Spivey v. Enter. City Bd. of Educ.

Decision Date21 September 2021
Docket Number1:18-cv-427-JTA (WO)
PartiesPENNY L. SPIVEY, Plaintiff, v. ENTERPRISE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JERUSHA T. ADAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Penny Spivey (Spivey) filed this action against Defendant Enterprise City Board of Education (“the Board”) after it terminated her employment as a special education teacher in the Enterprise City School District (“ECSD”).

This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by the Board (Doc. No. 71), Spivey's response in opposition thereto (Doc. No. 76), and the Board's reply (Doc. No. 77). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 71) is due to be GRANTED.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate if a moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P 56(a). A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., 920 F.3d 704, 707 (11th Cir. 2019).

To survive summary judgment, a nonmovant must assert facts that make a sufficient showing on every essential element of her case on which she bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Factual assertions must cite to specific materials in the record, including affidavits, depositions, declarations, and interrogatory answers. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Unsupported conclusions and factual allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). Also insufficient are allegations based on speculation. Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). Finally, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND[1] AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Spivey began her employment with ECSD as an instructor in the Alabama Occupation Diploma Program at Dauphin Junior High School in 2002 and transitioned to a position as a special education teacher at Dauphin in 2008. When that position was abolished in 2014, she accepted an offer to teach special education at Hillcrest Elementary, another ESCD school, for the 2014-15 school year. (Doc. No. 20-4, Tr. at 222-23.) In December 2014, Hillcrest Principal Teri Prim (“Prim”) told Spivey that special education students would be removed from general education classrooms because her “teachers don't like this” and the special education students would “not going to be in those [general] rooms anymore.” (Id., Tr. at 215.) Spivey told Prim that the removal was illegal because the special education students have a right to be in “those general ed classrooms per their IEP; that's their least restrictive environment.”[2] Prim repeated that the students would not return to the general education classrooms and Spivey reiterated that the removal plan was illegal. (Id., Tr. at 215-16.) Spivey sent an email reporting the illegal action to Joylee Cain (J. Cain), ECSD's Director of Special Education. (Id., Tr. at 216.) J. Cain took no action regarding the removal of the special education students. (Id.) Spivey reported her concern to the ECSD administrator in charge of student services but did not know the result of that action. (Id., Tr. at 217.)

When Spivey returned to Hillcrest at the beginning of the 2015-16 school year, she was reassigned from her special education classroom to a makeshift office in a library closet with new assignments consistent with those of a teacher's aide. (Id., Tr. at 194-95.) Her rate of pay was unchanged during this time. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 13, ¶ 4.) Spivey felt abused by other Hillcrest teachers who asked her to help make curtains for their classrooms and decorate the school, and felt “humiliated as a teacher, with an administrative degree, a master's in educational leadership, that had never had any kind of problems before.” (Id., Tr. at 199-200, 209.) Spivey felt such hate and animosity on a daily basis from other teachers “because of what [she] told [Prim] the first year” that she “stopped [Superintendent Greg Faught[3] in the hall last year” to try to tell him about “what's going on” with her job. Faught advised Spivey to “shoot him an e-mail and he would talk to [her] then, ” but he never made an appointment to meet with her. (Id., Tr. at 199-200.) Representatives from the Alabama Education Association (“AEA”) intervened on Spivey's behalf and she was reassigned to a classroom as a special education teacher at the beginning of the 2016-17 school year. (Id., Tr. at 206-07, 233.)

Also, at the beginning of the 2016-17 school year, Patrick Cain (P. Cain), Assistant Superintendent, former Director for Human Resources at ECSD, and husband of J. Cain, visited all ECSD schools to review policies on absenteeism. During these sessions P. Cain made clear that coming to work was an essential requirement of employment at ECSD. (Id., Tr. at 86-87.) In January of 2017, P. Cain was contacted by Prim to discuss excessive absences by Spivey. (Id., Tr. at 86.) On January 31, 2017, Spivey received a letter of reprimand dated January 23, 2017, and signed by Prim and Assistant Principal Mellissa Layton. (Doc. No. 73-10 at 2-3.) The letter cited several performance problems, such as Spivey's absences; failure to promptly report when she was absent so that appropriate substitutes for special education students could be secured; missing hall duty due to tardiness; failure to respond to calls, emails or texts from Prim and Layton; and late submissions of student assessments. (Id.) Prim said that Spivey's absences and late arrivals required her to arrange for other personnel to supervise students in the mornings between arrival and the start of the school day. (Doc. No. 20-4, Tr. at 164-66.) Spivey declined to provide her signature acknowledging receipt of the reprimand from Prim. (Doc. No. 73-10 at 3.)

On or about January 31, 2017, Prim and P. Cain presented Spivey with a proposal for her to participate in the ECSD Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) by enrolling in confidential, cost-free counseling. (Doc. No. 73-10 at 8; Doc. No. 20-4, Tr. at 92-93, 153.) Spivey declined to participate. (Doc. No. 20-4, Tr. at 93, 133-34, 154.) On February 17, 2017, Spivey did not meet with P. Cain and Prim as they requested. (Id., Tr. at 37-38, 105; Doc. No. 73-10 at 8; Doc. No. 76-1 at 8.) P. Cain did not say what the purpose of the meeting was, but Spivey testified that [P. Cain] and [Prim] would continuously schedule impromptu meetings, one after another, for things I didn't even understand what I was being put in there for.” (Doc. No. 20-4, Tr. at 203.) Spivey also stated that P. Cain and Prim lied when they said that she declined to meet with them. (Id., Tr. at 211.) When Faught learned from P. Cain that Spivey refused to meet with them, Faught met with her himself to determine why she would refuse to meet with her principal and human resources director. (Id., Tr. at 36-38.) Faught could not recall Spivey's response but did recall that he found it unacceptable. (Id., Tr. at 38.) He then had a letter prepared which informed Spivey of his recommendation that she serve a three-day unpaid suspension. (Id., Tr. at 38-39; Doc. No. 73-10 at 8; Doc. No. 76-1 at 8.) The letter cited Spivey's tardiness and absenteeism, inability to supervise assigned students due to tardiness and absenteeism, and failure to complete assignments. (Doc. No. 73-10 at 8; Doc. No. 76-1 at 8.) The letter also noted Spivey's declination of free counseling services and failure to meet with ECSD administrative personnel on February 17, 2017. (Doc. No. 73-10 at 8; Doc. No. 76-1 at 8.) Faught closed the letter by informing Spivey that the ECSD Board would consider his recommendation during its February 28, 2017 meeting and that she could request an audience with the Board to contest the suspension by submitting a written request to his office by February 23, 2017. (Doc. No. 73-10 at 8; Doc. No. 76-1 at 8.)

Spivey did not reply by the February 23 deadline but asked Faught in a February 24, 2017 email to appear before the Board to contest his recommendation. (Doc. No. 20-2; Doc. No. 20-4; Tr. at 50-52, 74-75.) Spivey apologized for the late submission but explained that she thought the AEA was responsible for responding to his letter. (Doc. No. 20-2 at 2.) The email informed Faught that Spivey's tenure at Hillcrest had been difficult due to harassment and retaliation, which in turn made her ill and caused her to miss work. (Id.) Spivey did not state the underlying cause for the harassment and retaliation but noted that it had been an issue since she joined the Hillcrest staff. (Id.) She cited an instance where Prim yelled at her because Spivey told P. Cain that she was not assigned a classroom during the 2015-16 school year. (Id. at 2-3.) She closed the email by telling Faught that she “tried to explain some of the things that have caused” the false accusations against her. (Id....

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