Spiteri v. Russo
| Decision Date | 09 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | 12-CV-2780 (MKB) |
| Parties | CARMEL SPITERI, Plaintiff, v. JOHN LEO RUSSO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Carmel Spiteri commenced the above-captioned action pro se on May 31, 2012 and filed a First Amended Complaint (the "Amended Complaint") on August 24, 2012. On November 30, 2012, Plaintiff wrote to the Court seeking to file a Second Amended Complaint to add the "Webmasters" of the "Busted Offenders" website as defendants. Plaintiff also sought to amend to add claims for "unfair trade practice," "deceptive trade practice," discrimination based on national origin, and interference with contract (which he defines as his California plea agreement) against the State Defendants.1 (Docket Entry No. 99.) Additionally, he sought leave to add claims against named State Defendants in their individual capacities and a retaliation claim. (Id.) The same day, November 30, 2012, the Court denied Plaintiff's request to file a Second Amended Complaint; however, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to renew his request toamend the Amended Complaint in his response to Defendants' motions to dismiss. (Docket Entry No. 101.)
Plaintiff wrote to the Court on December 1, 2012, to seek reconsideration of his request to amend the Amended Complaint. (Docket Entry No. 105.) Plaintiff also references, without asking for explicit reconsideration, the Court's denial of Plaintiff's temporary restraining order and denial of his request for document production. (Docket Entry No. 79.)2 Having considered Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, for the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to modify its prior orders.
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration "is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Local Rule 6.3 (). "Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." Hidalgo v. New York, No. 11-CV-5074, 2012 WL 3598878, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration "should not be used as a vehicle simply to voice disagreement with the Court's decision, . . . nor does it present 'an occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected or an opportunity for making new arguments that could have previously been made.'" Premium Sports Inc. v. Connell, No. 10-CV-3753, 2012 WL 2878085, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (citations and alteration omitted). Moreover, "it is well-settled that a party may not, on a motion for reconsideration, raise an argument for the first time." Image Processing Tech., LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 10-CV-3867, 2012 WL 253097, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2012) (citation, alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases).
In Plaintiff's papers requesting reconsideration, Plaintiff points to no "controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked[,]" Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257, but rather uses his request as an opportunity to "voice disagreement with the Court's decision." Premium Sports, 2012 WL 2878085, at *1. Therefore, for the reasons outlined below, the Court declines to modify its prior orders.
The Court's decision to deny Plaintiff's request to amend the Complaint a second time was two-fold: (1) the Court found that granting Plaintiff's request to amend the Amended Complaint on the very same day that Defendants' moving papers in support of their motions to dismiss and papers in opposition to Plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion were to be filedwould cause prejudice to Defendants; and (2) it was clear to the Court that amendment to add new defendants - the primary amendment sought by Plaintiff - would be futile. Nevertheless, the Court held that, if Plaintiff had amendments to the Amended Complaint that he believed would rectify any deficiencies outlined in Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff could seek to amend the Amended Complaint in his opposition to the motions to dismiss.
Under Rule 15(a)(2) and Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may grant leave to amend a complaint. "It is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to amend." Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 139 (2d Cir. 2011) (alterations omitted) (quoting McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007)); MHANY Mgmt. Inc. v. County of Nassau, No. 05-CV-2301, 2012 WL 523521, at *48-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 224 F.R.D. 550, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ( ). A court may deny a motion to amend the complaint because of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc." Straker v. Metro. Transit Auth., 333 F. Supp. 2d 91, 102-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Wilson, 671 F.3d at 140 .
Defendants Trakas and Russo first sought leave to dismiss Plaintiff's initial Complaint, on July 10, 2012. (See Docket Entry No. 12.) On August 8, 2012, during a telephone conference, the Court granted Defendants Trakas and Russo leave to file motions to dismiss. Plaintiff indicated during that conference that he intended to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on August 28, 2012. (See Docket Entry No. 45.) On September 28, 2012, during a status conference, the Court adjusted the briefing schedule to allow Defendants Trakas and Russo the opportunity to amend their motions to dismiss to address the additional allegations raised in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and to give Plaintiff an opportunity to properly serve the State Defendants, who had previously not been properly served. During the same status conference, the Court also granted Plaintiff leave to file a preliminary injunction motion. Plaintiff properly served the first State Defendant on September 28, 2012. (See Docket Entry 57.) The last State Defendant was not properly served until November 19, 2012.3 (See Docket Entry 98.) Due to delays in service, the hurricane known as Super Storm Sandy, and Plaintiff's requests for additional time, the original motion schedule was enlarged. (See Docket Entries 72, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91-93, 95.) On November 30, 2012 — the same day as Defendants' moving papers were due, Plaintiff requested leave to amend the Amended Complaint yet again. Plaintiff had given the Court no indication, at any point prior, that he wished to seek a further amendment of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiff's request would cause undue delay in the schedule for the motions to dismiss and prejudice Defendants who had already expended considerable time and effort on motion papers to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See,e.g., Johnson v. City of New York, 669 F. Supp.2d 444, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (). However, the Court nevertheless granted Plaintiff leave to seek to amend the Amended Complaint if the request was responsive to Defendants' motion papers.
The Court was able to determine that most of Plaintiff's requested amendments would be futile. "[L]eave to amend will be denied as futile . . . if the proposed new claim cannot withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, i.e., if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can plead no set of facts that would entitle him to relief." Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 320 (2d Cir. 2009)). A complaint must, however, "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Matson, 631 F.3d at 63 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2...
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