Spreitz v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 12 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 02-121-TUC-JMR.,CV 02-121-TUC-JMR. |
| Citation | 617 F.Supp.2d 887 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
| Parties | Christopher J. SPREITZ, Petitioner, v. Charles L. RYAN, et al.,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Respondents. |
Sean H. Bruner, Attorney at Law, Susan Bryson Fox, Advocates Law Group LLP, Tucson, AZ, for Petitioner.
Donna Jeanne Lam, Office of The Attorney General, Tucson, AZ, for Respondents.
Christopher J. Spreitz (Petitioner) has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced to death in violation of the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 38.)2 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court determines that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
In the early morning hours of May 19, 1989, Petitioner was stopped by police because his car was smoking and leaking oil.3 His arms, legs, and shirt were smeared with blood and fecal matter, and he claimed he had been in a fight with another man. The officers asked Petitioner to accompany them to the scene of the fight. Petitioner agreed, but upon arrival there was no sign a fight had taken place. Another officer was brought in to take pictures of Petitioner, who consented to being photographed. Although the officers could smell beer on Petitioner's breath, they did not believe he was impaired and released him with a repair order for his car.
Several days later, the naked and decomposing body of Ruby Reid was found in the desert on the outskirts of Tucson. At the scene, police officers observed tire tracks, oil stains, feces-stained pants, and a torn brassiere. Two blood-stained rocks lay next to the body.
Two days after the body's discovery, during a chance encounter at the police station, the investigating detective discussed the Reid case with the officer who had taken photographs of Petitioner during the traffic stop. Believing Petitioner may have been involved with Reid's death, the police executed an arrest warrant for outstanding traffic citations. While in custody, Petitioner confessed to killing Reid.
Petitioner was indicted in June 1989 for first degree murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping. Due to extensive pretrial litigation concerning admissibility of DNA evidence, trial did not commence until August 1994. During this lengthy period, Petitioner was represented by three attorneys: William G. Lane, from indictment through November 1991; M. Josephine Sotelo, a DNA specialist, from May 1991 to June 1994, when the trial court barred use of DNA evidence as a discovery sanction; and Marshall Tandy, from November 1991 through sentencing. A jury convicted Petitioner on all counts in August 1994.4 During the sentencing hearing, Petitioner apologized for killing Reid. (RT 12/21/94 at 12.) The trial judge sentenced him to death on the murder conviction.
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 945 P.2d 1260 (1997). On March 28, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the PCR court denied without a hearing. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the PCR court's ruling that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were precluded but affirmed the court's alternative ruling that the claims lacked merit. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 39 P.3d 525 (2002).
Petitioner then initiated the instant habeas proceedings and filed an amended petition raising numerous claims for relief.5 (Dkt. 38.) He subsequently moved for an evidentiary hearing with respect to his IAC claims. The Court denied the motion without prejudice because Petitioner had not identified which claims required a hearing and had failed to explain what facts needed further development or how such facts would entitle him to relief. (Dkt. 56 at 4.) Petitioner filed a renewed motion for evidentiary development. (Dkt. 74.) The Court denied this motion as well, concluding that Petitioner had failed to diligently seek development of his IAC claims in state court. (Dkt. 89 at 37.) The Court also dismissed several of the claims on the merits. (Id. at 38.) This order addresses Petitioner's remaining habeas claims.
A writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present" his claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
A claim is "fairly presented" if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). Unless the petitioner clearly alerts the state court that he is alleging a specific federal constitutional violation, he has not fairly presented the claim. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir.2004). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1999), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc).
In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and post-conviction relief proceedings. Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition or not presented in a timely manner. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1(d)(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).
A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in state court and "the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir.1998) (). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is "technically" exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996).
Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
Ordinarily, "cause" to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Id. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Objective factors which constitute cause include interference by officials which makes compliance with the state's procedural rule impracticable, a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). "Prejudice" is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional error or violation. Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir.1998). To establish prejudice resulting from a procedural default, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing not merely that the errors at his trial constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).
Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim "adjudicated on the merits" by the state court unless that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined...
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