Spreitz v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 04 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-99006,09-99006 |
| Citation | 916 F.3d 1262 |
| Parties | Christopher J. SPREITZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
In 1994, an Arizona jury convicted Christopher J. Spreitz ("Spreitz") of first-degree murder. The victim was thirty-nine year old Ruby Reid ("Reid"). Finding that the cruelty of the murder outweighed any mitigating circumstances, the trial judge sentenced Spreitz to death. Spreitz appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and sentence. We affirm the district court’s judgment with respect to Spreitz’s conviction,1 and reverse with respect to his sentence.2
In challenging his sentence, Spreitz argues that the Arizona Supreme Court unconstitutionally affirmed his death sentence by failing to consider mitigating evidence of his longstanding alcohol and substance abuse. He contends that the state court refused to consider, as a matter of law, this evidence in mitigation because he did not establish a causal connection between the crime and his long-term alcohol and substance abuse. In Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the Supreme Court held that under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a sentencer in a capital case may not "refuse to consider, as a matter of law , any relevant mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant. Id. at 114, 102 S.Ct. 869. Although a sentencer "may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence ... they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration." Id. at 114–15, 102 S.Ct. 869 (footnote omitted). In interpreting and applying Eddings , the Supreme Court has explained that "full consideration of evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is essential if the [sentencer] is to give a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime." Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I ), 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court has been clear: requiring a defendant to prove a causal nexus between his mitigating evidence and the crime is "a test we never countenanced and now have unequivocally rejected." Smith v. Texas , 543 U.S. 37, 45, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004) (per curiam).
At the time of Spreitz’s sentencing, Arizona Revised Statute Annotated § 13-703(G) (1994)3 listed five mitigating factors, and Arizona case law additionally recognized nonstatutory mitigating factors, including, for example, a defendant’s difficult family background or mental condition not severe enough to qualify as a statutory mitigating factor. In an en banc decision of our court, McKinney v. Ryan , 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015), cert denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 39, 196 L.Ed.2d 197 (2016) (mem), we explained:
For a period of a little over 15 years in capital cases, in clear violation of Eddings , the Supreme Court of Arizona articulated and applied a "causal nexus" test for nonstatutory mitigation that forbade as a matter of law giving weight to mitigating evidence, such as family background or mental condition, unless the background or mental condition was causally connected to the crime.
Id. at 802. As a result, we held in McKinney that "[a]pplication of the causal nexus test to nonstatutory mitigating factors violated Eddings , for it resulted in Arizona courts being entirely forbidden, as a matter of state law, to treat as a mitigating factor a family background or a mental condition that was not causally connected to a defendant’s crime." Id. Spreitz argues that the Arizona Supreme Court applied its causal nexus test in his case, refusing to consider evidence of his long-term substance and alcohol abuse because he did not adequately establish a causal connection between that history of abuse and his crime.
As in McKinney , "the precise question before us is whether the Arizona Supreme Court applied its unconstitutional causal nexus test in affirming [Spreitz]’s death sentence on de novo review."4 Id. at 804 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it did.
On May 25, 1989, the police arrested Spreitz after discovering Ruby Reid’s body in the desert. Upon questioning, Spreitz confessed to murdering Reid. We briefly provide the facts of the murder.
On the evening of May 18, after drinking heavily and being rejected by the woman he was dating, Spreitz "picked up" Reid at a convenience store. State v. Spreitz (Spreitz I ), 190 Ariz. 129, 945 P.2d 1260, 1264–65 (1997).5 In his confession, Spreitz claimed that Reid voluntarily left with him and that his understanding was that they would have sex later that evening. Id. at 1265. Spreitz further claimed that he drove her out to the desert, where Reid decided she no longer wanted to have sex. Id. The two fought as a result. Id. Spreitz explained that Reid slapped him and that he responded by punching her in the mouth. Id. Spreitz then sexually assaulted Reid—"remov[ing] her clothing and ha[ving] vaginal intercourse with her." Id. Spreitz also recounted that he hit Reid in the head multiple times with a rock "to make her stop yelling." Id. He explained that he left Reid without knowing whether she was alive or dead. Id.
Shortly after leaving Reid in the desert, Spreitz was stopped by a Tucson police department officer. Id. at 1264. The officer observed that Spreitz had a ripped shirt, smelled of feces, and appeared to be covered in blood and fecal matter. Id. In addition, when detectives later searched Spreitz’s car, they found blood spatter in the trunk, some of which was inconsistent with Spreitz’s blood characteristics. Id. at 1265.
On Monday morning, May 22, Reid’s naked and decomposing body was discovered on the outskirts of Tucson. Id. At trial, "the medical examiner testified that, due to the advanced state of decomposition, he could not determine the full extent and nature of [Reid]’s injuries." Id. Even so, he was able to observe "bruising on the legs, arms, and back; bruising and abrasions on the buttocks
; several broken ribs; internal bleeding; a broken jaw ; several head lacerations; and a skull fracture where the skull had been ‘shoved in.’ " Id. The medical examiner concluded that Reid had been killed by "blunt-force trauma to the head." Id.
In addition to finding Reid’s body Id. A few days later, police arrested Spreitz. Id.
On June 2, 1989, a grand jury indicted Spreitz for first-degree murder, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1105, 13-703 ; sexual assault, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-406(A) & (B) ; and kidnapping, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-304(A)(3) & (B). Spreitz I , 945 P.2d at 1265. After five years of pre-trial proceedings mostly regarding the admissibility of DNA evidence, a seven-day jury trial began on August 9, 1994. Id. at 1266. After the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts: first-degree murder (both premeditated and felony murder), sexual assault, and kidnapping. Id .
Prior to both his aggravation-mitigation and sentencing hearings before the trial judge, Spreitz submitted evidence and a memorandum in support of certain mitigating circumstances. As noted earlier, at the time of Spreitz’s sentencing, Arizona’s death penalty statutes provided a list of five specific mitigating factors; Arizona case law recognized nonstatutory mitigating factors as well. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) ; McKinney , 813 F.3d at 802. Spreitz argued as nonstatutory mitigating factors: "(1) his dysfunctional family life and lack of socialization; (2) a history of alcohol and drug abuse; (3) his expressions of remorse; [ (4) ] his good behavior while incarcerated; [ (5) ] his lack of adult convictions; [and (6) ] no prior record of violent tendencies." Spreitz I , 945 P.2d at 1279. Spreitz argued as statutory mitigating factors: (1) his age at the time of the murder, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G)(5), and (2) that his "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired [due to alcohol use], but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution," id. § 13-703(G)(1) ; see Spreitz I , 945 P.2d at 1279.
Spreitz provided evidence of and argued for all the foregoing mitigating circumstances but focused heavily on a combination of his relationship with his mother and his long history of alcohol and substance abuse. To that end, Spreitz submitted a written report by and presented testimony from an examining psychologist, Dr. Todd Flynn, Ph.D. After conducting interviews and research, Dr. Flynn concluded that Spreitz’s longstanding alcohol and substance abuse should be considered as both a statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factor. In his report, which was admitted into evidence at the aggravation and mitigation hearing, Dr. Flynn repeatedly emphasized Spreitz’s longstanding substance abuse6 :
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