Spratt v. Wall
| Decision Date | 18 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 03-390-M |
| Parties | WESLEY SPRATT, Petitioner, v. ASHBEL T. WALL, et al. Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Before the Court for decision is the State of Rhode Island's Motion to Dismiss Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (ECF No. 60.)1 The State argues that the eight grounds for relief contained in Petitioner Wesley Spratt's habeas petition (the Petition) were either procedurally defaulted or properly rejected by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Id. Mr. Spratt counters that the State's motion should be denied because he presents meritorious claims and triable issues that have not been procedurally defaulted. (ECF Nos. 66, 67-1, 70.) Upon consideration of Mr. Spratt's Petition (ECF No. 57), the Court GRANTS the State's Motion to Dismiss Mr. Spratt's Petition on all grounds.
Mr. Spratt was convicted after a jury trial for first-degree murder, carrying a pistol without a license, and committing a crime of violence with a firearm that resulted in the death of Christopher Naylor, an attendant at a Snow Street parking lot in downtown Providence on December 20, 1995. There is no need to recount the facts here because the facts underlyingMr. Spratt's conviction are well and thoroughly described in the Rhode Island Supreme Court opinion affirming his conviction, State v. Spratt, 742 A.2d 1194 (R.I. 1999) (Spratt I) and in that court's decision affirming the trial court's judgment denying Mr. Spratt's application for state post-conviction relief, Spratt v. State, 41 A.3d 984, 988 (R.I. 2012) (Spratt II). Certain relevant facts from these opinions are set forth below.
On December 20, 1995, Anthony Tortolani was working as an attendant at a parking lot on Weybosset Street in downtown Providence. Two men in the rear of the parking lot caught his attention. He recognized one as Wesley Spratt, a person with whom he had been acquainted. The other man was later identified as Mark Warren.
Mr. Tortolani testified that Mr. Spratt was emotional as he told Mr. Tortolani that he needed money because he had been in an accident while driving someone else's car the previous night. Mr. Spratt admitted that he and Mr. Warren had originally planned to rob Mr. Tortolani but then decided against it because Mr. Tortolani was a friend. Nevertheless, Mr. Spratt confided in Mr. Tortolani that he was definitely going to rob somebody that night, and pulled out a gun to prove his sincerity. When Mr. Spratt asked Mr. Tortolani for money, he gave him a twenty-dollar bill, but Mr. Spratt complained that it was not enough. Mr. Spratt then walked off angrily, in the direction of Snow Street. Mr. Warren followed. After Mr. Spratt left, Mr. Tortolani called the police to report that two men, one of whom was armed, were about to commit a robbery.
Mr. Warren continued to follow Mr. Spratt to a nearby parking lot on Snow Street. About thirty feet from the parking attendant booth, Mr. Warren stopped following him and watched Mr. Spratt approach the booth, enter it, and close the door behind him. Seconds later Mr. Spratt ran out of the booth. Mr. Warren heard moaning and a cry for help from inside thebooth. Mr. Spratt and Mr. Warren ran to their car. Mr. Warren asked Mr. Spratt what had happened in the booth, to which Mr. Spratt remarked, "Don't worry about it." When Mr. Warren questioned him about the screams he heard, Mr. Spratt explained "the guy scuffled" with him.
During these events, Raymond Perrin was cleaning the snow from his car parked in the Snow Street lot. When he heard someone shout, "This man's been shot!," he turned toward the voice and saw a man running away from the attendant's booth. Mr. Perrin saw the profile of the fleeing man's face from roughly fifteen feet away for a period he estimated to be between ten and fifteen seconds. After hearing someone shout something like, "Call an ambulance," Mr. Perrin ran to a nearby building and asked the guard there to call 911. Despite the efforts of medical personnel, the victim died from a shot to his abdomen.
Later that evening, Providence police officers apprehended and arrested Mr. Spratt in response to a police radio broadcast that identified him as a possible suspect in a robbery and shooting in downtown Providence.
A grand jury indicted Mr. Spratt on five counts: murder, robbery in the first degree, larceny of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and commission of a crime of violence when armed with a stolen firearm. After trial in Superior Court, the jury found Mr. Spratt guilty of murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, guilty of first-degree robbery, guilty of carrying a pistol without a license, and guilty of committing a crime of violence while armed with a firearm.2
After receiving the sentence of life imprisonment on the murder convictions, ten years on each weapons offense to run consecutively, and twenty additional years for being adjudged ahabitual offender, Mr. Spratt appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. That court denied Mr. Spratt's appeal from his convictions. Spratt I, 742 A.2d 1194. Mr. Spratt filed a state postconviction petition in March of 2003 and a federal post-conviction petition that same year. During his state petition hearing, Mr. Spratt claimed that the state court lacked jurisdiction and demanded that the Federal District Court hear his arguments. The state court dismissed his petition. The federal court stayed Mr. Spratt's federal petition in March of 2005 because he failed to exhaust his state remedies. Back in Rhode Island Superior Court, Mr. Spratt re-filed his petition, but it was dismissed because he had previously voluntarily dismissed his 2003 application. Mr. Spratt appealed that dismissal; the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the dismissal in June of 2007, and sent the state petition back to Superior Court. He received a postconviction relief hearing in May of 2009 after which his petition was denied. Mr. Spratt then appealed that denial to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. That court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Spratt II, 41 A.3d 984.
His state petition exhausted, Mr. Spratt now turns to this Court for relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, restricts federal court review of state court convictions and sentences. Before a federal court can reach the merits of a habeas claim, the petitioner "must have fairly presented his claims to the state courts and must have exhausted his state court remedies." McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). When a federal court reaches the merits of a habeas claim, the applicable standard of review depends on whether the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits. See, e.g., Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d21, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). Where a claim "was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings," a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's "adjudication of the claim" either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, even though the "AEDPA imposes a requirement of deference to state court decisions, [federal courts] can hardly defer to the state court on an issue that the state court did not address." Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001). Therefore, where the state court did not adjudicate the petitioner's claim on the merits, the federal court's review of that claim is de novo. Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003). Factual determinations made by the state court are presumed to be correct, with the petitioner bearing "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Mr. Spratt's Petition contains eight grounds for relief: 1) the State deliberately withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and coerced Mr. Perrin, the only eyewitness, to commit perjury; 2) the State manufactured evidence and coerced Mr. Warren to commit perjury; 3) the state trial justice failed to properly consider the five factors of witness reliability against the prejudicial effect of suggestive procedure in evaluating Mr. Perrin's testimony; 4) ineffective assistance of counsel; 5) the State was negligent in its pre-trial investigation, specifically in its witness identification procedures; 6) Mr. Perrin's testimony about his identification of the suspect, including the physical description, was unreliable andphysically impossible; 7) Mr. Spratt's sentencing as a Habitual Offender was an abuse of discretion; and 8) the additional twenty consecutive years to his life sentence was unconstitutional.
These three related grounds deal primarily with three sets of withheld arrest photographs of Mr. Spratt ("prior-arrest photographs") and one set of arrest photographs taken the night Mr. Spratt was arrested ("arrest photographs"), five or six additional profile photographs ("alleged additional profile photographs"), Mr. Perrin's allegedly orchestrated courthouse identification of Mr. Spratt, and his subsequent testimony. In Grounds One, Three and Five, Mr. Spratt alleges Brady violations and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, asserting that the State 1) deliberately withheld material and exculpatory evidence, 2)...
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