Spokane Valley Land & Water Co. v. Kootenai County, Idaho

• Decision Date: 19 August 1912
• Parties: SPOKANE VALLEY LAND & WATER CO. v. KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

199 F. 481

SPOKANE VALLEY LAND & WATER CO. v. KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO.

United States District Court, D. Idaho, Northern Division.

August 19, 1912

Allen &amp Allen, for plaintiff.

N. D Wernette, Co. Atty., of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, and C. H Potts, for defendant.

DIETRICH District Judge.

The plaintiff, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Washington, brings this action to recover from the defendant county $5,056; the same being the aggregate of taxes paid by it under protest upon its irrigating canals in that county for the years 1909 and 1910. There are two causes of action. In the first, which relates exclusively to the taxes for 1909, it is shown that in that year plaintiff was the owner of 50 second feet of water in Fish Lake, together with a ditch by which the same is conveyed to East Greenacres, and there used for the irrigation of lands, all situate within the boundaries of Kootenai county, Idaho also, of another water right to the amount of 250 second feet in the Spokane river, together with the dam and canal by which the water is diverted and conveyed from the river at Post Falls, Idaho, to the lands irrigated therefrom, such canal extending in a northwesterly direction about 18 1/2 miles, the first 5 1/2 miles thereof being in Idaho and the other 13 miles in the state of Washington. It is also averred that this Spokane river water is used partly for the irrigation of lands in Idaho and partly for the irrigation of Washington lands. It is further made to appear that, prior to 1909, plaintiff, being the owner of lands susceptible to irrigation from both of its canals, sold tracts thereof to divers persons, together with perpetual rights to receive water from these canals, and that all of its water rights in Fish Lake were thus sold; that the waters of Spokane river, not so disposed of, were used by the plaintiff in the irrigation of its own lands; and that none of the water distributed through either system is rented or held for rental, or used except upon lands owned by the plaintiff or owned by the several persons to whom such lands were sold with perpetual appurtenant water rights. At all times mentioned in the complaint the plaintiff was the owner of the primary water rights, together with the diverting and distributing works, subject only to the rights of the several purchasers of lands already referred to. By reference to the water deed or contract, a copy of which is attached to the complaint, it appears that the purchaser is granted title to a certain described tract of land, together with a perpetual right to use water flowing in plaintiff's canals sufficient for the irrigation thereof, upon certain conditions, one of which is the annual payment of a specified amount per acre as maintenance and operation charges. The plaintiff retains the control, and assumes the responsibility of maintaining the canal systems and of properly distributing the water therefrom. The taxes, inclusive of penalties, upon the Fish Lake system for the year 1909, amounted to $198.24, and upon the Spokane river system to $2,640.50. making a total for the year of $2,838.74.

In its salient features the second cause of action, involving the taxes for 1910, is similar to the first, with the important exception that it relates only to the Spokane river system, the taxes upon which for that year, including penalties, amounted to $2,217.26.

The contention of the plaintiff is that all the property so assessed was exempt from taxation under subdivision 12 of section 1644 of the Revised Codes of Idaho, which is as follows:

'All irrigation canals and ditches and water rights appurtenant thereto, when the owner or owners of said irrigating canals and ditches use the water thereof exclusively upon land or lands owned by him, her or them: Provided, in case any water be sold or rented from any such canal or ditch, then, in that event, such canal or ditch shall be taxed to the extent of such sale or rental.'

The defendant demurs to the amended complaint, and the objections raised thereto will now be considered.

1. It is first contended that, while the application of the statute relied upon is not in terms confined to cases where water is used exclusively for the irrigation of Idaho lands, such a restricted meaning is strongly implied by the considerations which must have led to its enactment, and in this view I am inclined to concur. There may be room for a difference of opinion as to the wisdom or policy of exempting from taxation canal property of any sort; but there would not seem to be even a semblance of a reason for extending such immunity to works constructed and maintained for the purpose of taking water out of Idaho for use in another state. In cases where the water is used for the irrigation of Idaho lands, it may be persuasively argued that the value of the irrigating system is correctly represented in the enhancement of the value of the lands irrigated therefrom, and that therefore, if such lands are fully assessed, the public revenues are not affected by the exemption of the irrigating canal.

But what can be said in favor of such a policy where the water is used upon lands beyond the reach of the Idaho revenue laws: By permitting its public waters to be carried beyond its borders the state loses one of its most valuable assets, and by clothing the appropriator with the power of eminent domain it enables him wholly to destroy the productive value of such lands as are taken for right of way. To accept the plaintiff's view of the statute is therefore to hold that the state not only intended to permit a nonresident to come within its boundaries, and, without price, appropriate water for use outside the state, and convert productive, revenue-bearing lands into nonproductive rights of way for canals and ditches, but also intended to encourage such an enterprise by exempting from taxation the entire property, including the right of way, which, but for the project, would bear its share of the burden of taxation; and all without any reciprocal advantage or possible benefit accruing to the state directly or indirectly. It is thought that, in the absence of language unequivocally expressing it, an intent so extremely altruistic ought not to be imputed to the Legislature of the state. The truth in all probability is that, in framing and enacting the statutory provision relied upon, the Legislature took no thought of a case where the irrigated lands were outside the state. It was concerned with the taxation and exemption of property subject to its jurisdiction only, and was not providing for a case where a part of the property involved lies beyond its reach. It is a familiar rule that in the construction of statutes such meaning will be given as will best harmonize with the considerations out of which they have sprung and is most likely to effect the object to accomplish which they were enacted. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, par. 73.

'The general language of statutes will be limited to such persons and subjects as it is reasonable to presume the Legislature intended it should apply. Throughout the entire history of English and American law the courts have been ruling that the general words of statutes were to be restrained in import and application whenever the taking of them in a literal sense would lead to absurd and hurtful consequences. ' State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 69 P. 199, 67 L.R.A. 903.

The case of State v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 P. 251,...