Spoklie v. Montana

• Decision Date: 13 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-35857.,03-35857.
• Citation: 411 F.3d 1051
• Parties: Robert SPOKLIE, Individually; Spoklie Enterprises, L.L.C., a Montana Limited Liability Company; Kim J. Kafka, Esq.; Cindy R. Kafka, individually, and as husband and wife, and as members of Diamond K Ranch Enterprises, L.L.C.; Diamond K Ranch Enterprises, LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of MONTANA; State of Montana, Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks; Jeff Hagener, Director of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, in his individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees. Sportsmen for I-143, Montana Wildlife Federation, Intervenor-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1051

411 F.3d 1051

Robert SPOKLIE, Individually; Spoklie Enterprises, L.L.C., a Montana Limited Liability Company; Kim J. Kafka, Esq.; Cindy R. Kafka, individually, and as husband and wife, and as members of Diamond K Ranch Enterprises, L.L.C.; Diamond K Ranch Enterprises, LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of MONTANA; State of Montana, Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks; Jeff Hagener, Director of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, in his individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees Sportsmen for I-143, Montana Wildlife Federation, Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 03-35857.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 1, 2004.

Filed June 13, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John E. Bloomquist and Suzanne Taylor, Doney Crowley Bloomquist UDA, Helena, MT, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert N. Lane, Fish Wildlife & Parks, Helena, MT, Mike McGrath, Office of the Attorney General, Helena, MT, for Defendants-Appellees.

Sarah K. McMillan, Tuholske Law Office, Missoula, MT, for Intervenor-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana; Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-02-00102-SEH.

Before: ALARCON, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Kim J. and Cindy R. Kafka, Diamond K Ranch Enterprises L.L.C., Robert Spoklie, and Spoklie Enterprises L.L.C. challenge a Montana ballot initiative, Proposition I-143, on federal and state constitutional grounds. We affirm the district court's denial of a motion to stay proceedings in the federal court pursuant to Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). We hold that the Kafkas' claims against the State of Montana and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks are precluded by the final judgment previously entered in their parallel state court case. Finally, we affirm the district court's dismissal of all remaining claims.

I. Background

Appellants Kim J. Kafka, Cindy R. Kafka, and Diamond K. Ranch Enterprises (collectively "the Kafkas"), and Robert Spoklie and Spoklie Enterprises (collectively "Spoklie"), formerly owned and operated "alternative livestock" ranches in Montana, on which they raised elk, deer, bighorn sheep, mountain goats, and bison. Montana defines alternative livestock as "privately owned caribou, white-tailed deer, mule deer, elk, moose, antelope, mountain sheep, or mountain goat[s] indigenous to the state of Montana, ... privately owned reindeer, or any other cloven-hoofed ungulate as classified by the department." Mont. Rev.Code § 87-4-406(1). Kim and Cindy Kafka own one alternative livestock ranch, the Diamond K Ranch. Robert Spoklie owns one alternative livestock ranch, Spoklie Enterprises, and is the co-owner of another, Spoklie Elk Ranches. Until the passage of Proposition I-143 ("I-143"), the income from the Kafka and Spoklie ranches came primarily from "fee shooting," a practice by which members of the public, many of them from out of state, paid to shoot a pre-selected animal on the ranch under the supervision of a guide.

In October 1999, an animal on a Montana game farm ranch was diagnosed with chronic wasting disease. Concerned about the risk of the disease spreading among stocks of alternative livestock, the legislature imposed a moratorium on applications for new alternative livestock ranches in May 2000. Meanwhile, opponents of fee shooting collected enough signatures to qualify I-143 for the November 2000 statewide ballot. Montana voters passed I-143 on November 7, 2000. It became effective immediately.

I-143 changed Montana law applicable to alternative livestock ranches in three major ways. First, it prohibited operating an alternative livestock ranch without a license obtained prior to November 7, 2000, and it prohibited the issuance of new licenses. Mont.Code Ann. § 87-4-407(1). Second, it prohibited the transfer of "[an] alternative livestock ranch license for a specific facility." Id. at § 87-4-412(2). Finally, it provided that an alternative livestock licensee "may not allow the shooting of game animals or alternative livestock ... for a fee or other remuneration on an alternative livestock facility." Id. at § 87-4-414(2). However, existing holders of alternative livestock licenses were permitted to "acquire, breed, grow, keep, pursue, handle, harvest, use, sell, or dispose of the alternative livestock and their progeny in any quantity and at any time of year." Id.

