Spirit & Truth Church v. Barnaby

• Decision Date: 29 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. ED 100421.,ED 100421.
• Citation: 428 S.W.3d 764
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: SPIRIT & TRUTH CHURCH, et al., Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. Mark BARNABY, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

428 S.W.3d 764

SPIRIT & TRUTH CHURCH, et al., Plaintiffs/Respondents,

v.Mark BARNABY, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. ED 100421.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.

April 29, 2014.

James A. Beckemeier, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.

Mark E. Goodman, Amy Lynn Fehr, Clayton, MO, for Respondent.

ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge.

Introduction

This is an appeal from the trial court's summary judgment declaring the status and positions of various members of the Spirit and Truth Church. Mark Barnaby, who was pastor and president of the Church's board of directors, purported to remove from membership in the Church the other two directors on the board, thereby disqualifying them from service on the board, and then appointed two new directors. The trial court concluded that those actions were void and of no force and effect. The court held that the ousted members retained their status as Church members and directors and that their subsequent removal of Barnaby as pastor and board president was valid. Barnaby and the directors he appointed appeal. We reverse.

Background

The material facts are undisputed. The Spirit and Truth Church is a Missouri nonprofit corporation, Pentecostal church and daycare. Since 1994, Barnaby has been the pastor and president of the Church's board of directors. In 2010, the board of directors consisted of Barnaby, his wife Tiffany Birch and John Hellman. Birch was also the vice-president and secretary.

Barnaby and Birch were in the process of divorcing in September of 2010. On October 2, 2010, Barnaby prepared a document titled “consent action,” which provided that Birch, Hellman and other Church members violated provisions of the Church's bylaws and were, therefore, removed by the pastor as members of the Church. Barnaby cited to Article II, Section 4(1) of the Church's bylaws, dealing with member discipline. In the consent action, Barnaby also stated that removal from membership thereby disqualified Birch and Hellman from the board of directors under Article III, Section 2.2 of the bylaws. Barnaby went on in that document to appoint Vinessa D'Sa and Brock Hall to replace the disqualified directors, citing Article III, Section 5, which states that the board of directors shall be appointed by the pastor. The consent action was signed only by Barnaby. Barnaby thereafter replaced Hall with Richard Sarpong as a director.

Birch and Hellman maintained that they were still members of the Church and that they retained their positions on the board of directors. In January of 2011, Hellman called a meeting of Church members to vote on dismissal of Barnaby as pastor and director. At the meeting, Birch and Hellman, purportedly acting as the board of directors, voted to remove Barnaby, and the Church membership voted to approve that action. Birch and Hellman notified Barnaby of his removal. Barnaby continued to hold himself out as pastor and to assert that the board of directors consisted of himself, D'Sa and Sarpong, and did not include Birch and Hellman. Barnaby continued to handle the Church's money and maintained sole control over the Church's bank accounts.

Birch, Hellman and other members of the Church, individually and in the name of the Church (hereafter collectively “Respondents”), filed a petition against Barnaby, D'Sa and Sarpong (hereafter collectively “Appellants”). Respondents alleged that the Church's bylaws under which Barnaby issued the consent action were inconsistent with Missouri nonprofit law. In Count I, Respondents sought a declaration that Barnaby's attempt to remove them from membership in the Church was void; that Birch and Hellman were still directors; that Barnaby had been lawfully removed as pastor; and that D'Sa, Sarpong and anyone else he had appointed to the board were not bona fide directors. In Count II, Respondents sought an equitable accounting of Church finances, alleging that Barnaby mismanaged and misused Church funds. In turn, Appellants filed a counterclaim and, in the name of the Church, a cross-claim seeking the opposite declaration: that the consent action was valid under the bylaws and Missouri law; that Respondents were no longer members of the Church; that Barnaby was the pastor; and that he, D'Sa and Sarpong constituted the board of directors. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Respondents' motion and denied Appellants' motion in part.¹ The court entered judgment finding that Barnaby's consent action was void, that Respondents were still members of the Church and that, as directors, they properly removed Barnaby as pastor.

