Spreader Specialists, Inc. v. Monroc, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 16565,16565 |
| Citation | 114 Idaho 15,752 P.2d 617 |
| Parties | SPREADER SPECIALISTS, INC. and Spreader, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MONROC, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
John R. Goodell, Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Chartered, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Richard T. St. Clair, St. Clair, Hiller, Wood, McGrath, St. Clair & Baker, Idaho Falls, for defendant-respondent.
This is a tort case involving damages to a commercial motor vehicle. The damage was inflicted when a cement mixer owned by Monroc, Inc., entered a highway construction area at excessive speed and struck an oil-spreading truck owned by Spreader Specialists, Inc. Monroc ultimately admitted liability. The issue of compensation was tried to a jury. Not satisfied with the judgment entered on the verdict, Spreader has appealed. We are presented with three questions: (1) whether the trial judge identified the proper standard for determining the measure of damages to a repairable commercial vehicle; (2) whether the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury that interest charges on a loan to finance repairs were recoverable; and (3) whether the judge properly allocated costs and attorney fees. In addition we address a question raised by Monroc concerning the timeliness of this appeal. For reasons explained below, we vacate the judgment and remand the case.
The facts are largely undisputed. The Spreader vehicle was struck while performing road repair work near Island Park, Idaho, in 1984. Following the accident, the truck was towed to Spreader's shop in Utah, where it was eventually repaired. To finance the repairs, Spreader obtained a commercial loan. Spreader then sued Monroc, claiming three items of damage: the cost of repairs, the loss of use of the vehicle during the remainder of the 1984 construction season, and towing expenses. Spreader subsequently sought to amend its complaint by adding a claim for interest charges on the loan. The court denied the motion to amend, reasoning that interest of this type was akin to prejudgment interest and, therefore, would not be recoverable in a tort case. Before trial, Spreader moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The motion was denied; however, shortly thereafter, Monroc admitted liability and made a settlement offer of $45,000 under I.R.C.P. 68. Spreader rejected the offer and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages.
The following evidence was uncontradicted. The oil-spreading truck had been specially manufactured according to certain specifications. The collision disabled the truck for the remainder of the 1984 highway construction season. Spreader undertook to restore its fleet to full operating capacity prior to the 1985 season. Having attempted unsuccessfully to locate a used replacement vehicle, and being uncertain whether a new vehicle would be available before the 1985 season began, Spreader elected to repair the damaged vehicle. The repair bill totalled $40,114.00. Spreader borrowed money to accomplish this task. The parties stipulated that interest charges on the loan amounted to $4,451.93 at the time of trial. Spreader also presented expert testimony that, even when repaired, the vehicle's market value had been diminished by the accident. Both sides also presented testimony regarding the market value of the vehicle before and after the accident, had it not been repaired.
At the close of the evidence, Spreader requested instructions authorizing the jury to award the actual cost of repairs plus the diminution in value of the repaired truck as well as lost profits and towing costs. The trial judge did not adopt Spreader's instructions. Rather, he instructed the jury to award the lesser of (a) the cost of repairs plus any diminution in the value of the truck as repaired, or (b) the difference in value of the truck before and after the accident without repairs. In either event, the jury was instructed to award damages for loss of use of the truck during a period reasonably necessary to repair or replace it.
In response to interrogatories on a special verdict form, the jury determined that the pre-accident value of the vehicle was $73,000.00 and that its unrepaired, post-accident value was $38,500.00--a difference of $34,500.00. The jury accepted Spreader's proof that the repairs cost $40,414.00. The jury further found that the value of the vehicle had been diminished, despite the repairs, by $3,586.00. Thus, the combined cost of repairs and diminution of value amounted to $44,000.00. Finally, the jury accepted Spreader's claim of $8,000.00 for loss of use during the remainder of the 1984 season and the claim of $1,458.80 in towing costs. Based on these findings, the judge awarded Spreader the difference between the value of the vehicle before the accident and its value immediately thereafter ($34,500.00), plus the lost profits ($8,000.00) and towing expenses ($1,458.80). The court also awarded Spreader $850.95 in other expenses. Judgment was entered for $44,809.75. 1
Both parties challenged the judgment with post-trial motions. In an order disposing of these motions, the trial judge denied every challenge to the judgment and denied Spreader's motion for attorney fees. Finally, because the recovery of $44,809.75 was less than Monroc's pretrial settlement offer of $45,000, the judge concluded that Spreader was not the prevailing party. He granted costs of $2,179.99 to Monroc, treating this award as an offset against Spreader's recovery. He then entered an "amended judgment" for $42,629.76. From this judgment Spreader has appealed.
