Spratt v. State
| Decision Date | 14 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2020-UP-292 |
| Parties | Eric Antonio Spratt, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2016-001346 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted March 1, 2020
Appeal From York County Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Brianna Lynn Schill, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
Eric Antonio Spratt appeals the denial of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing the PCR court erred in declining to find his sentencing counsel ineffective for failing to argue to the sentencing court on remand that in 1998, South Carolina did not recognize the right to appointed counsel for an individual accused of a misdemeanor that did not result in the immediate deprivation of his liberty. Spratt argues as a result of this failure, any Faretta[1] warnings provided during his 1998 guilty plea to the misdemeanor of possession of crack cocaine would not have informed him that he could have counsel appointed. We affirm in result.
In 1998, Spratt, who was not represented by counsel, pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine (the 1998 Plea). He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and a $5, 000 fine suspended upon three years' probation. The next year Spratt pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. At that time, his probation from the 1998 Plea was revoked for six months, and he was incarcerated, with his probation to continue upon his release.
In 2006, Spratt, who was represented by counsel, was tried in absentia and found guilty of trafficking in ice, crank, or crack cocaine and possession of marijuana (collectively, the 2006 Conviction), and his sentence was sealed. In 2007 Spratt appeared before the sentencing court, and the court unsealed his sentence of thirty years' imprisonment for the 2006 Conviction. Spratt immediately moved for reconsideration of his sentence, arguing the 2006 Conviction should not be treated as a third offense. The sentencing court granted the motion and reduced Spratt's sentence to ten years' imprisonment, finding the 2006 Conviction was Spratt's second offense. The State appealed, and this court reversed and remanded the case to the sentencing court to reevaluate Spratt's sentence after considering evidence regarding whether he waived his right to counsel during the 1998 Plea. See State v. Spratt, 383 S.C. 212, 214, 678 S.E.2d 266, 267 (Ct. App. 2009). Spratt filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with our supreme court, which was granted but ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted. See State v. Spratt, Op. No. 2011-MO-005 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 31, 2011).
A hearing was held consistent with the remand from this court. The sentencing court on remand (the Remand Court) found Spratt failed to meet his burden of proving he was not advised of and did not waive the right to counsel at the 1998 Plea. Thus, the Remand Court used the 1998 Plea to enhance the 2006 Conviction from a second offense to a third offense and sentenced Spratt to twenty-five years' imprisonment with credit for time served. Spratt appealed, and this court affirmed. See State v. Spratt, Op. No. 2013-UP-186 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 8, 2013).
Spratt filed a PCR application, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. A hearing was held, and Spratt argued his sentencing counsel was ineffective because she did not properly present the issue of waiver of counsel to the Remand Court. Specifically, Spratt argued sentencing counsel should have argued that he could not have waived his right to counsel at the 1998 Plea because he did not possess such a right at that time. The PCR court denied Spratt's PCR application by an order of dismissal, which highlighted that the Remand Court specifically found that Spratt was advised of his right to counsel and waived that right prior to accepting the 1998 Plea. The PCR court noted that although appointed counsel may not have been required at the time of the 1998 Plea, nothing prohibited appointing counsel for an indigent defendant. The PCR court also indicated Spratt possessed the right to counsel at the time of the 1998 Plea as a result of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Gideon v. Wainright.[2] Spratt filed a motion to alter or amend the PCR court's order, which the PCR court denied. Spratt then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this court granted by order filed September 10, 2018.
"In PCR actions, this [c]ourt will uphold the lower court's findings if there is any evidence of probative value to support them." Milledge v. State, 422 S.C. 366, 374, 811 S.E.2d 796, 800 (2018). However, this court reviews "questions of law de novo, with no deference to [PCR] courts." Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 180- 81, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 (2018). "Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo." State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602, 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018). "In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his application." Speaks v. State, 377 S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2008).
Spratt argues the PCR court erred in declining to find his sentencing counsel ineffective for failing to argue to the Remand Court that in 1998, South Carolina did not recognize the right of an accused to be represented by appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases that did not result in the immediate deprivation of a person's liberty. Spratt argues as a result of this failure, any Faretta warnings provided during the 1998 Plea to a misdemeanor would not have informed him he could have counsel appointed. We disagree.
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCR applicant must prove "(1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Williams v. State 363 S.C. 341, 343, 611 S.E.2d 232, 233 (2005) (per curiam). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated and at all critical stages." State v. George, 323 S.C. 496, 508, 476 S.E.2d 903, 911 (1996). In Gideon, the Supreme Court noted it had construed the Sixth Amendment "to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived." 372 U.S. at 339-40. The court in Gideon extended that right to indigent defendants in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 340-45. Thus, Gideon established "an affirmative right to counsel in all felony cases." O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997). The Supreme Court "clarified the scope of that right in Argersinger, [3] holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any misdemeanor case 'that actually leads to imprisonment.'" Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661 (2002) (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Downin, 884 F.Supp. 1474, 1477 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (). "To establish a valid waiver of counsel, Faretta requires the accused to be: (1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation." Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423- 24, 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990).
Before Alabama v. Shelton was decided, courts were divided as to whether the appointment of counsel was a constitutional prerequisite to the imposition of a conditional or suspended prison sentence for misdemeanor convictions. 535 U.S. at 657-58. Thus, in Shelton, the Supreme Court clarified the right to counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor and held that when a suspended sentence could result in a defendant's imprisonment, such a sentence cannot be imposed unless the defendant is given the right to counsel. Id. at 657-58. The Supreme Court differentiated that issue from cases in which the sentences imposed "were for felony convictions . . . for which the right to counsel is unquestioned." Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
Spratt cites to Shelton and our supreme court's retroactive application of Shelton in Talley v State[4] to support his argument that his sentencing counsel was deficient because she did not argue to the Remand Court that during the 1998 Plea, he did not have the right to representation by appointed counsel, and thus, any Faretta warnings given at that time would not have adequately explained such a right. However, those cases extended rights already applicable to defendants charged with felonies to those charged with misdemeanors, and at the time of Spratt's 1998 Plea, the offense of possession of crack cocaine was classified as a felony, not a misdemeanor. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(A) (Supp. 1995) ("A...
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