As to the equitable accounting count, the trial court appointed a receiver and ordered Appellants to provide the receiver the Church's financial documents. The receivership was to remain in effect until the equitable accounting was completed and all funds were accounted for thereunder. Earlier in the case, the court had entered an order prohibiting Barnaby from using Church funds to pay his personal attorney's fees. Respondents had filed a motion to hold Barnaby in contempt of that order, which was still pending at the time the court entered judgment. The court entered a separate order concurrent with the judgment explaining that Respondents' motion for contempt would remain under submission pending the receiver's report of an accounting of Church funds. It appears from the docket entries that the receiver filed an “interim report” shortly thereafter, but no further action has been taken on the contempt motion or the receivership.

Finality and Appealability of Judgment

After Appellants filed their notice of appeal, the trial court ordered that the equitable accounting was stayed during the appeal, and the contempt motion was ordered to remain under submission. After Appellants' brief was filed, this Court ordered Appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. At that time, we indicated there did not appear to be a final judgment, partly because the disposition of claims was unclear from the existing legal file and partly because Respondents' equitable accounting claim appeared to be still pending in the trial court. The receiver had been appointed, but the final accounting had not yet occurred.

In response to that order, Appellants filed a supplemental legal file, which includes the trial court's certification under Rule 74.01(b) that there is no just reason for delay of the appeal. It found “that while a cause of action remains pending in the trial court as to all parties, the remaining cause of action is for contempt concerning [Barnaby's] alleged use of church funds to pay personal attorney fees and therefore the factual underpinnings of the claims are not intertwined, that similar relief cannot be awarded in each separate Count and further that determination of the claims pending in the trial court will not moot the claim being appealed.” This Court then issued another order indicating that while it appeared there was now an appealable judgment, it was for this panel of judges to whom the case has been assigned to finally determine ourselves whether certification was appropriate. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997). We find that it was.

The parties' competing claims for declaratory relief were finally and completely disposed of in the judgment entered in favor of Respondents and against Appellants. But Respondents' equitable accounting claim has not been finally resolved: the receiver has not filed its final accounting, the court expressly stayed the receivership, and there remains pending a motion for contempt that cannot be resolved until the receiver's accounting. Thus, there remains much for future determination, and the judgment on that claim is not final and appealable. See Glick Finley LLC v. Glick, 310 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Mo.App. E.D.2010). Because the declaratory relief and equitable accounting claims are not based on the same underlying facts and require the application of different law to enforce different legal rights, they are distinct judicial units.²See generally First Community Credit Union v. Levison, 395 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Mo.App. E.D.2013) (judicial units are distinct and separately appealable when the claims have different factual underpinnings and different applicable law). Moreover, although it appears the trial court has not taken any further action on the equitable accounting claim or contempt proceeding, any determination thereon would not moot this appeal. See id. at 581. We agree that there is no just reason to delay appeal of the declaratory judgment claim while the equitable accounting claim remains pending in the trial court.

Authority of Courts and Ecclesiastic Doctrine

We turn now to the issues on appeal. In Point I, Appellants contend that the civil courts do not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Church's membership removal process because it is an ecclesiastic matter for the Church to decide without interference from the secular courts. Our subject matter jurisdiction derives solely from Article V, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution, which provides that we have jurisdiction over all civil cases and matters. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. banc 2009). Thus, we may only exercise our jurisdiction over this case if it is civil in nature and does not entangle the court in a religious matter. Courts must refrain from becoming entangled in questions that are religious, but are allowed to decide issues involving a church when it can be done using neutral principles of law. First Missionary Baptist Church of Ballwin v. Rollins, 199 S.W.3d 823, 827 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). “The First Amendment does not preclude the court's involvement in church disputes where the issue is one which deals purely with a religiously neutral civil law.” Id. Appellants support their claim that this is an ecclesiastic matter by citing to cases in which the ousted member's or leader's...