Spowal v. ITW Food Equip. Grp. LLC
Decision Date | 03 May 2013 |
Docket Number | C.A. No. 10–187. |
Citation | 943 F.Supp.2d 550 |
Parties | Cecilia SPOWAL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ITW FOOD EQUIPMENT GROUP LLC, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Carl R. Schiffman Schiffman & Wojdowski, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew H. Cox, Elizabeth B. Wright, Stacey A. Greenwell, Thompson Hine LLP, Cleveland, OH, Kenneth S. Mroz, Swartz Campbell, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.
Presently pending before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant, ITW Food Equipment Group LLC (“ITW FEG”), against the Plaintiff, Cecilia Spowal, who injured her hand while working with a commercial food mixer manufactured by ITW FEG. On August 4, 2010, Ms. Spowal filed a Complaint alleging strict liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Count I), negligence (Count II), and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and/or fitness for a particular use (Count III). [ECF No. 1] Her husband, Joseph Spowal, asserts a loss of consortium claim (Count IV). Id. at ¶¶ 24–25. We have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be granted.
In adjudicating a Motion for Summary Judgment, we apply the well-established legal standard presently set forth in Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(a), pursuant to which summary judgment shall be granted when no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by the substantive law.” Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir.2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A factual dispute is “genuine,” and thus warrants a trial, “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
” Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976)). However, summary judgment must be entered against any party unable to present sufficient evidence in support of an essential element of a claim because “a complete failure of proof concerningan essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are not in dispute.
On August 9, 2008, the Plaintiff, Cecilia Spowal, while working in the bakery at BiLo supermarket in St. Marys, Pennsylvania, injured her hand while operating a large commercial food mixer. The mixer was a Hobart model V–1401, manufactured by the Defendant, ITW FEG, and sold to BiLo Supermarket in 1989. It stands nearly six feet tall and more than two feet wide and encompasses a 140 quart bowl. Its basic parts include a stand, a mixing paddle, and a bowl. In order for the paddle to rotate, the mixer must be turned on. When in use, the mixer's bowl is raised so that the paddle is down inside the bowl while operating. Therefore, the bowl surrounds the paddle and acts as a guard to prevent an operator from inadvertently contacting the paddle. Once turned off, there is a short wind-down time before the paddle comes to a complete stop. There were no warnings or instructions on or around the mixer on the day of the accident.
On the day of her injury, Ms. Spowal had been at work in the bakery department since 5:00 a.m. At about 1:15 p.m., Ms. Spowal was making peanut butter filling for doughnuts and added peanut butter to the mixture already in the bowl and turned on the mixer. After five or six minutes, she turned the mixer off and as the paddle was slowing down but still rotating, she stuck her hand into the mixer and used the top of the paddle to wipe peanut butter off her bare hand. She testified that there were numerous other times when she had wiped something off her hand onto the paddle. Ms. Spowal's hand slipped off the paddle and got stuck between the paddle and the inside of the bowl, causing her to sustain a serious permanent injury to her right hand.
Ms. Spowal testified that she had used the mixer one or two times a day for more than two years prior to the accident and that it was obvious that users should not put their hands in the mixer while the paddle was rotating. However, she testified that she was unaware that the paddles did not stop rotating when the mixer was turned off. BiLo had not given her an instruction manual. Had she read the instruction manual, she would have seen the following warning:
WARNING: MOVING BEATER IN BOWL. KEEP HANDS,
CLOTHING, AND UTENSILS OUT WHILE IN OPERATION.
Plaintiffs' Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 58–2, p. 3, ¶ 2]
The Defendants have submitted an affidavit of William C. Schlieper [ECF No. 54–2], the Director of Product Design Policy for ITW FEG. Mr. Schlieper testified that “[c]ommercial mixers are intended to be used by workers who adhere to safe and sanitary work practices as set forth by the Federal Food & Drug Administration, whose standards prohibit bare hand contact with ready-to-eat foods.” Id. at ¶ 6. Mr. Schlieper testified that Id. at ¶ 4. He also testified that the mixer's design “met all the safety standards set forth by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (“UL”) and NSF International,” the independent entities in the commercial food equipment industry charged with the duty to “evaluate,test, and certify product designs for safety and sanitation.” Id. at ¶ 8.
III. DiscussionA. Applicable Law
At the outset, we note a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Covell v. Bell Sports. Inc., 651 F.3d 357 (3d Cir.2011), in which the court reiterated its holding in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38 (3d Cir.2009), that federal district courts applying Pennsylvania law to products liability cases should look to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.1 “ ‘[I]n the absence of a controlling decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a federal court applying that state's substantive law must predict how Pennsylvania's highest court would decide this case.’ ” Covell, 651 F.3d at 362 ( quoting Berrier, 563 F.3d at 45–46). In making that determination, the court must consider “ ‘relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at hand.’ ” Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir.2009) ( quoting McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir.1980)). Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 2012 WL 5077571 (C.A.3 (Pa.)).
Essentially, the Court of Appeals in Covell predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which abandons the negligence versus strict liability distinction. Broadly speaking, its predecessor, the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies a strict liability standard, making sellers liable “for harm caused to consumers by unreasonably dangerous products, even if the seller exercised reasonable care,” so long as the seller is in the business of selling the product and the product reached the ultimate consumer without substantial change. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. “Section 402A thus creates a strict liability regime by insulating products liability cases from negligence concepts.” Covell, 651 F.3d at 361.
In contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Torts defines a product design as defective when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been avoided if the manufacturer had used a reasonable alternative design. § 2(b). In order to make product design defect determinations under the Restatement (Third), the trier of fact must consider traditional negligence concepts, such as foreseeable risk and reasonable care. Therefore, under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the inquiry focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer, rather than applying a strict liability standard.
As will be explained infra, pertinent to the outcome of the pending Motion is our reliance on the affidavit of William C. Schleiper. We note that the Covell court affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of the seller's compliance with product regulations as evidence of whether or not a product is defective, citing Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2, Comments thereto, and Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 4 ( ). Al...
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