Appellants filed several lawsuits challenging I-143 in federal and state court. In February 2001, the Kafkas sued Jeff Hagener, Director of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks ("DFWP"), and Marc Bridges, Executive Officer of the Montana Department of Livestock, in their individual and official capacities, in federal district court. They sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of I-143 on federal and state constitutional grounds. The district court denied the injunction on October 5, 2001. See Kafka v. Hagener, 176 F.Supp.2d 1037 (D.Mont.2001). The Kafkas voluntarily dismissed this suit on November 7, 2001.

On April 8, 2002, the Kafkas sued the State of Montana and DFWP in Montana state court on several of the same federal and state constitutional grounds raised in their federal suit, as well as on several additional federal and state grounds. In late 2002, the state trial court dismissed all claims other than the takings claims under the federal and the state Constitutions. Kafka v. Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, DV-02-059 (October 21, 2002). On February 8, 2005, the state court dismissed the Kafkas' federal and state takings claims. Kafka v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, DV 02-059 (Feb. 8, 2005).

On September 28, 2001, Spoklie sued the DFWP in state court, challenging its interpretation of I-143. The state court granted Spoklie a preliminary injunction, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed. Spoklie v. Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 311 Mont. 427, 56 P.3d 349 (2002). Spoklie then amended his state court complaint to include federal and state constitutional claims. So far as we are aware, no final judgment has been entered in that suit.

On November 6, 2002, the Kafkas and Spoklie filed this action in federal district court against the State of Montana, DFWP, and Jeff Hagener, Director of DFWP, in his individual capacity, challenging I-143 under the federal and state Constitutions. Shortly thereafter, the Kafkas and Spoklie moved to stay their federal action pursuant to the Pullman abstention doctrine, pending resolution of their state-court suits. On December 30, 2002, the district court denied the motion to stay. On September 11, 2003, the district court dismissed appellants' claims in their entirety. They timely appealed.

II. Pullman Abstention

Before reaching the merits, we consider Appellants' argument that the district court should have abstained under Pullman. Abstention under Pullman is "an equitable doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding sensitive federal constitutional questions when state law issues may moot or narrow the constitutional questions." San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir.1998). Pullman abstention is appropriate when: "(1) the federal plaintiff's complaint requires resolution of a sensitive question of federal constitutional law; (2) the constitutional question could be mooted or narrowed by a definitive ruling on the state law issues; and (3) the possibly determinative issue of state law is unclear." Id. Although it is unusual for the party that has chosen the federal forum to invoke the abstention doctrine, no bar exists to either party doing so. Id. at 1105. We review de novo the question of whether the requirements for Pullman abstention are met. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir.2002).

We may make short work of Appellants' argument under Pullman. We hold that the third element of the test, supra, has not been satisfied, which makes it unnecessary to address the first and second elements. When the district court denied the motion to stay under Pullman, the Montana trial court in the Kafkas' case had already ruled adversely on most of their state law claims, and the federal district court in the Kafkas' case had ruled adversely on one of them. Kafka, 176 F.Supp.2d at 1043 (holding that the fee-shooting ban did not implicate any fundamental rights under the Montana Constitution). Further, the Montana Supreme Court in Spoklie's case had already sustained DFWP's interpretation of I-143. See Spoklie, 56 P.3d at 356. Under these circumstances, the district court was entirely justified in concluding that Appellants had not shown that state law was unclear.

III. Preclusion Against the Kafkas

We next consider whether the Kafkas' claims against the State of Montana, DFWP, and Jeff Hagener are barred by claim preclusion. The Kafkas have brought two earlier suits against these defendants, one in state court and one in federal court.

A. The Kafkas' State Court Suit: Preclusion of Claims Against the State of Montana and DFWP

When the district court decided this case, no final judgment had been entered in the Kafkas' state court suit. However, the state trial court has now entered a final judgment dismissing their suit in its entirety. Kafka v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, DV-02-059 (February 8, 2005). In determining the preclusive effect of the Montana judgment, we apply Montana law. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The final judgment of a trial court is entitled to preclusive effect. Hollister v. Forsythe, 277 Mont. 23, 918 P.2d 665, 667 (1996); Meagher County Newlan Creek Water Dist. v. Walter, 169 Mont. 358, 547 P.2d 850, 852 (1976). Under Montana preclusion law, "claims...