Spradlin v. Primm

Decision Date25 January 2022
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 20-19-DLB-EBA
Parties Lisa SPRADLIN, Plaintiff v. James PRIMM, Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

Ned Pillersdorf, Pillersdorf Law Offices, Ryan D. Mosley, Pillersdorf, DeRossett & Lane, Prestonsburg, KY, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan C. Shaw, Porter Banks Baldwin & Shaw, Paintsville, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David L. Bunning, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant James Primm's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 33). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. (Docs. # 34 and 36). In her Complaint, Plaintiff Spradlin brings several claims against Defendant Primm in both his individual and official capacity. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 51-52). First, Spradlin alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶ 51). Second, Spradlin alleges Kentucky state law causes of action for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶ 52). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED .

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 9, 2019, Plaintiff Lisa Spradlin got into an argument with her then-boyfriend Brian Palmer while the two were intoxicated.1 (Doc. # 1 ¶ 7). Spradlin and Palmer's argument escalated into a physical altercation which caused Palmer's exit to a neighbor's residence to call 911. (Id. ); (see also Docs # 1-1 at 2-6 and 30 at 36).

Officer Primm had previously been dispatched to a domestic violence situation at Palmer's residence between Palmer and Spradlin. (Docs. # 30 at 50 and 32 at 11). On this night, Primm was dispatched to the scene, spoke with Palmer at the neighbor's house, then made his way to Palmer's residence to speak with Spradlin. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 11). Primm spoke to Spradlin about the incident, asking whether Palmer had kicked in a door that Spradlin showed him. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 13 and 1-1 at 9). Primm told Spradlin that Palmer did not want her to "go to jail and stuff," and that Palmer "just wants you out of here ...." (Id. at 10). Primm explained that he knew Spradlin did not reside at Palmer's home, to which Spradlin responded that Palmer had indeed "kicked [her] out." (Id. ). Primm then asked Spradlin if the phone in her hand belonged to Palmer to which she responded affirmatively. (Id. ). After Primm made several requests for Spradlin to hand over Palmer's phone with Spradlin refusing and asking for her own phone, a scuffle occurred between them. (Id. at 10-11); (see also Doc. # 1 ¶ 14). After the scuffle, Primm stated, "you're going to jail if you don't let me have that phone." (Docs. # 1 ¶ 16 and 1-1 at 11).

The altercation continued as Primm yelled at Spradlin to turn around, Spradlin asked about the location of her own cellphone, and Primm commanded Spradlin to release the phone in her possession to him. (Doc. # 1-1 at 11). At this point, Primm shoved Spradlin onto the bed in the bedroom and wrestled with her for the phone, while Spradlin yelled for Primm to "get off of" her and Primm then deployed his taser for the first time. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 17, 1-1 at 12, and 32 at 19). A few seconds later, Primm then deployed his taser again after telling Spradlin to turn over. (Doc. # 1-1 at 12). At some point during this altercation, Officer Primm punched Spradlin in the face for grabbing his taser while he attempted to tase her a second time. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 20 and 1-1 at 13-15, 18). After deploying his taser the second time, Primm shouted repeatedly for Spradlin to "let go" and to "turn around." (Doc. # 1-1 at 12). Then, Spradlin argued with Primm stating that she had not done anything and that she was recording the incident. (Id. ). Primm requested a backup unit. (Id. ).

They continued to argue while Primm directed Spradlin into the living room to wait for an additional officer after they both agreed another officer would handcuff Spradlin. (Docs. # 1-1 at 13-14 and 32 at 33). Spradlin returned to the bedroom to use the adjacent bathroom while Primm told her to get back out. (Doc. # 1-1 at 16-17). Spradlin told Primm to get away from her to which Primm responded, "No, I'm not. I'm standing where I can see you, okay?" (Id. at 17). They proceeded to argue about the previous altercation on the bed and whether it was okay for Primm to punch Spradlin for grabbing his taser. (Id. at 18-20). Primm informed Spradlin that he tried to arrest her for not releasing Palmer's phone and for the alleged domestic violence. (Id. at 20-21).

At this point, Spradlin was unhandcuffed in the bathroom and began using the phone with both hands to take pictures of her face. (Docs. # 1 ¶¶ 36-38, 1-1 at 21, 32 at 40, and 30 at 109). Officer Primm instructed Spradlin not to take photos to which she responded, "no." (Docs. # 1 ¶ 38 and 1-1 at 21). Primm is then heard saying "uh-uh-uh," before tasing Spradlin again from about two feet away. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 38-39, 1-1 at 21, and 30 at 112). After tasing Spradlin, Primm told her that "it's going on again unless you put your hands up." (Doc. #1-1 at 21). Then, Primm handcuffed Spradlin and took her back into the living room to wait for additional law enforcement. (Doc. # 32 at 43).

Sometime after this incident, Spradlin realized that the cellphone in her possession at the time was in fact her own device and not Palmer's phone. (Doc. # 30 at 43). In state court, Spradlin was indicted for assault, domestic violence, theft by unlawful taking, resisting arrest, assault of a police officer, and attempted disarming of a police officer. (Doc. # 30 at 65-66). However, Spradlin was only convicted of resisting arrest, she was acquitted of the remaining charges. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 5 and 30 at 66).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact." Sigler v. American Honda Motor Co. , 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Plant v. Morton Int'l Inc. , 212 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 2000) ). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Following the Court's review of the record, if a "rational factfinder could not find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 154 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1998). Lastly, where an audio recording is present, the Court should view the facts in the light depicted by the recording. Rudlaff v. Gillispie , 791 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 2015) ; see Coble v. City of White House, Tenn. , 634 F.3d 865, 868-69 (6th Cir. 2011).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Excessive Force Claim

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that any "person who, under color of any statute ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." To make out a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law." Robertson v. Lucas , 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014).

Here, Spradlin asserts that her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant Primm. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 51). The Sixth Circuit has long adhered to the view that the Fourth Amendment prohibits excessive force under certain pre-trial circumstances. Hanson v. Madison Cnty. Det. Ctr. , 736 F. App'x 521, 528 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing McDowell v. Rogers , 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) ). "Fourth Amendment protections extend through police booking until the completion of the probable cause hearing." Coley v. Lucas Cnty., Ohio , 799 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2015). Fourteenth Amendment violations occur when the conduct of the law enforcement official shocks the conscience, the conduct is malicious and sadistic in the context of a fluid and dangerous situation, or the officer shows deliberate indifference when there was reasonable opportunity to deliberate before taking action. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the Fourth Amendment governs Spradlin's claim because she was being arrested at the time of the alleged excessive force, she had not even been booked at the time of the incident. See id. ; (see also Doc. # 1); Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (noting that where an excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest, "it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment."). However, Primm has raised the defense of qualified immunity and the Supreme Court has cautioned that "lower courts ‘should think hard, and then think hard again,’ before addressing both qualified immunity and the merits of an underlying constitutional claim." Dist. Of Columbia. v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Camreta v. Greene , 563 U.S. 692, 707, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) ).

1. Official Capacity Claims

"A suit against an individual in his official capacity has been held to be essentially a suit directly against the local government unit and can result in that unit's liability to respond to the injured party for his injuries." Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff , 891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 19...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT