Spool Stockyards Co. v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PAC. R. CO.

• Citation: 353 F.2d 263
• Decision Date: 10 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 20848.,20848.
• Parties: SPOOL STOCKYARDS COMPANY, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

353 F.2d 263 (1965)

SPOOL STOCKYARDS COMPANY, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 20848.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

November 10, 1965.

A. J. Folley, Amarillo, Tex., Folley, Snodgrass, Calhoun & Kolius, Amarillo, Tex., of counsel, for appellant.

R. A. Wilson, Amarillo, Tex., Joe E. Gracey, Fort Worth, Tex., Thompson, Walker, Smith & Shannon, Fort Worth, Tex., and Underwood, Wilson, Sutton, Heare & Berry, Amarillo, Tex., of counsel, for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENBERRY, District Judge.

CHRISTENBERRY, District Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court recognizing the validity of appellee's title to an easement on certain property and enjoining appellant from interfering with or obstructing appellee's use and possession thereof.

The land involved is a 200-foot strip across Section 124, Block 2, Potter County, Texas, as shown on a survey of Adams, Beaty and Moulton. Until 1958 this constituted part of the main line of appellee, Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter called Rock Island) and its predecessors Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railroad Company and Choctaw, Oklahoma and Texas Railroad (hereinafter called Choctaw). This line ran generally in an easterly and westerly direction from Memphis, Tennessee, to Tucumcari, New Mexico.

In 1958, the enlargement of the Amarillo Air Force Base necessitated the relocation of the main line of the railroad from its then existing location in Section 124 to a strip to the south, the new line still passing over and through Section 124. After the relocation of the main line, the original 200-foot strip became a spur or industrial track. It serves the Air Base and is intended to be used as a lead to other industrial areas or as a location for loading and unloading cars or for car storage.

Appellant, Spool Stockyards Company, contends here, as it did unsuccessfully in the trial court, that the change in use from main line to spur track effectively cancelled Rock Island's easement on the property. Specifically, Spool argues 1) that the original acquisition of the right-of-way by Choctaw in 1903 was for main line purposes only, and that any other use terminates the user's rights; 2) that Choctaw's charter in 1903 did not authorize the company to construct a spur or industrial track, but only a main line; and 3) that in 1903 the laws of the State of Texas did not authorize a commercial railroad such as Choctaw as distinguished from an industrial railroad to construct and operate spur or industrial tracks or to condemn property for that purpose.

In 1903, Choctaw acquired the right-of-way here at issue by condemnation from the then owner of the land J. B. Kerr. Kerr had instituted suit in trespass to try title against Choctaw, and for damages and injunctive relief. Choctaw, having disclaimed any interest in all property except the easement in question, filed a cross action for condemnation of the right-of-way, and prevailed in judgment. It is undisputed that Choctaw then intended to use the right-of-way for main line purposes and that Choctaw and its successors did until 1958 use the right-of-way solely as a main line.

The issue here boils down to what effect, if any, the change of use from main line to spur track had on Rock Island's right to the continued use of the property.

We turn first to Spool's contention that the judgment of the court in the 1903 condemnation suit did not grant to Choctaw the right to use the property for any other purpose than that of operating its main line. The judgment of condemnation awarded to Choctaw "* * * the right of way across the land of plaintiff in controversy as set up and described in Defendant's answer, and here described as follows: (Here follows a description of the land)." The answer to which the court referred disclaimed as to all property "save and except as to an easement therein and a user thereof as long as it maintains its line of railway over and through said section of land." Appellant argues that engrafted on the judgment is the condition that the easement continue only so long as Choctaw or its successor maintain its "line of railway" over and through Section 124.

Appellee insists that the district court was correct in finding that the terms of the judgment of condemnation granting the easement "as set up and described in the defendant's answer" were intended only to limit the easement to right-of-way uses, so that it could not be used for depots, yards or other legitimate railroad purposes. It further insists that even accepting the construction which appellant gives to the judgment of condemnation, the condition that the line of railroad over and through Section 124 be maintained has been and is now being complied with since the new main line, though south of the old line, still passes over and through Section 124.

We conclude from a reading of the judgment in its entirety, as Texas law requires in the interpretation of judgments, that the court in rendering it intended to limit the use of the easement to right-of-way purposes, but not to specifying the precise nature of right-of-way use, as contended by appellant.

The easement was acquired by Choctaw for the purpose of operating a railroad. The change from main line usage to spur created no greater burden than was contemplated when the right-of-way was acquired in 1903. "The owner of land subject to a public easement has no right to insist that the public use remain...