Sponsel v. Park County

Decision Date11 January 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-109.,05-109.
Citation126 P.3d 105,2006 WY 6
PartiesMichael SPONSEL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Scott Sponsel; and Kathleen Sponsel, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Justin Mark Anderson; Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. PARK COUNTY, Wyoming; Board of County Commissioners, of the County of Park, State of Wyoming; and Park County Agents and Employees, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Representing Appellants: Richard A. Mincer of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees: Tracy J. Copenhaver and Scott E. Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Copenhaver.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellants, Michael Sponsel, as personal representative of the estate of Michael Scott Sponsel, and Kathleen Sponsel, as personal representative of the estate of Justin Mark Anderson (collectively "the Personal Representatives"), filed governmental claims against Appellee, Park County, and certain of its employees (collectively referred to as Park County), asserting that Park County's negligence in failing to provide adequate signage on County Road 8VC (Clark's Fork Canyon Road) contributed to the deaths of Michael Scott Sponsel and Justin Mark Anderson. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Park County on the basis that it was immune from liability under the terms of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), given the circumstances of this case.1 We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The Personal Representatives pose these issues for our consideration:

Is Park County immune from claims that it breached statutory duties to regulate, warn and guide traffic in substantial compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control devices?

Does Wyoming Statute section 1-39-108 waive immunity only for those enumerated utilities despite the Legislature's use of the word "including" in that statute?

Park County rephrases the issues in these terms:

A. The [Personal Representatives] failed to provide any material facts which fit within the exceptions to immunity under the Governmental Claims Act.

B. The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act's specific grant of immunity for the maintenance and reconstruction of roads provides immunity for Park County.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

[¶ 3] This matter is on appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Park County on its theory that it was immune from liability because of the application of the WGCA. The facts of this case have not been adjudicated, but for purposes of summary judgment we set out all asserted facts in a light most favorable to the Personal Representatives, as required by our applicable standard of review.

[¶ 4] On May 5, 2002, Michael Scott Sponsel (Sponsel) and Justin Mark Anderson (Anderson) died in a one-car crash on Clark's Fork Canyon Road in Park County. The automobile was operated by Amanda DeBerg (DeBerg),2 and she too died in the crash. At the time of the crash DeBerg was not of an age where she was permitted to buy or consume alcoholic beverages.

[¶ 5] Thomas P. and Mary L. Klein, who are not parties to this appeal, are the owners of a business known as the Edelweiss Bar. That business is located on the Clark's Fork Canyon Road. Sponsel, Anderson, and DeBerg spent a part of the night of May 4, 2002, into the early morning of May 5, 2002, drinking alcoholic beverages at the Edelweiss.

[¶ 6] The exact circumstances of the crash are not known. The Personal Representatives aver that DeBerg was driving at the time of the crash, but the two persons who survived the accident indicated that Anderson was driving. What is apparent is that the five occupants of the car left the Edelweiss Bar and drove down the Clark's Fork Canyon Road. That road comes to an abrupt end as it approaches a forest recreation area. The automobile crashed through a barbed wire fence and down into a field strewn with boulders.

[¶ 7] The Personal Representatives contend that there were several negligent acts that contributed to the deaths of Sponsel and Anderson but, for purposes of this appeal, we are concerned only with the Personal Representatives' contention that proper road signage was lacking and that Park County was responsible for providing proper road signage. The specific allegations of the complaint are these:

9. Park County assumed jurisdiction of the Road on or about 27 October 1988 from the State of Wyoming. At that time, the road had a WC-3 barricade across the main roadway and shoulders with a black on yellow left turn arrow mounted on the barricade. This arrow advised of a turn onto an existing forest service trail providing access to a recreation area. There was also a black on yellow left turn arrow with a 15 MPH speed advisory mounted below the arrow located approximately 925 feet in advance of the WC-3 barricade. Upon information and belief, Park County purposely removed these signs and devices at some point after Park County assumed jurisdiction for the Road.

10. Park County had a statutory duty to provide a public service by placing appropriate signage on roadways under its jurisdiction pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-5-113, 31-5-112, and 31-5-108. The signage must conform to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. One of the express purposes of this Legislative mandate is to warn traffic.

11. On 5 May 2004, the only sign in the vicinity of this accident was a "Pavement Ends" sign. A "Pavement Ends" sign does not conform to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for this location. As such, Park County breached its statutory duty to the traveling public, including [Sponsel and Anderson] and the other vehicle occupants.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] When considering a district court's order granting a motion for summary judgment, we review the district court's ruling without according any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Summary judgment is not favored in negligence actions, and in such cases a more exacting scrutiny is applied. However, where a plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, summary judgment is appropriate. The result in this case is controlled by the WGCA, and those statutes establish that immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. Newberry v. Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County, 919 P.2d 141, 144-45 (Wyo.1996).

[¶ 9] In this case, the Personal Representatives ask us to construe a particular provision of the WGCA. The general rules applicable to the construction of statutes guide our resolution of such an issue. In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Statutory construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo. We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. We must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation. Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not fall within its express provisions. Loberg v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo.2004) (citing Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶¶ 40-41, 65 P.3d 720, ¶¶ 40-41 (Wyo.2003)) (internal citations omitted); see also Union Pacific Resources Company v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶¶ 13, 17, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291-93 (Wyo.2004). In addition, we direct our readers' attention to City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104-5 (Wyo.1993) (wherein we construed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108(a)).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 10] We begin our discussion with recognition that the signage maintained by Park County on the Clark's Fork Canyon Road was most likely inadequate and, to the extent signage was present at all, it was misleading. If the resolution of this case were to turn on the status of those facts, summary judgment would most certainly be improper because at a minimum there could be a genuine issue of material fact in this regard. However, this case is not to be decided on the question of whether or not Park County provided inadequate signage, but whether the WGCA provides the Personal Representatives with an exception to the general rule of governmental immunity so that Park County may be held liable for its inaction with respect to road signage. In other words, does the WGCA except Park County's conduct with respect to placing necessary signage on this road from the general rule of immunity.

[¶ 11] The Personal Representatives assert that the circumstances of this case are outside the general rule of immunity provided by the WGCA. Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-39-108(a) (LexisNexis 2005) provides:

(a) A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities and services including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating and ground transportation. [Emphasis added.]

[¶ 12] The Personal Representatives contend that use of the word "including" greatly expands...

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