At the outset, we consider a jurisdictional argument interposed by Monroc. Monroc asserts that Spreader's notice of appeal was not timely filed and must be dismissed pursuant to I.A.R. 21. Monroc initially made this argument by way of a motion to dismiss, filed in the Supreme Court. The motion was denied without explanation. After the case was assigned to us, Monroc urged reconsideration of that ruling.
Subject to the limitations of Rule 11(a)(2), I.R.C.P., a party may seek reconsideration of an adverse ruling on a motion. Solely for the sake of discussion today, we will assume that this right also exists during an appeal and that it is unaffected by an intervening assignment of the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals. As we shall see, however, our analysis of Monroc's motion to dismiss leads us to the same conclusion reached by the Supreme Court.
It is undisputed that Spreader filed this appeal more than 42 days after the original judgment; indeed, the appeal was filed more than 42 days after the court ruled on the post-trial motions. However, the appeal was filed within 42 days of the entry of the "amended judgment." This judgment differed from the original judgment only in that it reflected an offset for costs awarded to Monroc. Because the time for filing an appeal is not extended by the taxing of costs, Monroc argues that the 42-day time period began to run from the trial court's ruling on the post-trial motions rather than from the entry of the "amended judgment."
There is some authority to support Monroc's position. We have held that where a court enters a judgment containing blank spaces for the awards of costs and attorney fees, the time for appeal begins to run at that point and is not extended by the subsequent entry of another judgment in which the blanks have been completed. State ex rel. Moore v. Lawson, 105 Idaho 164, 667 P.2d 267 (Ct.App.1983). Moreover, it is well established that a trial court cannot restart the time for appeal by the mere expedient of entering a second judgment identical to the first. Annot., Power of Trial Court Indirectly to Extend Time for Appeal, 89 A.L.R. 941 (1934), supplemented 149 A.L.R. 740 (1944).
However, this is not a case in which blank spaces were merely completed, nor is it a case where a trial court attempted to extend the time for appeal after the original time had expired. Rather, the "amended judgment" in this case altered the figure previously adjudged as Spreader's recovery. The "amended judgment" also contained the following order:
[T]he clerk shall forthwith enter this Judgment pursuant to rule 58, I.R.C.P., which shall constitute the Final Judgment of the Court upon which interest may accrue, execution may issue, and appeals may be taken pursuant to applicable law.
It is evident from this language that the trial court had treated the original judgment as an interim document, reserving all characteristics of finality, such as accrual of interest and availability of execution, to the "amended judgment." The trial court's procedure was irregular and not to be encouraged. However, we think it would be palpably unjust to dismiss as untimely an appeal taken within 42 days of the instrument described by the trial court as its final judgment in the case. Accordingly, we adhere to the Supreme Court's denial of Monroc's motion to dismiss. We now turn to the merits of the appeal.
We begin with the proper measure of recovery for the damage to Spreader's vehicle. Spreader contends that the trial court erred in failing to award the actual cost of repairs plus the diminution in value to the vehicle as repaired. 2 As discussed above, the trial judge instructed the jury to calculate this figure and a figure corresponding to the difference between the market value of the truck before the accident and immediately thereafter. The judge then awarded the lesser sum. In this case, as we have seen, the cost of repairs substantially exceeded the diminution in market value without repairs.
The general rule of damages to personal property in collision cases has been stated succinctly by Professor McCormick in his leading treatise on the law of damages:
When personal property is wrongfully injured--
(a) The normal standard of recovery is the...
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