that land. See Patterson v. Buffalo Nat'l River, 76 F.3d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1996).

B.

The government argues that the Tribe "knew or should have known" of its claim to Devils Lake by at...

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