Spratt v. Vannoy
| Decision Date | 04 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-9115 SECTION "F"(4) |
| Parties | JIMMIE SPRATT v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
On June 16, 2020, the undersigned Chief Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 27) recommending dismissal of the remaining exhausted claims in Jimmie Spratt's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as amended (ECF Nos. 1, 24) on January 31, 2020.1 Spratt through counsel filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation.2 On April 1, 2021, the District Judge remanded the matter with the following instructions:
IT IS ORDERED: that the matter is remanded to Magistrate Judge Roby to assess, in a supplemental Report and Recommendation, the merits of the plaintiff's June 25, 2020 objection. In addition to any other analysis she deems pertinent, the magistrate shall (1) consider whether the petitioner's case is materially distinguishable from Dickerson v. Guste, as the petitioner contends at page 6 of his objection, and (2) assess the extent to which the petitioner's case is analogous to Dickey v. Florida, as well as the legal effect of any such similarity. See Obj. at 6-8.
The Court's June 16, 2020, Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 27) is included and adopted as if repeated in full herein and supplemented with the following discussion, findings, and conclusions. For the reasons that follow, and those previously assigned, Spratt's objections should be overruled and his petition dismissed with prejudice.I. Spratt's Speedy Trial Claim is Procedurally Barred
Applying the deferential standards of the AEDPA and appropriate federal law, the Court's June Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 27) recommended that Spratt's free-standing speedy trial claim be dismissed as procedurally barred from federal habeas review because it had been found procedurally defaulted in the state courts' post-conviction review. The Court also assessed whether Spratt proved an excuse to the procedural bar through the recognized doctrines of cause and prejudice and fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Court concluded that Spratt failed to prove cause for his procedural default (leaving no reason to discuss the prejudice factor) or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the claim was not addressed on the merits.
Specific to cause, Spratt asserted that his trial counsel's ineffective assistance caused the default when he failed to file a motion to quash the indictment based on violation of his speedy trial rights. The argument was arguably asserted as a separate claim3 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and review of the claim was exhausted through the state courts as required under Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000). To avoid repetition of the necessary Strickland standards, the Court included the cause for default discussion in its review of Spratt's other ineffective assistance of counsel claims.4
Spratt's arguments were specifically focused on trial counsel's failure to object to the pre-indictment delay between placement of a detainer in 2005 and the 2010 arrest and indictment. He occasionally noted that his trial counsel also was his appellate counsel, and at that stage, also failed to challenge the alleged speedy trial violation. In both the state courts and his federal petition, Spratt also asserted these arguments as a separate ineffective assistance of counsel claim which had been denied as meritless by the state courts under Strickland. The effective assistance of counsel, whether at trial or on appeal, is adjudged under the Strickland standard.5
In the June Report and Recommendation, the undersigned thoroughly discussed and resolved under the doubly deferential AEDPA review, that Spratt had not shown that the state courts' ruling under Strickland was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. To accomplish this task, the Court engaged in a complete review of the record to determine whether Spratt's counsel's failure to file the motion to quash was unreasonable under Strickland's deficient performance prong. This complete review included the historical progress of Spratt's case from the occurrences of the rapes in New Orleans, his conviction for other rapes in Memphis, the discovery of his matching DNA, placement of the detainers, and his eventual arrest, indictment, prosecution, and conviction for the multiple rapes in New Orleans. The assessment of this timeline of events was critical in evaluating the reasonableness of his counsel's performance under professional norms as required under the deferential Strickland standards.
It is disingenuous and a misstatement of the record for Spratt to suggest that this Court limited its review to the post-arrest delays to the exclusion of the pre-indictment delays whenconfirming the state courts' resolve that Spratt's counsel was not ineffective under Strickland. To the contrary, the Court thoroughly discussed the pre-indictment events and alleged delay.
Spratt, however, takes exception to the Court's application of relevant and critical Supreme Court and other federal law to confirm that the pre-indictment, post-detainer delay, in the words of the Supreme Court, were "wholly irrelevant" to assessment of his speedy trial rights. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)). As a result, the state courts' denial of relief was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Having reached that conclusion, the Court also found that, because Spratt had not shown deficient performance by his counsel under Strickland, he also had not established cause for the procedural default of his free-standing and procedurally defaulted speedy trial claim.
To be clear, this Court did not and could not address the merits of Spratt's defaulted speedy trial claim in the June Report and Recommendation. Spratt cannot use his objections to the Court's evaluation of his Strickland claim (and cause for default arguments) as an end-around attempt to have the District Court now consider the merits of his defaulted speedy trial claim. The evaluation of his speedy trial arguments is limited here to the Court's determination and evaluation of his counsel's performance under Strickland and whether it constituted cause for the default.
In summary, to prove cause based on his counsel's assistance, Spratt had to demonstrate that his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to file a motion to quash (or assert the claim on direct appeal). In addressing that argument, the state courts found that Sprat's counsel was not ineffective under Strickland. This federal habeas court had to determine whether that ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. For the following reasons andthose previously assigned in the June Report and Recommendation, Spratt has not met that burden under Strickland or the AEDPA and has not established cause to excuse the default.
To accomplish a full consideration of cause for the default, and any separate ineffective assistance claim, this federal habeas court is bound by the doubly deferential standards AEDPA to consider whether the state courts' denial of relief on Spratt's Strickland claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of the two-prong test in Strickland. Under Strickland, it would not be enough for Spratt to show deficient performance, i.e. that counsel should have filed the motion; he would also have to show prejudice to the outcome of the proceeding, i.e. that but for counsel's deficient performance the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
The Supreme Court has held that, under Strickland's first prong, "[t]he question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). As for prejudice under Strickland, "[t]he petitioner must 'affirmatively prove,' and not just allege, prejudice." Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). This is the critical consideration under Strickland's "but for" prejudice test; this standard requires a "substantial," not just "conceivable," likelihood of a different result. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112.
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not provide (and need not have provided) a detailed statement of its reasons under Strickland, or whether it relied on the deficiency or prejudice prong. Therefore, in the June Report, this Court first reviewed the record to consider whether it wasreasonable performance for Spratt's counsel to have proceeded without filing a motion to quash and the substantial likelihood of prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings as a result to determine under the doubly deferential AEDPA standard whether the denial of relief was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Under that standard, the court gives deference to the reasonableness of the counsel's actions and the reasonableness of the state court's denial of relief under Strickland. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011); Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. This Court reviewed and considered both state and federal law to evaluate counsel's performance.
Turning to the deficiency prong first, the Court considered Spratt's claim that there was a pre-indictment delay violative of his Sixth Amendment federal rights to speedy trial that should have compelled his trial counsel to file the motion to quash. In doing so, the Court's research resolved that there are no cases on the proverbial "all-fours" as Spratt suggests. The Court then relied on...
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